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The following study examines the relationship between competing national 
interests and the implementation of multilateral diplomacy as characterized by the United 
Nations.  Although primary attention focuses on the events Suez Crisis of 1956, the scope 
of work analyzes this dichotomy from the Suez Canal’s construction to the post-Suez era 
of the 1960s.  Adopting a more comprehensive approach to understanding the crisis and 
its impact on international diplomacy provides adds a new and timely perspective to 
scope of the crisis and the complexities of conflict resolution. 
In many respects, the diplomatic maneuvering of the nineteenth century remained 
a constant in diplomatic exchange leading up to the Suez crisis.  As the canal’s architect, 
Ferdinand de Lesseps marginalized international differences in order to win support for 
the fulfillment his own ambitions.  De Lesseps’s tactics gained in popularity throughout 
the remainder of the century as British politicians and early Zionists presented their 
particular interests as broader, universal goals.  This became the operational model for 
many twentieth century leaders and diplomats.  Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, 
President Eisenhower, and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles used similar 
methods to in order to enlist support for their Cold War agenda.  Egyptian Prime Minster 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and other nationalists usurped pluralistic initiatives to serve state 
interests.  Virtually all of these efforts heightened international tensions within and 
between blocs of interests. 
Concomitant with these developments, some members of the international 
community engaged in more genuine multilateral diplomatic pursuits.  International civil 
servants inside the United Nations, including UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, 
advanced ideas that placed the international interest above the agenda of any single 
country.  During the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Lebanon Crisis of 1958, and the Congo 
Crisis of 1960, this diplomatic alternative helped defused tensions. 
Rather than encourage independent multilateralism, national leaders established 
closer relations with non-government organizations through which they could continue to 
exercise influence without sacrificing control.  After the Suez crisis, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), and the European Economic Community (EEC) all sought greater conformity.  
The sense of interdependency was lost. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A multitude of masters is no good thing; let there be one master, one king . . . . 
 
  --Agamemnon from The Iliad 
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Introduction 
 
At various stages throughout international history, competing interests have 
exerted themselves to influence a larger whole.  World leaders during the Suez Crisis of 
1956 and many historians since then have examined the event as a competition between 
various spheres of influence or conflicting perspectives within like-minded blocs.  While 
insightful, these arguments often overshadow the United Nations and the pivotal role it 
has played in quarantining crisis.  The following study probes this relationship by 
investigating the effects of intolerant interests throughout the history of the Suez Canal, 
how the United Nations reversed these effects ever so briefly during the height of the 
Suez crisis in 1956, and the return to the status quo ante bellum as national leaders 
created new institutions supplanting the UN‘s success.  Understanding the Suez crisis 
from this perspective demonstrates the successful interaction of viewpoints inside the 
United Nations that recognized the need for more inclusive diplomacy, how multilateral 
dialogue resolved this particular conflict more effectively than traditional methods, and 
the various lengths to which national leaders attempted to monopolize multilateral 
diplomacy. 
As United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld dedicated himself to 
transforming the United Nations into an independent institution responsible for providing 
an internationalist alternative in the mediation of crises.  He stressed the monumental 
discipline international civil servants required in order to maintain their objective 
integrity.  During a lecture at Oxford University in 1961, Hammarskjöld remarked that 
the international civil servant must remain cognizant of his or her ―sympathies‖ and must 
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prevent them from influencing the individual‘s actions.  Should conflict arise from up-
holding this perspective, Hammarskjöld argued, then it would be the result of adhering to 
neutrality rather than deviating from it.
1
  The organization‘s success lay in the ability of 
its member states to abide by similar principles.  When he became UN Secretary General 
in 1953, Hammarskjöld called for member states to subordinate national interests to 
broader international interests.
2
  Operating from this premise required that vigilant 
attention be paid to policing one‘s own interests and segregating them from influencing 
the interests of the international community. 
Instead of embracing this viable alternative, national leaders sponsored initiatives 
portraying national interests as emblematic of a broader, multilateral agenda.  As 
historian A.G. Hopkins proclaims, ―Where international themes are recognized, they are 
often treated as spare parts that have to be bolted on to the national story.‖  This leads to 
―nationalizing internationalism, by treating the wider world as an extension of narrower 
national interests.‖3  Many policy-makers from around the globe operated from this 
presupposition.  As John Ikenberry contends in his book, After Victory, America‘s post-
World War II policy-makers imbued multilateralism with an understanding of ―the 
American experience and a thoroughgoing understanding of history, economics, and the 
sources of political order.‖4 
                                               
1 Taken from W.H. Auden, ―Forward,‖ in Dag Hammarskjöld, Markings, trans. Leif Sjöberg and 
W.H.Auden (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. xix. 
2 Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, ―Annual Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Work of the Organization: 1 July 1952 – 30 June 1953,‖ 15 July 1953, Doc. A/2404, p. xi. 
3 A.G. Hopkins, ―The History of Globalization—and the Globalization of History?,‖ in Globalization in 
World History, ed. A.G. Hopkins (New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 2002), p. 16. 
4 John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major 
Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 171-172.  More specifically, American 
officials labored to construct a world order that fulfilled the country‘s national security interests, free 
market principles, and ardent anti-communist sentiments.  As historian Melvyn Leffler put it, American 
hegemony after WWII made many Americans want to ―refashion the world in America‘s image.‖ Melvyn 
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National leaders from around the globe viewed international affairs from a similar 
self-interested perspective.  British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and several of his 
advisers maintained intrusive imperialist policies in the Middle East that preceded his 
administration by roughly seventy-five years.
5
  Such intransigence stemmed from the 
colonial possessions both British and French officials considered essential for economic 
recovery following World War II.  Meanwhile, emerging nationalists, such as Egyptian 
Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, extended influence by nationalizing domestic 
institutions and industries while simultaneously attempting to monopolize pan-Arab 
organizations including the Arab League.  During the Suez crisis, Israeli Prime Minster 
David Ben-Gurion took a hard-line Zionist approach as adamant in its stance over the 
Sinai region as Nasser‘s pan-Arab nationalism. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 3.  See also John Ikenberry, ―Multilateralism and U.S. 
Grand Strategy,‖ in Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick 
and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 121.  For America‘s specific 
application of this mentality to the Middle East, see Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United 
States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 
3.  Michelle Mart‘s wonderful assessment of America‘s equating Israel‘s situation in the 1950s to that of 
the Puritan‘s plight in the New World epitomizes Leffler‘s point.  See Michelle Mart, Eye on Israel: How 
the United Sates Came to View the Jewish State as an Ally (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2006), p. 60.  See also David Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United Sates and Right-
wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 3-5; 
and David Reynolds, ―American Globalism: Mass, Motion, and the Multiplier Effect,‖ in Globalization in 
World History, p. 253.  See also Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding 
Globalization (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), pp. 7-11. 
5 Anthony Nutting makes the articulate argument that the Suez Crisis developed in part over the clash 
between Britain‘s need to control Egypt and its compliance with allies to support Israel‘s existence.  
Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1966), pp. 9-
11.  Peter Lyon reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of Britain‘s Commonwealth Relations Office 
(CRO) during the 1950s.  Lyon‘s suggests that British policy-makers expected greater loyalty with regard 
to the Commonwealth in exchange for greater independence along the periphery.  See Peter Lyon, ―The 
Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis,‖ in Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, ed. William Roger 
Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 262. 
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In many respects, these leaders simply wished to create the best circumstances for 
fulfilling their respective national interests.  These motives are understandable and 
continue to dominate the scope and scholarship of international relations.  The competing 
national interests involved in the Suez crisis have been thoroughly researched and 
analyzed.  Peter Hahn‘s investigation of U.S., British, and Egyptian relations addresses 
the factors and personalities that directed U.S. foreign policy making in the Middle East 
during the first decade of the Cold War.  Hahn argues that the Eisenhower 
administration‘s Cold War focus was responsible for failures in U.S. foreign policy in the 
region.
6
  In her book Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy, Diane 
Kunz discusses the interconnectivity between ―guns and butter‖ and uses various events 
throughout the Cold War, including the Suez crisis, as case studies.  With regard to 
economic policies, Kunz concludes that British and Israeli economies were particularly 
susceptible to U.S. sanctions while the Egyptian economy was ―totally immune.‖  The 
successful resolution of the crisis, and the perceived role the U.S. played in it, left 
Eisenhower‘s successors and their fellow Americans inflating the strategic value of 
economic sanctions.  As Kunz put it, ―Sanctions appeared to offer all the benefits of 
military action with none of the disadvantages.‖7  Although Hahn and Kunz analyze 
different aspects of the Suez crisis, both scholars agree that, the Cold War policies 
                                               
6 Peter Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the 
Early Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 3-5, 246-247. 
7 Diane Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York: The Free Press, 
1997), pp. 5 and 92-93. 
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initiated by the U.S. government bare some of the responsibility for the escalation of the 
Suez crisis. 
What has received less attention is the repeated efforts made by these competing 
national interest and their attempts to represent a broader, international interest as it 
relates directly to the Suez crisis.  The prevailing context in which the Suez crisis 
occurred was one where national leaders interchanged their specific national agendas 
with international peace and security.  As John Ikenberry points out in his study of the 
U.S.‘s relationship to multilateralism, ―institution building‖ has served as a cornerstone in 
U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy-making of the twentieth century.  Ikenberry 
concludes that U.S. policymakers understood the benefits of limiting their own ―policy 
autonomy,‖ that membership in international organizations required, in order to ―[lock] 
other states into enduring policy positions.‖8  The underlying assumption, as described 
earlier, is that the ―other states‖ must adhere to the U.S.‘s perspective of multilateralism. 
When states or organizations strayed from this underlying assumption, U.S. 
policymakers reacted with considerable ambivalence, if not outright condemnation.  
Given this highly-conditional context, U.S. foreign policy has worked at cross purposes.  
As Stewart Patrick, Research Associate at New York University, surmised, ―the [U.S.] 
has been the world‘s leading champion of multilateral cooperation and, paradoxically, 
one of the greatest impediments to such cooperation.‖9  The Suez Crisis of 1956 exposed 
this paradox not only with regard to U.S. policymakers, but also regarding the 
policymakers of numerous other countries. 
                                               
8 Ikenberry, ―Multilateralism and U.S. Grand Strategy,‖ p. 127. 
9 Stewart Patrick, ―Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of U.S. 
Ambivalence,‖ in Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, eds. Stewart Patrick 
and Shepard Forman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 7. 
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The divide emerging during the Suez crisis, between Hammarskjöld‘s 
internationalist orientation and the dominant interests of particular national leaders, raises 
provocative questions that deserve close attention.  Placed within an international context 
where national governments advertised their own brands of multilateralism, how could 
Hammarskjöld and the United Nations play such an effective role in crisis resolution?  
What were the competing visions of multilateral diplomacy and how convincing were 
they in the eyes of the international community?  What is the history behind these views 
as they relate to the Suez crisis?  What are the lasting effects of the Suez crisis as seen 
from this internationalist perspective?  These are some of the more pressing questions 
that this examination addresses. 
Attention to conformity, as expressed in matters of national security, wreaked 
havoc with more popular matters promoting international opinion.  After 1945, world 
leaders adopted policies that desperately tried to disguise internationally unpopular 
national agendas with internationally popular notions of interdependency.  The Suez 
crisis reflected this strategy.  Writing in 1961, historian Daniel Boorstin described the 
phenomenon as advancing a particular nation‘s ―‗prestige‘‖ by making the country‘s 
worldview palpable to others.
10
  For example, British officials adjusted their post-1945 
colonial policy-making to convey ―a benign imperial image [to] assuage the latent forces 
of anti-imperial opinion.‖11  Clearly, such an approach hoped to undermine anti-imperial 
                                               
10 Daniel Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 
25th Anniversary ed., p. 246.  Other scholars interpret have commented on this subject matter in a variety of 
ways.  David Halberstam notes the rift occurring between the young presidential candidate John F. 
Kennedy and the elder-statesman Chester Bowles.  According to Halberstam, Bowles represented an 
antiquated ―idealism of world opinion [and] of political morality;‖ whereas Kennedy and his close 
associates favored realism and bi-polar ideological struggle.  See David Halberstam, The Best and the 
Brightest, 20th Anniversary ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992), p. 21. 
11 William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ―The Imperialism of Decolonization,‖ in The Decolonization 
Reader, ed. James LeSueur (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 50. 
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sentiment around the globe—but equally important was the fact that this policy also 
manipulated popular opinion to serve Britain‘s national interest. 
 
II 
 
Evidence supporting nearly universal attitudes of conformity date back to the 
Suez Canal‘s construction; but post World War II events, including the Iranian crisis of 
1953 and the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, directly contributed to the Suez crisis.  
Mohammad Mossadegh‘s election as Iran‘s Prime Minister in 1951 signified that 
country‘s impulsive desire for self-determination.  Soon after taking office and hearing of 
British business leaders‘ rejection of proposals calling for more equitable oil profit-
sharing, Mossadegh nationalized Iran‘s oil production, snatching oil industry possessions 
from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company‘s (AIOC) control without compensation.  The 
frustration American officials felt towards their British counterparts yielded to urgent 
fears over the effect Iranian nationalization might have on other oil-producing states 
holding U.S. concessions.  Truman and Eisenhower administration officials responded by 
boycotting Iranian crude oil shipments and halting Justice Department investigations into 
anti-trust activities within America‘s largest oil companies.12  International criticism of 
Western business practices led to greater domestic consensus in the United States 
When Mossadegh attempted to bluff the West into ending its boycott by making 
overtures to the Soviet Union, U.S. officials organized the overthrow of Mossadegh‘s 
government.  Iran‘s new and Western-friendly regime created a ―multinational [oil] 
                                               
12
 Little, American Orientalism, pp. 56-57. 
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consortium‖ consisting of four countries: Iran, the United States, Britain, and France.  
Together, the United States and Britain reconsolidated their control over 80% of Iran‘s oil 
production.
13
  Using ―multinational‖ agreements as a front permitted great powers to 
legitimize and protect national interests at the expense of the Iranian peoples‘ desire for 
greater autonomy. 
Formation of a regional security network served as the next opportunity for using 
multilateral means to achieve unilateral ends.  Installation of a nationalist-oriented regime 
in Egypt, in which Nasser played a prominent role, led to a 1954 treaty requiring the 
withdrawal of British forces from Egypt by 1956.  Eager to compensate for its loss of 
influence in the most powerful Arab country, British officials searched for alternative 
allies in the Middle East.  Attention centered on Iraq after U.S. officials looked to include 
Iraq in a defensive military alliance designed to prevent communist infiltration into the 
Middle East.
14
  Known as the Northern Tier, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan would form 
the backbone of the Middle East Command (MEC).  Within a month of its creation, 
Britain joined what it referred to as the Baghdad Pact in the spring of 1955.
15
 
Through this mutual defense agreement, British officials satisfied two key 
security concerns.  First, British military strategists retained the right to intervene in 
Middle Eastern affairs.  Any act of aggression against Britain‘s Middle East interests was 
subject to legitimate retaliation under this agreement.  Second, they could exert influence 
without deploying their own military resources needed to enforce it.  The Middle East 
                                               
13 Little, American Orientalism, pp. 57-58. 
14 According to historian Peter Hahn, ―Maintenance of stability was the sine qua non of American postwar 
[World War II] policy in the Middle East.‖  See Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-
1956, p 1. 
15 The alliance of these states goes by several names including the Northern Tier, the Baghdad Pact, the 
Middle East Command (MEC), the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), and the Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO). 
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Command was an American Cold War initiative; the United States was responsible for 
providing it with the necessary military hardware.  As a result, British officials could 
execute strategic objectives without depleting their own military resources. 
The British government‘s success in securing a continued presence in the Middle 
East also succeeded in raising the stakes among competing national interests by 
superseding international unity.  In many respects, this strategy perpetuated the status 
quo.  Since the end of the First World War, British and French competition for power in 
the region led British officials to encourage Arab protests against French rule while 
simultaneously accentuating British benevolence in the region.
16
  After the Second World 
War, the British government yielded to U.S. and French demands for greater access to the 
Middle East and its oil reserves.  L.J. Butler, a scholar in contemporary British history, 
contends that this realization strengthened amicable relations between Britain and the 
Arab world.
17
 
The undermining of a regional collective security arrangement detracts from 
Butler‘s conclusion, however.  American allies cringed after hearing of British 
participation in the Baghdad Pact.  Old colonial relationships that had exploited Arabs 
tainted efforts to construct new Cold War alliances.
18
  Under these circumstances, 
                                               
16 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the 
Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1989), pp. 193-194. 
17 L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 
16. 
18 Historians debate America‘s tolerance of the colonial policies of their Western European allies.  John 
Lewis Gaddis argues that Eisenhower and Dulles walked a tight-rope between imperialist and anti-
imperialist activity.  ―The United States,‖ he writes, ―found itself . . . in the awkward position of having to 
balance its anti-colonialism against its alliances [with imperial powers].  Tilting too far in either direction—
by alienating new friends in the Middle East or old friends in Western Europe—could create openings for a 
Soviet threat that would endanger them both.‖  See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold 
War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 165.  Richard Immerman shares similar views 
but sees the matter as one dominated by America‘s anti-communist interests.  See Richard Immerman, John 
Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly 
Resources, Inc., 1999), p. 155.  Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley draw similar conclusions by 
10 
 
nationalists such as Nasser saw little incentive to endorse Cold War agendas or, more 
importantly, to sacrifice his own interests in exchange for perceived British benevolence.  
Apprehensive of Nasser‘s involvement in Algeria‘s war for independence and further 
imperial erosion, French officials disapproved of any type of Middle East military 
alliance.
19
  British policy-makers may have addressed pressing security concerns, but 
they did so at the cost of international clout among allies and adversaries alike. 
French efforts to keep its North African colony of Algeria in 1954 only confirmed 
Nasser‘s suspicions.  Where British strategists perfected the art of subtle, diplomatic 
maneuvering in the Arab world by the 1950s, French officials unleashed the full fury of 
their military to rein in Algerian separatists.
20
  As one historian put it, ―the Algerian War 
was . . . a conflict of peculiar brutality which helped institutionalize torture in the armies, 
police and security forces of countries that purported to be civilized.‖21  Evidence of 
                                                                                                                                            
comparing the Republicans distain for supporting Western European allies via the Marshall Plan, yet 
allocating funds for covert operations supporting anti-communist regimes in the Third World.  See Stephen 
Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 8th ed. (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 147-148.  Other historians, such as H.W. Brands, see the Kennedy 
administration as a true proponent for Third World independence movements.  See H.W. Brands, The Devil 
We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 87.  Acting as a 
summation of these divergent perspectives, Melvyn Leffler contends that ―Eisenhower and Dulles‖ 
disguised their ―nuanced‖ activities behind a boisterous rhetoric.  See Melvyn Leffler, ―9/11 and American 
Foreign Policy,‖ Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 3, (June 2005): p. 411.  Regardless of perspective, 
national self-interest dictated the Eisenhower‘s administration‘s degree of involvement in repudiating the 
policies of its allies or those of anti-colonial independence movements often with little regard for 
international opinion. 
19 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the 
Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 58-66. 
20 As several historians rightly contend, British imperial in the Middle East seemed to be the exception 
rather than the norm.  Caroline Elkins description of British repression of the Kenyan from 1952 to 1960 
has expanded the scope of debate of colonial and postcolonial debate.  Specifically, the corruption of power 
included squalid detention camps, torture, sexual assault, interrogation, and indoctrination of Kenyans to 
create, as one reviewer of Elkins‘s work put it, ―a procolonial new citizen.‖  See Caroline Elkins, Imperial 
Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britian’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2005).  See also 
Marshall Clough, reviewed work: Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britian’s Gulag in Kenya by 
Caroline Elkins, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 885-886; and Kennell 
Jackson, reviewed work, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britian’s Gulag in Kenya by Caroline 
Elkins, The international Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2006), pp. 158-160. 
21 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 
1994), p. 220. 
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Egyptian arms shipments to Algerian rebels further infuriated French commanders.  In 
addition to fulfilling Nasser‘s pledge to assist Arab neighbors in need, Egyptian weapons 
shipments combined with French torture accelerated the pace with which French 
strategists were losing control of the war.
22
  Faced with the news that Nasser agreed to 
barter Soviet munitions for Egyptian cotton, French officials wrestled with the prospect 
that the Algerian conflict could become a war of attrition. 
The proliferation of conventional weapons in the Middle East added to the sense 
of insecurity in the international community.  Ever since Israel‘s independence in 1948, 
policy-makers in Washington aimed to thwart moves towards a regional arms race 
between Arabs and Israelis.  Maintaining this precarious status quo proved illusive.  As 
early as 1950, American and British diplomats had tried unsuccessfully to create a 
military alliance with Egypt.  The prospect of Egypt‘s military acquiring modern, 
Western weapons was tantalizing to Egyptian officials; but President Eisenhower‘s 
insistence that Egyptian leaders place Cold War regional interests above national interests 
made the proposed tripartite coalition untenable.
23
  Eager to retaliate against Nasser for 
Egypt‘s support of Algerian rebels and Egypt‘s securing Soviet munitions, the French 
government—with American consent—authorized the selling of weapons to Israel in 
early 1956.
24
  Much like British policy, Washington‘s leaders experienced an ironic twist 
                                               
22 For an articulate analysis of the Algerian War, consult Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: 
Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
23 Richard Saunders, ―Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency,‖ Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 1 , (Spring 1985), p. 100 
24 Guy Laron‘s working paper on the Czechoslovakian Arms Deal offers detailed insight of the proceedings 
from the perspective of Egyptian and Soviet negotiators.  See Guy Laron, ―Cutting the Gordian Knot: The 
Post-WWII Egyptian Quest for Arms and the 1955 Czechoslovak Arms Deal,‖ in Cold War International 
History Project Working Paper Series, ed. Christian Ostermann, 55 (February 2007): 1-43. 
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where American policies of enforcing an arms embargo conflicted with its attempts to 
build regional alliances.
25
 
To their credit, American officials attempted to entice Nasser with modernization 
projects such as providing funds for construction of the Aswan Dam.  Infrastructural 
improvements such as this one aimed to limit Soviet influence in Egypt while providing 
humanitarian relief through socio-economic development.  Regrettably, the terms 
American, British, and World Bank officials applied to the loans undercut the proposal‘s 
intent.  Nasser welcomed the West‘s aid in advancing Egyptian self-sufficiency, but 
could not agree to the West‘s intrusive terms.  World Bank involvement in the affairs of 
the Egyptian treasury resurrected disturbing memories of foreign domination.  In order to 
participate in socio-economic development, Nasser had to conform to Western standards 
of international finance.  Additional stipulations calling for an Arab-Israeli peace 
agreement contributed to Nasser‘s distain.26  While perhaps reasonable to Western 
interests, interference in financial and security matters could not be interpreted by Nasser 
as anything other than a loss of Egyptian sovereignty. 
In both foreign and domestic matters, Eisenhower‘s chief concern was focused on 
maintaining order.  Much like his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, the president 
operated from a mindset where enforcing order would be restrained so long as everyone 
agreed to his brand of authority and amenable to his pace of change.  With regard to the 
process of decolonization, Eisenhower adopted a protracted approach.  Although the 
                                               
25 Historian John Lewis Gaddis draws similar conclusions.  See footnote #8. 
26 Although Douglas Little credits Nelson Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, and Walt Rostow with wielding 
development aid as an instrument to combat communism, it is easy to see that such policies stemmed from 
the Eisenhower administration.  Regardless of form, American initiatives remained fixated on self-interest 
by making modernization synonymous with Cold War conformity.  See Little, American Orientalism, pp. 
169 and 195-196.  Peter Hahn identifies how American officials continued ―subordinating‖ Egyptian 
nationalism to the needs of U.S. regional security concerns, which persisted throughout the Suez crisis.  
Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956, pp. 243, 246-247. 
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president‘s pace of change differed from that of international allies, such as Britain and 
France, and domestic ones, such as southern segregationists, Eisenhower afforded a 
greater degree of leniency.  Those provoking greater suspicion, including Nasser and 
other members of the non-white world, were rebuked more readily.  One reason for this 
intolerance stemmed from the fact that, according to anti-colonist Aimé Césaire, Africans 
and Asians requested modern facilities while the West remained noncompliant.  ―The 
colonized man [wanted] to move forward, and the colonizer [held] things back.‖27  Given 
this context, the premise that Eisenhower required others to submit to his sense of order 
and worldview, and the racial bias accompanying it, only perpetuated the protests of 
those he alienated.
28
  As Albert Memmi wrote in his classic work The Colonizer and the 
Colonized first published in 1957, ―racism . . . is the highest expression of the colonial 
system and one of the most significant features of the colonialist.‖29  In an era defined in 
part by the pace of decolonization, Eisenhower‘s actions were responsible in part for the 
escalation of unrest. 
 
 
 
                                               
27 Aimé Césaire Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 
p. 46. 
28 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 94 and 100-104.  Borstelmann‘s analysis draws 
flawless parallels between Eisenhower‘s domestic and international agenda.  See also Steven Lawson and 
Charles Payne, Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 10-13.  Outside official policy-making, historian Melani McAlister examines 
how this attitude was more characteristic of American society overall.  See Melani McAlister, Epic 
Encounters: Culture, Media, and the U.S. Interest in the Middle East, 1945-2000 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2001), pp. 44-45. 
29 Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, expanded edition (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991) 
p. 74.  Continuing on, Memmi describes racism as a tool used to maintain social stagnation.  Again, 
Eisenhower‘s record on race relations reflects this tendency. 
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III 
 
Failure to recognize and respond to the particular interests of other countries 
exacerbated tensions and, therefore, the potential for conflict.  By the spring of 1956, 
American and British policy-makers began distancing themselves from Nasser.  The 
West‘s withdrawal of funds for the Aswan Dam project in mid-July showed a lack of 
consideration for Nasser‘s concerns.  With few resources at his disposal, Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal.  Redirecting canal tolls from the Universal Company of the 
Maritime Suez Canal to the Egyptian treasury meant that Nasser could still prepare for 
the Aswan Dam‘s construction, all while flaunting his authority as an Arab leader in the 
face of European imperial impotence.  For these reasons, the circumstances proved ideal 
for Nasser.  His public declaration on 26 July 1956 transformed the last monument to 
British imperial authority into a symbol of Egyptian and Arab empowerment. 
While Nasser‘s act may have appeared bold and rash, it served also as a 
designation of the lengths to which world leaders went to guarantee their own interests.  
In preparation for his socio-economic coup, Nasser kept his intentions even from his own 
advisers.  When he unveiled his plan, he did so not to invite debate but to enlist support.  
Dissenting voices were quieted.
30
  Indeed, Nasser‘s governing philosophy left little room 
for alternative perspectives.  For example, in outlining his strategy for Egypt and its Arab 
neighbors, Nasser‘s plea for greater Arab unity required a more homogeneous ―public 
                                               
30 Mohamad Heilkal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes (New York: Arbor House, 1987), 
p. 124.  This is not to say that Nasser‘s plan was flawed.  Indeed, he demonstrated considerable ingenuity 
and resolve.  However, the process by which he arrived at his decision reflects those of his rivals. 
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opinion.‖31  Dissension from Nasser‘s pan-Arab ideology was impermissible.  
Independence movements such as the ones in Algeria and Palestine became early 
instruments of Nasser‘s pan-Arab cause.  Arab institutions that competed against Nasser 
became targets for reprisal.
32
  Much like Eisenhower, Nasser was not alone in his desire 
to consolidate consensus. 
Rather than work towards peaceful accords, the initial rounds of diplomacy during 
the Suez crisis operated from the presupposition that Egypt must relinquish control of the 
canal.  During a National Security Council meeting in early August 1956, Vice President 
Richard Nixon suggested drafting ―management contracts . . . providing for Egyptian 
sovereignty and Western management.‖  Citing evidence to support his case, Nixon 
described how successful negotiations between the U.S. and the Philippine government 
permitted U.S. use of military bases in the pacific archipelago in exchange for respecting 
Philippine sovereignty.
33
  Dulles broadened the scope of this idea by proposing that the 
Suez Canal function as an international waterway, governed by the international 
community. 
The negotiations that endorsed Dulles‘s scheme, known as the First and Second 
London Conferences, provided little hope of avoiding conflict.  Interpreting any 
collective administration of the canal as ―‗joint colonialism,‘‖ Nasser refused to 
                                               
31 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 34, and 68. 
32 Such a fate befell the Society of Muslim Brothers.  Once numbering among Nasser‘s allies prior to the 
revolution of 1952, by 1954, Nasser had distanced himself from the organization.  In October 1954, the 
Muslim Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser.  Within six weeks, mass arrests and executions of the 
perpetrators pushed the Society underground.  See Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 151.  Another, more contemporary source includes Carrie 
Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 21-24. 
33 292nd NSC Meeting, 9 August 1956, D.D.E. Papers as Pres. of the U.S., 1953-1961, Ann Whitman File, 
NSC Series, Box #8, D.D.E. Library, Abilene, KS. 
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participate in a conference that rejected Egypt‘s claims of unconditional ownership of the 
canal.
34
  When a diplomatic mission presented Nasser with the conferences‘ 
recommendations, tempers flared. 
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden‘s decision to initiate military preparations 
only compounded the degree of disingenuousness.  Within a week of Nasser‘s seizing the 
canal, Eden and his advisors began concentrating forces and supplies needed for an 
invasion.
35
  The coordination Israel‘s invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and Western 
Europe‘s response calling for a cease-fire and deployment of military personnel to secure 
the Suez Canal alarmed the international community.
36
  The prospect of British and 
French forces occupying the Canal Zone overshadowed and discredited their sense of 
moral legitimacy of acting on the international community‘s behalf.  Yet, this was 
precisely the argument French and British delegations made in defense of their countries‘ 
actions. 
Fearing a rapid escalation of hostilities, matters surrounding the Suez crisis 
moved to the UN Security Council and then to the General Assembly.  Ironically, the 
                                               
34 The term ―‗joint colonialism‘‖ was also quoted as ―‗collective colonialism‘‖ or ―‗international 
colonialism.‘‖  See Schnee to State Department, Cairo, ―‗Collective Colonialism‖ phrase,‖ 17 August 1956, 
RG 59, General Records of the State Dept., #974.7301/8-1756, Box #5354, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. 
35 Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, The Suez Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 61. In addition to 
coordinating logistics, Eden‘s government also had to mobilize public support for military intervention.  In 
addition to Gorst and Johnman, numerous other historians and eyewitnesses have contributed to 
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failed to win popular support for his hawkish plans and that domestic and international opinion condemned 
him for it.  For a thoughtful assessment see Ralph Negrine, ―The Press and the Suez Crisis: A Myth Re-
Examined,‖ The Historical Journal 25 (December 1982): 976-977; and Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 12.  
See also Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 
381-382.  Others commend Eden for marshalling British opinion to support some sort of military 
intervention.  Tony Shaw offers a particularly optimistic assessment.  Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez, and the 
Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. x-xi.  
Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles held a similar view.  United States Department of State, 
FRUS: Suez Crisis, July 26 – December 31, 1956, Vol. XVI (no. 9740) 1990. 
36 Such was the case for Britain‘s enemies and allies.  As T.B. Millar writes word of the British and French 
ultimatum ―was a shock to [fellow members of the British Commonwealth.]‖  See T.B. Millar, The 
Commonwealth and the United Nations (Sydney, Australia: Sydney University Press, 1967), p. 65. 
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British and French delegations‘ posturing used diplomatic channels to legitimize the need 
for military intervention rather than prevent it.  Unconvincing as these arguments were, 
French and British status as permanent members of the Security Council guaranteed 
deadlock.  The non-permanent Yugoslav delegate‘s motion to move debate to the General 
Assembly marked a pivotal shift in the resolution of the crisis, however. 
Decision-making shifted from smaller, exclusive groups, which the London 
Conferences and UN Security Council characterized, to a larger, inclusive, and more 
multilateral forum.  As Uruguay‘s UN Representative Enrique Rodrigues Fabregat 
opined during the General Assembly debates, ―We [UN member states] all thought that 
after the signing of the UN Charter in San Francisco the use of force in the old arbitrary 
way had become a thing of the past.‖  India‘s UN delegate Arthur Lall echoed his 
colleague‘s views saying that ―this violent approach to the safeguarding of vital interests 
is . . . plunging the world into chaos.‖37  These sentiments resonated throughout the UN 
General Assembly during the emergency sessions pertaining to the Suez crisis.  Besides 
focusing attention on a renewed faith in international diplomacy, this popular perspective 
challenged the subordinate status multilateral diplomacy played in advancing national 
interests. 
 
IV 
 
This new role for the United Nations evolved from several sources that challenged 
the prevailing trends preoccupied with securing self-interested conditions.  For example, 
                                               
37 Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Year, First Emergency Special Session, 1 November 
1956, Plenary Meetings, 562
nd
 Meeting, Document A/PV. 562, pp. 30-31, 44. 
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the Asian Relations Conference (ARC) of 1947 provided a forum whereby newly 
independent Asian countries, including most notably India and China, discussed regional 
security concerns free from their respective interpretations of world order.  According to 
historian A.W. Stargardt, attendees to the ARC voiced their own individual concerns, 
enhancing the diversity within national delegations, while simultaneously diminishing 
advocacy for a particular national interest.  ARC‘s chairperson Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru 
understood nationalism‘s role but argued that ―it must not be allowed [to obstruct] 
international development.‖38  Contemporary historians interpret these thoughts as the 
earliest expressions of post-WW II ―globalization.‖39  In addition to enhancing 
international dialogue, the mentality emerging from the ARC offered an alternative to the 
rigid, doctrinal assumptions of states preoccupied with their own security concerns. 
The goodwill emanating from the ARC helped inspire the Bandung Conference of 
1955 and the launching of the non-aligned movement.  This new collection of states 
emerged independently from U.S. and Soviet Cold War paradigms, European 
colonialism, and other contexts where national interest reigned supreme.  While 
susceptible to ideological bickering between communist and anti-communist 
perspectives, the Bandung Conference represented more eclectic interests that challenged 
Cold War or colonialist ambitions.
40
  As Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, 
put it during his opening remarks at Bandung: 
The pass to which humanity has been brought by the domination and 
doctrine of force is the most vivid demonstration of the bankruptcy of 
                                               
38 A.W. Stargardt, ―The Emergence of the Asian System of Powers.‖ Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, 
(1989), pp. 563 and 565.  Nehru quoted in Stargardt article. 
39 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), p. 149. 
40 C.P. Fitzgerald, ―East Asia after Bandung,‖ Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 24, No. 8, (August 1955), pp. 113-
114, 117; and Richard Wright, The Color Curtain (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1956), pp. 
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force.  Of what advantage is it to hold sway over vast territories, to have at 
one‘s command innumerable armies, to be able at the touch of a button to 
unleash the deadliest weapons science can invent, if, with all this, we are 
unable to rid ourselves of fear and hysteria and despair?
41
 
 
Put another way, the methods powerful nations used on weak ones were self-defeating.  
Instead of assimilation, blind pursuit of national interests only bred international anxiety.  
In many cases, international organizations such as the United Nations acted as a 
counterweight combating these fears by intervening in crises on behalf of a more 
collective set of interests. 
The complexities surrounding the UN‘s mission also reflected those aspects of its 
new leadership.  After his election as United Nations Secretary General in the spring of 
1953, Dag Hjalmar Agre Carl Hammarskjöld began moving the organization in the 
direction of this new pluralistic philosophical approach.  However, the transformation 
was not as smooth as previous analysts have depicted.  As so many scholars have 
described, Hammarskjöld was somewhat of an enigma.
42
  On the one hand, he entered 
office with a dedicated sense of ―interdependent principles.‖  On the other hand, he based 
these principles on his traditional European heritage of ―liberal democracy.‖  
Unapologetic in wanting to assert UN authority, Hammarskjöld nevertheless respected 
traditional avenues of direct diplomacy between states.  He understood the United 
Nations‘ paradoxical role as a forum where states willingly transferred power to the 
                                               
41 Taken from Richard Wright, The Color Curtain, p. 143. 
42 Some of the best material is located in Kent Kille‘s, Mark Zacher‘s, Richard Miller‘s, Michael Oren‘s 
analysis of Hammarskjöld‘s leadership.  See Kent Kille, From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-
General to the United Nations (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006); Mark Zacher, Dag 
Hammarskjöld’s United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Richard Miller, Dag 
Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1961); Michael Oren, 
―Ambivalent Adversaries: David Ben-Gurion and Israel vs. the United Nations and Dag Hammarskjöld, 
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world body to pressure member states into obeying the principles of the UN Charter.
43
  
Hammarskjöld revered the Charter, proclaiming at one point that the principles within the 
Charter eclipsed the organization responsible for enacting them.
44
  As a result, 
Hammarskjöld remained, on the one hand, a deeply committed international civil servant 
who, on the other hand, seemed reluctant to seize the initiative yet wielded it skillfully 
once invited to do so.  While contradictory, these dynamic qualities contributed to 
Hammarskjöld‘s uncanny ability to gain a multilateral understanding of international 
conflicts.
45
 
Hammarskjöld‘s upbringing and early career influenced his philosophical 
approach to international affairs.  As the son of Sweden‘s one-time Prime Minister and 
accomplished scholar of law and economics, Hammarskjöld developed an early 
sensitivity to politics and the diplomatic skills that came with it.  His early professional 
experience was a blend of serving as a ―nonpolitical [Swedish] civil servant‖ and as a 
representative to international institutions including the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation.  According to his biographer, Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld 
struggled with an unfulfilled sense of self that was not satiated ―until he became [UN] 
Secretary General.‖46  Hammarskjöld‘s apolitical mindset, spurred on by his sense 
destiny, served him well as the world‘s leading international civil servant of the 1950s.   
Evidence of Hammarskjöld‘s pioneering efforts to reform the United Nations 
emerged within weeks of his taking office.  Faced with Senator Joseph McCarthy‘s 
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(Republican-Wisconsin) allegations of subversive conduct among the UN‘s American 
staff members, Hammarskjöld trod delicately to win concessions allowing him to 
evaluate UN employees according to an independent set of standards instead of one 
dictated by UN member states.
47
  By 1955, Communist China‘s sentencing of American 
airmen captured during the Korean War and Algeria‘s revolt against French colonial rule, 
launched about the same time, provided Hammarskjöld and the UN with opportunities to 
represent a broader diplomatic perspective.  Indeed, Hammarskjöld‘s philosophy took 
root within the UN‘s international bureaucracy precisely when national leaders were 
pursuing doctrinal world order most earnestly. 
 
V 
 
Critics of UN effectiveness may argue that the United Nations‘ role during the 
Suez crisis merely reflected the status quo remedies of national interests acting through 
the General Assembly rather than the more traditional venue of the Security Council.  To 
the critics‘ credit, Hammarskjöld‘s initial reluctance to assume a leading role in 
managing the crisis suggests that he wished for the Great Powers to resolve the dispute.  
As debate progressed in the General Assembly, however, a more dynamic set of 
delegates seized the initiative intent on galvanizing consensus.  As Canada‘s Foreign 
Minister, Lester Pearson negotiated with other UN delegations to enlist support for a 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to re-establish peace in the wake of the Suez 
                                               
47 For a through analysis of thee events, see Peter Heller, The United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 
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War.  While diplomatically creative, skeptics argue that Pearson‘s ulterior motives sought 
to satisfy his national interests of repairing the breach in Anglo-American relations that 
the war had precipitated.
48
  However, other historians point out that Canadian officials 
disagreed with their British and American counterparts over the extent of UN 
participation as early as February 1956.
49
 
Equally important was the way in which Pearson campaigned for creating the 
UNEF.  Instead of presenting his idea as a fait accompli, Pearson canvassed delegates of 
the General Assembly for their input.
50
  Additionally, India‘s representative to the UN, 
Arthur Lall, along with representatives from over a dozen other UN member states, 
championed the idea that Hammarskjöld organize cease-fire efforts in the Middle East.  
These proposals enjoyed overwhelming support in the General Assembly.  Once charged 
with leading the peace effort, Hammarskjöld shed his hesitancy, committing his full 
attention and energy to the task at hand. 
These initiatives proved particularly effective.  The degree of transference and 
multilateralism exhibited in the peace agreements served as the main reason for 
successful conflict resolution.  The diligent efforts of Pearson and Lall as well as many 
others oversaw deployment of the UN-sponsored emergency force designed to bring 
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peace to Suez while vowing to respect Egyptian sovereignty.  In return, Nasser agreed to 
honor the canal‘s significance as an international artery of world trade.  As a result, the 
international community—including Britain and France—recognized Egypt‘s jurisdiction 
while Egyptian officials enforced nearly unfettered access to the Canal Zone.  In other 
words, the differing parties labored to uphold the interests of each other, leading to a 
more resilient peace agreement. 
Steps taken towards enacting an Arab-Israeli peace agreement proved more 
complex.  Deployment of the UNEF meant that a considerable portion of Egyptian-Israeli 
national security concerns became the UN‘s responsibility.51  Though slow to withdraw 
from the Sinai Peninsula, Israeli forces respected the UNEF mandate establishing a buffer 
zone that separated the belligerents.  UNEF diligence during its decade in the field 
virtually eliminated the abundant number of border clashes that had contributed to the 
heightening of Arab-Israeli tensions prior to the Suez crisis.  The Arab-Israeli conflict 
remained, but the presence of UNEF succeeded in providing a measure of regional 
stability that has rarely been rivaled. 
As the Suez crisis abated, leaders of the major powers moved rapidly to re-gain 
the initiative.  The first step in doing so returned the United Nations to its subordinate 
status.  The Eisenhower administration contributed to this effort when the president 
issued his foreign policy doctrine authorizing U.S. intervention in any confrontation in 
which Middle East countries requested assistance in defending against international 
                                               
51 Admittedly, the Egyptian government continued to deny canal access to Israeli ships or to those ships 
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communism.  Besides shoring up the U.S.‘s national interests in the region, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine conveyed a remarkable lack of confidence in the UN‘s ability to 
handle international crises. 
When tensions flared in Lebanon in the summer of 1958, Hammarskjöld and the 
UN respected Eisenhower‘s lead.  The opportunity for multilateral action was lost.  
Lebanese Prime Minister Camille Chamoun could not afford to seem any less resolved 
than his country‘s internal instability made him seem.  Though beholden to UN principles 
and wishing to remain independent from pan-Arab regional politics, Chamoun was forced 
to request American intervention.  Bound by its doctrine, the U.S. government could not 
entertain the suggestion of ideological input other than its own.  Hammarskjöld respected 
these motives as he always had and—perhaps—as he should have; yet doing so 
marginalized the good faith upon which multilateral diplomacy constituted itself.  
Chamoun‘s first choice to remain independent of alliances with more powerful states who 
could manipulate the Lebanese government was no longer an option.  Had the United 
Nations acted in a capacity similar to that of the Suez crisis, Chamoun may have had an 
alternative that catered to his specific needs. 
The United Nations enjoyed somewhat greater latitude in the Congo crisis of the 
early 1960s.  At the dawn of the new decade, the Congo‘s transition to independence was 
becoming a more erratic affair.  As Belgian bureaucrats relinquished control, internal 
dissent between rival factions split the loyalties of the international community.
52
  The 
domestic and international rift posed new challenges for UN officials.  Though successful 
in securing peace, UN efforts led by Hammarskjöld and Ralph Bunche came at a tragic 
cost.  The organization‘s prestige declined with Hammarskjöld‘s unexpected death in 
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1961 and the refusal of some UN member states to fulfill their fiscal responsibilities in 
protest over the outcome of the Congo crisis.  According to historian Jim Haskins, UN 
member states appeared to be ―losing their commitment to world government.‖53  The 
culmination of these circumstances makes the Congo crisis somewhat of a Pyrrhic victory 
for the United Nations. 
 
VI 
 
With the loss of the UN‘s interdependent architect, world leaders turned their 
attention to expanding their influence over intergovernmental and quasi-governmental 
organizations in both domestic and international spheres.  Domestically, Egyptian 
President Nasser monopolized numerous professional associations in pursuit of his 
monolithic, pan-Arab ambitions.  Internationally, Nasser utilized the United Arab 
Republic and the Arab League to minimize dissenting voices from within the Arab world.  
By 1960, however, rival institutions such as the Organization for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) succeeded in dividing the Arab world between oil-rich and oil-poor 
states.
54
  France‘s leaders embraced their European neighbors during the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Numerous scholars have investigated the effects of private interests on 
globalization.  Several specialists, such as John Lonsdale, conclude that private sector 
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exploitation has resulted in a ―decivilizing form of globalization.‖55  Like so many other 
post-Suez organizations, the EEC championed greater economic, social, and cultural 
unity among its members while simultaneously encouraging the integration of developing 
countries into the world community.  Acceptance in the ―world community‖ often 
involved newly independent countries strengthening ties to their one-time imperial 
overseers.  For example, in 1958, French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle created the 
French Community, where former French colonies were encouraged to seek 
reconciliation with France.  ―Such ties,‖ writes Frank Costigliola, ―would demonstrate 
France‘s worldwide interests and sympathy for former colonial peoples.‖56  The resulting 
paradox left EEC members hailing the emergence of independent states in Asia and 
Africa while simultaneously marginalizing their significance by creating a new and 
exclusive supranationalist framework.  U.S. policy-makers followed suit by creating 
institutions designed to advance the country‘s ideological, cultural, and commercial 
interests.  In doing so, senior government officials persisted in creating outlets where 
self-interest could be disguised in broader, universal terms. 
Specialized institutions such as OPEC, the EEC, and others challenged more 
inclusive organization such as the United Nations in pursuing a multilateral agenda.  
These new international structures represented a narrow set of interests that world leaders 
favored over broader consensus located within the UN General Assembly.  As a result, 
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decision-making within these exclusive circles replaced genuine debate within more 
multilateral forums.  Thus, the single most important lesson emanating from the Suez 
crisis—the importance of open exchanges of diplomacy in crisis management—was lost. 
 
VII 
 
Several notable historians and other scholars of the Suez crisis have over looked 
this aspect.  Historians such as Peter Hahn, Cole Kingseed, Salim Yaqub, Amos Yoder, 
and others give varying degrees of credit to President Eisenhower and his administration 
for taking matters to the United Nations.
57
  Typically, the United States is cast as playing 
a leading role thwarting British, French, and Israeli belligerence.
58
  Matthew Holland 
argues that direct, unilateral military intervention on the part of the United States ―could 
have prevented the British and French invasion and made America an Arab hero.‖  Only 
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President Eisenhower‘s campaign for re-election and Secretary of State Dulles‘s severe 
health problems let this opportunity slip.
59
  The historical record, however, proves that 
these conclusions may be oversimplified.  The administration‘s initial inclination was to 
handle the matter through the London Conferences, which as mentioned earlier, placed 
preconditions on negotiations.  Once the crisis turned to conflict, the U.S. delegation to 
the United Nations disagreed with the General Assembly‘s mandated deployment of an 
impartial peacekeeping force.  Instead, America‘s UN ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
Jr. called for returning the Middle East to the status quo ante bellum.  Yet, the 
deployment of the UNEF marked a significant shift in the status quo.  Additionally, of all 
the calls for a cease-fire, including one by U.S. officials, the UN‘s appeal was the only 
one all parties observed.  Under these circumstances, the Eisenhower administration 
played a minor role in rallying the General Assembly and maximizing its influence. 
Other historians use different means to reach similar conclusions.  In his chapter 
titled ―The United Nations Fails,‖ Herman Finer accuses Dulles of ―‗stringing along‘‖ 
Britain and France to mask his own cowardice in the face of ―Russian power.‖  Contrary 
to more contemporary assessments, Finer implies that UN ineffectiveness in averting war 
resulted from decisions made by U.S. cabinet officials.  By attributing UN success to 
U.S. actions, Finer disregards the General Assembly‘s role as well as that of 
Hammarskjöld, Pearson, and Lall.
60
  Frederick Marks pays generous credit to 
Hammarskjöld‘s abilities during the crisis but maintains that the United Nations remained 
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ineffective because national interests remained dominant.
61
  While accurate in assessing 
the aftermath of the Suez crisis, Marks‘s analysis deprives the United Nations of due 
credit during the crisis itself.  The multilateral diplomacy practiced in the early weeks of 
November 1956 superseded the interests of any one nation, however brief it may have 
been. 
Non-Western historiography accentuates many of the same attitudes as Western 
historians.  Similar to American scholars, Mohamed Heikal, one of Nasser‘s most trusted 
advisors, agrees that the U.S. was largely responsible for organizing world pressure to 
force the removal of Israeli troops from Sinai.  In another instance, Heikal describes a 
scene where Nasser implied that Hammarskjöld was little more than an unwitting puppet 
of American and Israeli interests.
62
  As a Senior Fellow at the Shalem Center in 
Jerusalem, Michael Oren describes a similar situation from the Israeli perspective.  
Defining the relationship between Israeli Prime Minister David-Ben Gurion and 
Hammarskjöld as ―ambivalent adversaries,‖ Oren points out how Israel ―harbored great 
resentment toward the UN.‖63  According to historian Mark Kramer, the Soviets 
interpreted UN actions in Suez as a sign to accelerate unilateralist policies in Hungary.
64
  
Clearly, numerous historians of the Suez crisis say little that is positive regarding United 
Nations involvement and relegate the world body to a dependent and often ridiculed role. 
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VIII 
 
Comprehending the crisis from a multilateral perspective requires an overview of 
events relating to the Suez Canal and the UN‘s involvement in the Suez crisis.  Chapter 
One of my paper provides an overview of the relationship between national interests and 
multilateral dialog from mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries.  Particular 
attention addresses Ferdinand de Lesseps‘s undaunted negotiations in promoting the Suez 
Canal project, its effects on British policy-making as well as an impressionable Zionist 
movement, and the various initiatives that contested this prevailing mindset as a more 
genuine multilateral perspective emerged in the postwar, post-colonial world.  At a time 
when adversarial world powers huddled in their respective spheres of influence, new rival 
powers such as India and China initiated a dialog at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference 
(ARC).  The ARC‘s constructive meetings conveyed a willingness to negotiate openly, 
which slowly grew in popularity. 
Chapter Two examines the continued growth of these popular trends and the 
concurrent pursuit of enforcing a stricter sense of world order by the leading world 
powers.  During the Eisenhower administration, America‘s Cold War security interests to 
preserve the status quo clashed with British and French imperial interests as well as Arab 
nationalist fervor and Israeli security concerns.  These attitudes dictated policy formation 
and responses among the Western powers that escalated the likelihood of conflict.  Rather 
than accommodate nationalist movements in Iran and Egypt and the diplomatic latitude 
that they required, leaders of Western governments interpreted these events by using their 
own nationally-interested criteria.  Nasser‘s adoption of identical standards in the case of 
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the Algerian War, the Czechoslovakian arms deal, the proposed Aswan Dam deal, and 
antagonizing border raids between Egypt and Israel made regional security nearly 
impossible.  The irony involved in the headlong pursuit of security interests leading to 
greater insecurity left few alternatives for the genuine reconciliation of differences. 
Fortunately, efforts to implement these rigid agendas coincided with the United 
Nations‘ shift toward engaging in more multilateral diplomacy.  When Dag 
Hammarskjöld was elected to the post of Secretary General, the organization succeeded 
in diffusing crises that individual nations had promulgated.  One such example concerned 
American pilots held as prisoners in Communist China ever since the Korean War.  
Acting on behalf of international opinion and in the interest of good faith, Hammarskjöld 
negotiated the pilots‘ release.  Quick to transform their compliance into their own public 
relations victory, however, Chinese officials touted their benevolent goodwill at the 
Bandung Conference. 
Named for the Indonesian city where the conference convened, the Bandung 
conference of 1955 became a forum where independent acclaim and interdependent 
cooperation co-existed.  On the one hand, several prominent world leaders from the 
African-Asian bloc, including Nasser and Communist China‘s Premier Zhou Enlai, 
manipulated the event to further their own goals.  On the other hand, the meeting 
symbolized the emergence of the non-aligned nations‘ intent on achieving socio-
economic independence and exerting influence through international institutions such as 
the United Nations.  Both the UN‘s actions under Hammarskjöld and the Bandung 
Conference of 1955 demonstrated the complex divide between national interest and 
multilateralism around which the Suez crisis revolved. 
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The next three chapters address the Suez crisis and the concurrent Hungarian 
crisis. A meticulous investigation of the diplomatic deadlock encountered between 
Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 and the eruption of hostilities 
three months later reveals that static and erroneous perceptions only heightened tensions.  
Analysis of the London Conferences and the diplomatic maneuvering both outside and 
inside these meetings demonstrates how no national leader approached the problem with 
an adequate sense of objectivity.  America‘s preoccupation with re-establishing an 
antiquated status quo was mired in futility.  British and French imperial interests secretly 
supported Israel‘s quest for territorial security.  Meanwhile, the Arab community in the 
Middle East consolidated themselves under Nasser‘s pan-Arab banner.  So self-consumed 
were these various interests that the UN played no role in the Suez crisis until October 
1956.  Once recruited to handle the crisis, UN officials focused on the alarming 
disintegration of border security between Israel and its neighbors rather than wade 
through the exhaustive ideologically-charged arguments.   
Similar circumstances existed behind the Iron Curtain.  Contrary to his spring 
1956 speech in which he championed the concept of pluralist consensus, Nikita 
Khrushchev faced his own crisis when Poles and Hungarians began plotting a more 
independent course.  Like Western leaders, Khrushchev stoked the fires of crisis by 
masking his desire for order beneath an illusive veneer of multilateral legitimacy.  The 
resulting confusion dispirited Communist party subordinates who initially withdrew 
Soviet troops from Hungary only to return days later as the Suez crisis turned violent.  
The key difference between the Hungarian crisis and the Suez crisis was the UN‘s 
temporary ascendance to power in Middle East matters. 
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Chapter Four focuses on the General Assembly‘s discussion of the Suez crisis in 
late October and early November.  The extensive emergency sessions leading to 
compromise and the creation of the first peacekeeping force demonstrate that agreement 
was not based on the assumptions of a select few, but rather reflected a broader 
consensus.  As architect of the UNEF, Canada‘s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson built a 
wide base of support prior to announcing his proposal.  In conjunction with Pearson‘s 
plan, India‘s UN representative, Arthur Lall, and delegates from eighteen other nations 
introduced their own draft resolution charging Hammarskjöld with the task of overseeing 
the cease-fire process.  As a result, re-establishing stability through more inclusive means 
promoted the likelihood of establishing a more resilient resolution. 
Yet, as examined in Chapter Five, the triumph of multilateral diplomacy receded 
as national leaders manipulated the UN‘s diplomatic success to benefit national interests.  
Short- and long-term consequences of the Suez crisis shared in marginalizing the UN‘s 
role as a more dynamic, independent institution.  The Eisenhower Doctrine and Treaty of 
Rome set the course for U.S. and European policy priorities.  French reconciliation with 
Germany aimed to establish an economic order independent of American infringement.
65
  
With British backing, America‘s policy in the Middle East pursued well-established Cold 
War objectives hoping to contain communism via proxy allies.  The Lebanese crisis of 
1958 serves as an excellent example of how these Cold War concerns deprived 
Lebanon‘s political leaders of alternatives that could be tailored to address their concerns. 
The Soviets followed much the same course as the Americans for the remainder of the 
Cold War.  Pan-Arab nationalism quickly lost focus, consumed by more immediate local 
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concerns: petroleum, the plight of the Palestinians, and the growing appeal of Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
The growth of non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations proved 
especially pivotal in advancing national interests.  As a result of these efforts, the 
international harmony generated by the UN‘s initiatives yielded to new, rival 
organizations.  Appointed by the leadership of participating countries, executives within 
organizations such as OPEC and the EEC promoted uniformity of interests while 
ignoring serious ruptures within and between communities.  OPEC paid little attention to 
matters outside the petroleum trade, leaving a seriously divided Arab society to cope with 
the new commercial classification between oil-producing and non-oil-producing states.
66
  
In addition to commercial concerns, states began consolidating cultural authority.  Where 
Europe‘s Treaty of Rome supported economic development in places such as Africa on 
the one hand, the treaty promoted European supranational solidarity by coordinating 
social and cultural programs among its members to distinguish itself more clearly from 
the international community.  Nasser employed similar tactics when implementing 
strategies to guarantee popular compliance with his political agenda.  To thwart domestic 
infiltrations by political rivals such as the Society of Muslim Brothers, Nasser created a 
network of government-sponsored professional associations.  By 1965, members of the 
United States Congress proposed federal funding for private organizations to extend 
cultural and economic goodwill around the globe. 
Not surprisingly, some scholars warned of the consequences that disguising 
government policies as private initiatives might have on society and self-identity.  
Assessing Hannah Arendt‘s 1958 book, The Human Condition, scholar and author Peter 
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Watson believes that Arendt identifies ―the essential difficulty with modern society:‖ 
people were becoming increasingly disconnected with politics and frustrated with the 
idea that an individual could not affect change in an increasingly interconnected world.
67
  
In other words, the masses turned their backs on the promise of independent 
internationalism and reverted to finding sanctuary in the advancement of national 
interests.  Astute intellectuals understood the dire consequences of such sentiments.  
Writing in 1961, Daniel Boorstin warned that the United States suffered most from its 
―illusions‖ and urged his countrymen not to ―make the world in our image.‖68  Others, 
including Neil Postman, reiterated these concerns in the 1980s.
69
 
 
IX 
 
The warnings of past decades appear to be coming to fruition.    Numerous 
scholars note the ―intrinsic‖ role private organizations play in government policy 
making.
70
  While some organizations have aided in hard fought struggles for freedom and 
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equality and thereby enhanced ―civil society,‖ these institutions have done so by creating 
an international relations environment emblematic of the governments sponsoring their 
activities.  Instead of one, primary institution, such as the United Nations, where differing 
interests converge and negotiate, an abundance of institutions advance the principles of a 
particular set of interests.  Where some historians herald the arrival of these NGOs as 
evidence of a burgeoning ―global consciousness,‖ others describe how they can 
undermine moderate governments.
71
  Contrary to the UN‘s role during the Suez crisis, 
private associations act as the most popular instrument for states to antagonize other 
states rather than promote compromise.  By 1998, government funding accounted for 
roughly 40 percent of NGO budgets.
72
   Equally disturbing is the paradoxical nature of 
having a multitude of private groups encouraging economic and ideological uniformity 
while an institution such as the United Nations negotiates less successfully betweens 
disparate groups.
73
  Eager to remain relevant, the UN works closely with private 
organizations at the expense of its own influence.  As a result, interdependency among 
differing points of view becomes a lost art. 
Comprehensive investigation of the Suez crisis from this perspective requires the 
use of several archival resources.  Transcripts of UN Security Council and General 
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Assembly meetings including analysis of emergency sessions pertaining to the Suez and 
Hungarian crises are extremely valuable.  These records are available electronically at 
various regional repositories including the New York Public Library and the Library of 
Congress.  UN Annual Reports also offer additional insight into Hammarskjöld‘s sense of 
institutional mission.  Records within the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library 
provide a thorough understanding of the attitudes taken by senior executive branch 
officials as well as cabinet and national security staff.  Materials located at the National 
Archives in College Park, Maryland record the views and perspectives of U.S. embassy 
staff and provide first-hand reactions to international developments.  Combined with the 
wealth of narratives, biographies, and collected primary documents regarding the Suez 
crisis and its aftermath, the lost art of interdependent diplomacy becomes a matter 
deserving greater attention as the effects of international affairs grow more immediate. 
Viewed from this perspective, a new understanding emerges from the UN‘s 
involvement in the Suez Crisis of 1956.  More than any other example, the organization‘s 
participation in resolving the crisis demonstrated its ability to act independently of any 
one set of interests—particularly the interests of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council.  With this in mind, world order is a concept that is better achieved 
through multilateral diplomacy rather than through the nationally-interested concerns of a 
particular nation.  More inclusive approaches, involving the UN‘s perceptive leadership 
and the exchange of international opinions within the UN General Assembly, create a 
more robust sense of international commitment.  This multilateral approach not only 
facilitated circumstances necessary for resolving the Suez crisis, but also provided a 
successful course of action for the enforcement of peace.  While world leaders agreed to 
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the UN‘s conditions for peace, they rejected the means by which it was achieved.  Since 
1956, world leaders redoubled their efforts to redefine multilateral discourse by 
monopolizing circumstances surrounding diplomatic negotiation.  Much like trends 
emerging from the late nineteenth century, perceptions of multilateralism remain 
beholden to public and private interests within nations rather than the interactions 
between nations.  In many cases, the new definition cultivates crisis by ostracizing 
alternative perspectives and undermining the efforts of creating a vibrant international 
system.  Over half a century later, the Suez crisis demonstrates the need for national 
leaders to respect multilateral diplomacy rather than re-create it in their own self-
interested image. 
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Chapter I 
 
 
 
Disingenuous Consensus: the Subjugation of Multilateral 
Diplomacy from the 1850s to the 1950s and Its Impact on the Suez 
Crisis of 1956 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In many respects, the diplomatic maneuvering that led to the Suez Canal‘s 
construction in 1869 factored into the positions of national leaders taken during the Suez 
Crisis of 1956.  As the canal‘s chief lobbyist and architect, Ferdinand de Lesseps 
appealed to a host of conflicting national interests to gain support for the canal, which 
was to serve as an example of internationalist harmony.  Ignoring the irony, de Lesseps 
forged ahead with creating the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal.  
Originally conceived as a multi-national conglomerate, the company enjoyed little 
official support from European powers, including Great Britain.  Stubborn political 
opposition in London waned over the course of the next decade as Britons reconsidered 
the canal‘s economic and strategic benefits. 
40 
 
As sentiments changed, British politicians and policy-makers began mimicking de 
Lesseps‘s campaigning technique.  Witnessing de Lesseps‘s ability to influence 
governing officials by catering to their national interests, observers realized that the 
Frenchman had also fused these independent interests together to convey a sense of 
multilateral destiny that the canal would generate, thus fulfilling his own entrepreneurial 
interests.  Nineteenth century British policy-makers employed similar measures to extend 
their own unilateral economic, strategic, and colonial interests over the canal.  Brit ish 
policy remained largely unchanged during the events comprising the Suez Crisis of 1956.  
To those officials who inherited this mindset, the Suez crisis loomed as an incident 
without end, mainly because the more inclusive and, therefore, authentic multilateral tack 
required for successful conflict resolution was antithetical to British interests. 
Meanwhile, early Arab and Jewish nationalists followed de Lesseps‘s strategy in 
marshaling heterogeneous sentiments to suit their own hegemonic purposes.  
Unfortunately, for Egyptian nationalists such as Ahmed Urabi, efforts to thwart British 
and French incursion in the 1880s failed.  Zionists, on the other hand, enjoyed greater 
success.  De Lesseps‘s organizational and diplomatic skills inspired those such as 
Theodore Herzl, who were eager to establish their own non-governmental interest groups.  
Herzl used de Lesseps‘s Suez Canal Company as a model for his own Zionist ambitions.  
The combination of national and ethnic interests directly affected the animosities 
fermenting in the long ascent to the Suez crisis.  The progression of these events and the 
characteristics shared among them demonstrate how the Suez Crisis of 1956 served as the 
culmination of a series of crises where key leaders disguised their particular sense of 
world order beneath a more palpable, multilateral perspective. 
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I 
 
Over the course of its lifetime, the Suez Canal has helped redefine the relationship 
between governmental and non-governmental interests.  The growth of entrepreneurial 
influence encroached rapidly upon matters once relegated to traditional diplomacy.  This 
new development benefited de Lesseps greatly.  Once in the service of France‘s elite 
diplomatic corps, Ferdinand de Lesseps left public service to become the self-proclaimed 
ambassador of the Suez Canal project by the 1850s.  Favorable personal relations with 
the French imperial family and the head of the Egyptian government provided de Lesseps 
with an advantage in carrying out his colossal business proposition. 
Like any good businessman, de Lesseps used any means of nationally-interested 
flattery to convince his audience of the importance of his engineering marvel, the Suez 
Canal.  When addressing his cousin Eugenie de Montijo, wife of the French Emperor 
Louis-Napoleon, de Lesseps described the proposed canal as a monument to French 
imperial industrialization.  To woo the Egyptian viceroy Muhammad Pasha al-Said, 
whom de Lesseps had known since childhood, the Frenchmen thought that the canal 
would serve as ―a glorious record for [Mohammad Said‘s] reign‖ and ―an inexhaustible 
source of wealth for Egypt.‖  Continuing on in somewhat of a non-sequitur, de Lesseps 
described how the canal would also revitalize the Ottoman Empire, thus demonstrating 
that its better days lay ahead.
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The common theme running throughout these presentations illustrates the 
mutually exclusive means de Lesseps used to garner support from the various parties.  
While these tactics were neither original nor surprising, de Lesseps‘s methods generated 
a false sense of consensus from contradictory interests.  Instead of working to bridge gaps 
among competing national interests, de Lesseps tailored his ambitions and diplomatic 
strategy to serve these competing interests.  As a result, de Lesseps‘s approach helped 
fuel later confrontations by misrepresenting consensus.  By 1956, American and Soviet 
cold war security, British and French imperialism, as well as Egyptian and Israeli 
nationalism collided in their presentation of self-interest as selfless interest. 
In addition to forming the basis of de Lesseps‘s sales pitch, delusion also 
pervaded his business model.  Nearly four years after acquiring the rights and titles to 
build the canal and collect canal tolls over the course of a ninety-nine year lease, de 
Lesseps set about creating the Suez Canal Company responsible for completing 
construction.  Ideally, de Lesseps hoped to have ―all Western Powers‖ participating as 
major shareholders of his company‘s stock.  All of the 400,000 shares would be divided 
between eight countries.  Minor shareholders such as the United States and Portugal had 
access to 20,000 shares a piece.  France and Britain each had 80,000 shares set aside.  
When the stocks were made available in November 1858 at a sum of 500 francs per 
share, however, de Lesseps‘s scenario disintegrated.  According to historian Hugh 
Schonfield, ―the issue [of stock] would have failed completely had it not been for the fine 
response of France and Egypt.‖  Although disseminated more broadly across nineteen 
countries, France and Egypt controlled over ninety-six percent of all the company‘s 
shares.  Of the nineteen countries that bought initial stock in the Suez Company, only six 
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held 1,000 shares or more.
75
  Yet, despite high concentrations of company securities, de 
Lesseps insisted that the canal would benefit international commerce and 
communication.
76
  When combined with de Lesseps‘s penchant for presenting plans to fit 
his audiences‘ ambitions, the incompatibility between a national interest-oriented sense 
of world order and a more multilateral dialogue becomes clear.  Support for the canal 
operated from interests that not only competed with one another, but also contested any 
sense of multilateral harmony.  Rather than comprehend these divergent complexities, de 
Lesseps believed that they were interconnected.  He manipulated both for his own 
purposes, but the very nature of his approach was, at best, disingenuous toward 
constructing a more genuine consensus.  For de Lesseps, the citizens of nineteen different 
countries wanting a preverbal ―piece of the action‖ represented an international mandate.  
He remained less concerned about where the bulk of shares resided or what impact that 
could have in international affairs. 
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II 
 
Apathy within the British government turned to alarm once it learned that almost 
all of the profits from canal traffic would be consolidated in French and Egyptian 
treasuries.  England‘s Prime Minister, Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston, remained the 
project‘s chief opponent.  As a nineteenth century liberal, Palmerston thought that 
economics, not politics, should determine the issue.  As Palmerston‘s biographer, Herbert 
Bell, points out, the prime minister opposed not so much the canal, but the conditions 
under which it was conceived and the ramifications it would have on Europe‘s balance of 
power.  Palmerston argued that France had pursued the canal project ―in hostility to the 
interests and policy of England.‖  He feared that the canal would transform the 
Mediterranean Sea ―into a French lake‖ threatening British imperial security and access 
to India.  Lastly, Palmerston fretted over implications the canal held for the Ottoman 
Empire.  Britain supported the Turks as a bulwark against Russian ambitions in eastern 
and central Asia.  Completion of the Suez Canal would make Egypt more independent 
from Turkish control, thus weakening Britain‘s regional ally, while simultaneously 
bringing Egypt under French influence and providing Russia with an additional target 
should it wish to invade the Middle East.
77
  Palmerston might have succeeded in 
thwarting de Lesseps‘s plans had it not been for a divided British public.  For a time, 
Parliament and the British people agreed, but small cracks in the public support became 
large fissures by 1858 and 1859. 
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Advocates for the Suez Canal included Palmerston‘s political opposition and the 
public‘s perception of British world dominance once cultivated, ironically enough, by 
Palmerston himself.  One of Palmerston‘s critics was William Gladstone who objected to 
the prime minister‘s Anglo-centric outlook.78  Another parliamentarian, sensing political 
opportunity, took more extraordinary measures to not only criticize government policy, 
but also facilitate its collapse.  On a visit to Paris in December 1856, the aging Member 
of Parliament Benjamin Disraeli became friends with Ralph Earle, a young British 
attaché at the Paris embassy.  As biographer Sarah Bradford puts it, both men were 
highly critical of Palmerston‘s government and shared a ―passion for secrecy and 
intrigue.‖79  From 1857 through 1858, Earle supplied Disraeli with ―secret information‖ 
for use as political ammunition against Palmerston.  Political intrigue became diplomatic 
intrigue when Earle began passing information on to French officials and reporting his 
encounters to Disraeli.  According to Robert Blake: 
[Earle] gave [Napoleon III] a summary of the case which might be 
published by the French Government against Palmerston, and advised the 
[French] Emperor to revive the Suez Canal scheme . . . in order to 
emphasize British dependence on French goodwill in the East.  In effect, 
[Earle] was inciting Napoleon to pursue an anti-British policy in the hope 
that the resulting fracas would bring down Palmerston . . . . The absence of 
clear evidence about Disraeli‘s attitude cannot absolve him from 
complicity.  It is very unlikely that Earle would have written as he did 
unless he had good reason to expect a favorable reception.
80
 
 
By December 1859, such intrigue had not removed the prime minister from office, but it 
had fractured the nation‘s public opinion.  The Times favored construction of the canal as 
long as it was ―essentially British.‖81  Days later, Palmerston wrote J.T. Delane, the 
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newspaper‘s editor, to repeat his objections.82  Nearly eight months after construction on 
the canal began Palmerston‘s arguments against political involvement in the project were 
disintegrating. 
 To some extent, Palmerston was responsible for his political predicament.  
According to another of his biographers, the prime minister became a victim of his own 
popular success.  To buoy his mass approval prior to 1859, Palmerston acquiesced to 
popular perceptions ―of Britain‘s giving the law to the world,‖ but this mentality did not 
dictate Palmerston‘s meticulously crafted and pragmatic foreign policy.83  In many 
respects, Palmerston maintained the diplomatic practices established during the Congress 
of Vienna.  After 1815, harmony among Europe‘s leading states required a measure of 
latitude between honoring an international ―pact of restraint‖ while preserving a nation‘s 
freedom of self-interested ―mobility.‖84  Keeping within these perimeters helped maintain 
peace—not by imposing order—but by appealing to the competing interests of order.  By 
the 1860s, these two diverging approaches, national interests versus multilateral 
diplomacy, created political friction for Palmerston.
85
  Almost a century later, a similar 
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quandary applied to the Suez Crisis of 1956 as the international community, represented 
by the United Nations, came to terms with its constituent members without sacrificing its 
objectivity as an internationalist arbiter. 
During the 1860s, both Palmerston and Gladstone labored to improve Britain‘s 
relations with Egypt once canal construction began.  Not until Benjamin Disraeli became 
Prime Minister in 1874, however, did the British government chart a more unilateral 
course in policy-making.  International affairs of the early 1870s exhibited swift, 
converging economic currents that played to Disraeli‘s political strengths.  For much of 
the nineteenth century, Egypt had prospered in the cotton-growing industry.  During the 
American Civil War, the northern embargo of southern cotton exports increased Egypt‘s 
annual export profits from one million pounds sterling in 1860 to nearly eleven million 
pounds sterling by 1865.  Careless monetary policies and expensive modernization 
efforts, however, left Egypt financially over-extended and suffering from inflation.  With 
the resumption of America‘s cotton trade by 1866, prices plummeted leaving the viceroy 
and his successor, Ismail Pasha, few resources for paying the nation‘s suffocating debt.  
By the mid-1870s, Egyptian debt approached 100 million pounds with millions more 
being added for overdue interest payments.  Among its few worthwhile assets were the 
nearly 177,000 shares of Suez stock the Egyptian government purchased to help fund the 
canal‘s construction. 
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III 
 
Opened on the eve of the new decade, the canal quickly became an investor‘s 
nightmare.  Shares lost over half their value by 1871.  The shares rebounded by 1875, but 
Ismail needed cash desperately to avoid defaulting on immense loan interest payments.  
Having already mortgaged his shares to raise cash, Ismail had no choice but to announce 
the sale of these securities which would yield no dividends and possess no voting rights 
on the company‘s board until 1895.  In the summer of 1875, he set his price at four 
million pounds. 
As England‘s newly elected prime minister, Disraeli jumped at the opportunity to 
fulfill his imperial ambitions and acquire almost half of the canal‘s shares in a single 
stroke.  Disraeli pounced for several reasons.  First, eighty percent of the canal‘s traffic 
flew the Union Jack.  While still only accounting for about ten percent of England‘s 
world trade total, the waterway‘s economic value benefited Britain‘s interests undeniably.  
Second, by 1873, British creditors controlled more than half of the debts extended to prop 
up Egypt‘s economy.86  Defaulting on these debts threatened England‘s creditors as much 
as Egypt‘s debtors.  Third, a recent mutiny in India and Russia‘s continued interest in the 
Middle East and Central Asia made the canal more valuable as a strategic asset for 
British policy-makers.  Lastly, as Robert Blake mentions, ―it seemed all too likely that if 
[Egypt‘s] Khedive, whose financial profligacy was only surpassed by that of his nominal 
suzerain, the Sultan, finally went bankrupt, the French Government would seize the 
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chance [to intervene].‖87  The possibility of French unilateral action was an event 
Britain‘s Conservatives and Liberals hoped to avoid. 
To meet Ismail‘s asking price, Disraeli operated outside official government 
circles.  By-passing his Chancellor of the Exchequer, the prime minister established a line 
of credit with Baron Lionel de Rothschild, one of the wealthiest bankers in Europe.  
Using the British government as collateral, Disraeli received four million pounds at five 
percent interest with an additional two-and-a-half percent commission to compensate 
Rothschild personally.  On 26 November 1875, the British government transferred funds 
via Rothschild‘s bank—an astounding three days after Ismail agreed to Britain‘s offer. 
The hasty and clandestine nature of this transaction polarized British public 
opinion.  For the most part, the masses cheered Disraeli‘s actions.  ―Suez captured the 
public imagination,‖ says Disraeli biographer Stanley Weintraub, ―and helped move the 
Palmerstonian Daily Telegraph, which had supported Gladstone, over to Disraeli.‖88  The 
Queen also expressed her approval.
89
  Support came from the Jewish community too.  A 
spring 1876 article in the Jewish Chronicle hailed Disraeli‘s move as proof of Britain‘s 
interest in bringing Palestine under British control.
90
  Pronouncements such as these, 
however, left some questioning the prime minister‘s motives. 
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Critics attacked nearly every aspect of Disraeli‘s dealings.  Anti-Semites spread 
fears of a Jewish conspiracy.  Himself of Jewish decent, Disraeli was shunned as a 
―Shylock‖ obsessed with ―personal gain at the expense of the national interest.‖91  
Rothschild‘s Jewish heritage only fueled these conspiracy theories.  In the more reasoned 
realm of politics, William Gladstone and others took the opportunity to critique their 
adversary‘s policies.  During a 21 February 1876 debate in the House of Commons, 
opponents questioned the wisdom of purchasing shares that would be financially 
impotent until near the end of the century.  In response, Disraeli argued that by simply 
owning such a large portion of a company, it was impossible not to wield some degree of 
influence regardless of the stocks‘ condition.92  Gladstone worried that England was 
committing itself beyond its capabilities.
93
  Regarding the Rothschild loan, Gladstone and 
others took umbrage at the two-and-a-half percent commission because it made it seem 
―as if [the Rothschilds] were a nonprofit concern and Britain a charity case.‖94  In many 
respects, these developments shared similar characteristics with de Lesseps‘s strategy.  
Both men blended public and private interests to achieve their respective 
objectives.  De Lesseps enlisted the help of government leaders to provide moral and 
financial support for his proposal.  Disraeli reversed the relationship, using Rothschild‘s 
bank to provide the capital for purchasing Egypt‘s shares and aid in securing British 
national interests.  In doing so, both men consolidated control over the canal.  De Lesseps 
expressed an initial interest in limiting the disbursement of Suez Company stock to fewer 
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than ten countries.  After the initial public offering, de Lesseps‘s wish appeared to be 
granted when only two countries held an overwhelming majority of the securities.  In 
1875, the British government perpetuated the trend by replacing Egypt as the largest 
single shareholder. 
Another characteristic de Lesseps and Disraeli shared was the ability to project 
their respective perceptions of reality as innate fact.  During de Lesseps‘s induction into 
the French Academy on 23 April 1885, the institution‘s director Ernest Renan hailed de 
Lesseps‘s qualifications.  ―No one, assuredly, in our age,‖ Renan proclaimed, ―has been 
more persuasive than [de Lesseps], and in consequence no one has been more 
eloquent.‖95  Disraeli‘s brilliant maneuvering in 1875 rivaled that of the French 
entrepreneur, de Lesseps.  Yet, like many of his fellow citizens, Disraeli misunderstood 
the division between public investment and physical ownership.
96
  Contrary to Britain‘s 
popular perception, the Suez Company did not own the canal, only the rights to fees 
collected from it.
97
  In addition to mimicking de Lesseps‘s techniques, Disraeli‘s 
approach also reflected some trends practiced by his own political rivals.  Similar to 
Palmerston, Disraeli projected Britain‘s hegemony.  Like Palmerston, Disraeli allowed 
the British people to believe in this identity without correcting or restraining it.  Unlike 
Palmerston, however, Disraeli believed his own illusions.  The symbiotic relationship 
between Disraeli‘s policies and public fervor became intoxicating.98  This errant 
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mentality persisted for the next eighty years, directly contributing to the Suez Crisis of 
1956.    
Meanwhile, the British government‘s monopolization of commercial and strategic 
influence proved detrimental to cultivating a broader sense of international harmony.  
Although these methods established a greater sense of unity among state and non-state 
interests, they undermined connections between individual states and the rest of the 
international community.  Agreements continued to be drafted and implemented, but the 
basis on which these understandings rested was increasingly unstable.  In essence, greater 
compatibility between governments and private organizations helped contribute to 
international tension and crisis diplomacy.  Neither de Lesseps nor Disraeli heeded these 
concerns as they worked to insulate their respective interests from international 
interference.  Indeed, their perspective reflected the prevailing sentiments of the era. 
 
IV 
 
From this period on, England and much of the world applied and reacted to 
increasingly jingoist ideology expressed first and foremost in various competing foreign 
policies.  Gertrude Himmelfarb‘s analysis of Victorian social history establishes, 
implicitly, how the English transformed national values into universal ones.  In her book 
The De-moralization of Society, she contends that integrating imperialist national 
interests with international common interests emerged as the standard in British policy-
making.  Although Himmelfarb remains suspicious of interpreting the application of 
values as virtuous behavior, she concludes that ―it was no small feat for England, in a 
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period of massive social and economic changes, to attain a degree of civility and 
humaneness that was the envy of the rest of the world.‖99  In other words, Himmelfarb 
pardons the imposition of British values on others because of their enlightening effects on 
other societies.
100
  The period following England‘s acquisition of canal stock reveals a 
more complex relationship. 
By 1876, European colonial appetites gorged on further Egyptian misfortune.  
Within a year of selling its interests in the Suez Canal Company, the Egyptian 
government returned to the brink of defaulting on its crippling debt.  French and English 
financiers intervened on a massive scale.  Known as ―Dual Control,‖ European 
bureaucrats began crafting Egyptian fiscal policy.  Under this policy, Egyptian viceroys 
lost political credibility.
101
  As public services in Egypt either declined or were usurped 
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by British officials, some Egyptians clamored for reform.  Ahmed Urabi, a colonel in the 
Egyptian army, began fighting for prompt payment of money owed to soldiers.  By 1881, 
Urabi criticized the Egyptian government and the amount of foreign influence throughout 
the bureaucracy.  He wished to implement a nationalist agenda.
102
  In September, he and 
his allies brought down the government and created a new one in December.  While 
emphasizing Egyptian sovereignty, Urabi maintained loyalty to the Khedive, the Sultan, 
and the paying of Egypt‘s debts. 
For the British government, Egyptian sovereignty threatened British colonial 
interests.  On 8 January 1882, British and French officials issued a Joint Note threatening 
direct intervention.  Urabi‘s defeat at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir on 13 September 1883 
left British officials in complete control.  Disbanding of the Egyptian army meant that 
British military personnel assumed responsibility for Egypt‘s protection.  As one 
historian put it, ―Britain had put a lid on Egyptian Nationalism, which was to be kept 
down for more or less seventy years, . . . and assumed responsibility for the most 
populous and sophisticated country in Africa.‖  Additionally, the British government had 
also muzzled domestic opposition to its imperialist policies.
103
  By the time this latest 
crisis ended in 1883, Gladstone‘s ruling Liberal Party had endorsed the imperialist 
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ideology that Disraeli‘s Conservatives had long championed.104  The narrow spectrum of 
Britain‘s ideological debate was set. 
Indirectly, these circumstances also influenced the scope of ideological debate 
within Egypt.  Empathy for Egyptian nationalism had not been extinguished, but the 
lessons of these late-nineteenth century experiences altered the relationship between 
Egyptians and their nationalist aspirations.  Numerous issues, including the canal, 
sparked repeated protests during the first half of the twentieth century.
105
  Rather than 
challenge the British government‘s usurpation of multilateral principles to fulfill Britain‘s 
national interests, Egypt‘s iconic nationalist leader of the 1950s, Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
adopted these tactics to advance his own pan-Arab vision.  The precedent set was to make 
a particular cause appear more inclusive than any other cause and to exploit divisions 
within rival perspectives.  Instead, these Machievellian machinations undermined the 
fundamental characteristics of multilateral diplomacy. 
With much of British society firmly believing in the benevolent principles of 
universal liberal doctrine, the country‘s diplomats set about reconciling England‘s North 
African gains with the rest of Europe.  While not the first conference assembled to 
discuss Suez Canal matters, the Constantinople Convention of 1888 was perhaps the most 
important.  Unlike the Conference of 1873, which standardized the canal‘s fees and the 
measurement of tonnage, the 1888 convention addressed the issue of security.  
Immediately after ousting Urabi, British officials wanted a multilateral agreement ―to 
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preserve the freedom of the canal for the passage of all ships in any circumstances‖ while 
reserving ―the right to defend the canal from an act of aggression against Egypt so long as 
[Britain‘s] occupation . . . continued.‖106  Negotiations teetered for the next six years 
culminating in the 1888 meeting.  Attendees included British, French, Russian, Spanish, 
Italian, Dutch, Austrian, German, and Ottoman officials. 
Signatories of the Constantinople Treaty represented a broader collection of 
interests and opinions than the French and British rivalries decades earlier, but certain 
conditions provided ample opportunities for unilateral activity.  Throughout his quest to 
build the canal, de Lesseps believed that the great powers should maintain the waterway 
as a neutral site benefiting world trade.
107
  Unfortunately, the politics of Europe‘s balance 
of power were not so idealistic.  France and Russia wanted Britain out of Egypt as soon 
as possible.
108
  The 1888 agreement not only failed to do so, it also did little to clarify 
transit rights and canal control.  In the words of historian Hugh Schonfield, ―the Canal 
was not to be neutralized but rather extraterritorialized while remaining part of Egypt.‖109  
The canal may have remained a part of Egypt, but matters concerning its operation 
belonged to the Commission of Consular Agents, comprised of the states attending the 
1888 convention.  Article 12 guaranteed international safeguards by proclaiming ―that 
none of [the participants] shall endeavor to obtain with respect to the Canal territorial or 
commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be 
concluded.‖110  Yet, under Articles 8 and 9, all participants oversaw proper enforcement 
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of the treaty, but Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were responsible for resolving canal-
related disputes.
111
  The combination of these stipulations robbed the Constantinople 
Treaty of any multilateral value.  Interested parties were left to police themselves and 
settlement of any infractions rested in the hands of the two governments least able to 
impose authority on others.  Egypt‘s de facto status as a protectorate of the British 
Empire meant that the British government sacrificed very little when it agreed to these 
conditions.  With Egypt and the canal under British control, attention shifted to securing 
British interests in Palestine.  ―The urge,‖ historian Isaiah Friedman writes, ―to widen the 
cordon sanitaire off the Suez Canal zone became almost irresistible‖ and led the British 
government to dominate much of the Middle East.
112
  The mirage of a multilateral 
framework not only disguised the aims of unilateral control, but also, in Britain‘s case, 
demonstrated a perpetual desire for expansive influence. 
 
V 
 
Special interest groups, such as the burgeoning Zionist movement of the late 
nineteenth century, adopted similar political tactics.  Zionist ambitions of creating a 
Jewish homeland reflected trends tracing back to the early 1800s.  Roughly a decade after 
Napoleon‘s invasion of Egypt, Jews began returning to the Negev region in ―large, 
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organized parties.‖  Turkish and Egyptian rulers respected Jews, providing them with 
legal rights and representation in local government.  As the century progressed, orthodox 
Jews saw Erez-Israel as a pristine, uncorrupted land far removed from the modern 
European culture that eroded the foundations of Judaism by satisfying immediate 
gratification with ―material needs.‖  Over time, Europe‘s Jewish community split 
between those espousing separation from and those favoring assimilation with 
mainstream European society.
113
  As the century drew to a close, Zionist leadership 
established an illusion of unity to mask stark divisions within the Jewish community and 
all across Europe regarding the formation of a Jewish state. 
As a young journalist in Vienna, Theodor Herzl became an ardent Zionist.  Just as 
de Lesseps had done nearly forty years earlier, Herzl moved almost constantly across 
Europe to spread his ideas and rally support.  From 1890 to 1895, the journalist organized 
Jewish nationalist sentiment to combat what he considered to be a rising tide of anti-
Semitism.  He corresponded with religious figures, fellow journalists, authors, and both 
active and retired politicians.
114
  During these years, Herzl remained adamant in his 
perspective.  After submitting his ideas to the Rothschild Family Council, the young 
journalist recorded in his dairy: ―I [Herzl] bring to the Rothschilds and the big Jews their 
historical mission.  I shall welcome all men of goodwill—we must be united—and crush 
all those of bad.‖115 
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Herzl realized that he faced stubborn opposition.  In Paris, Baron Maurice von 
Hirsch described Herzl‘s views as ―fantastic‖ and utterly unattainable without help from 
wealthy Jews who opposed the Zionist movement.
116
  Where Herzl wished to transplant 
Jewish culture, Hirsch sought its complete reconstruction from an urban, professional 
culture to a rural, agrarian one.  Herzl wanted to accentuate Jewish innovation and 
ambition.  Hirsch wanted a more humble approach to Zionism.  By 1896, many Jews, 
including formal publications such as The Jewish Chronicle, preferred Hirsch‘s 
arguments over Herzl‘s.117  Other Europeans such as the wealthy Jewish banking family 
of the Rothschilds as well as former German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck also deemed 
Herzl‘s proposals to be somewhat radical and dangerous.118  After these early negative 
critiques, Herzl traveled to England and found a more favorable audience. 
English support for a Jewish homeland in the Middle East was well-established by 
the time Herzl visited London and Wales.  Since the mid-nineteenth century, Lord 
Palmerston advocated Jewish emigration to Palestine, in effect, reinforcing Britain‘s 
consolidation of power in the region.  To demonstrate the level of commitment to the 
region, the British government pursued, not only formal diplomatic ties with Ottoman 
officials, but also cultivated informal relations with a private, ethnic community within 
the Ottoman‘s domain.  Disraeli‘s handling of Suez Canal securities and the outright 
seizing of control in Egypt in 1882 only intensified England‘s interests in the Negev 
region.   Jewish settlement of the area would secure the only viable route through which 
England‘s chief rival, Russia, could threaten the Suez Canal.  In November 1895, Herzl 
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toured England spreading his Zionist message.  England‘s Zionist allies, including Israel 
Zangwill, helped Herzl refine his nationalist aspirations.
119
  Inspired, Herzl returned to 
Vienna in 1896 to record his thoughts in what has become a centerpiece in Zionist 
literature. 
Similar to de Lesseps‘s approach to constructing the Suez Canal, Herzl applied 
business-oriented means to fulfill romantic Zionist ends in his 1896 landmark book, Der 
Judenstaadt.
120
  Like the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal, Herzl called 
for creating a ―Jewish Company‖ to act as ―a joint-stock company‖ to assist in the 
emigration of Jews interested in establishing a Jewish homeland.  Understanding the need 
for popular consensus within the Jewish community, Herzl organized ―the Society of 
Jews‖ to ensure, as Herzl put it, ―that the enterprise becomes a Suez rather than a 
Panama.‖121  As two de Lesseps-inspired projects, the Suez and Panama Canal ventures 
became the measure for the Jewish Company‘s success and failure.  Herzl could not have 
been any clearer in how influential the Suez Canal Company, and de Lesseps himself, 
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was to his envisioning the Jewish settlement of Palestine.
122
  However, one of the earliest 
challenges facing Herzl‘s scheme was the faulty presupposition upon which his ―Society 
of Jews‖ rested. 
As Herzl ascended to the forefront of the late nineteenth century Zionist 
movement, he underestimated the persistent divisions within the Jewish community and 
opposition he had experienced in sharing his views.  Just as European heads-of-state and 
British public opinion had splintered during the Suez Canal‘s construction, Jewish 
opinions regarding Zionism were by no means unified.  Hirsch remained committed to 
his agrarian experiment in Argentina.
123
  In another instance, Jewish publishers refused to 
print Herzl‘s book.  One such publisher believed that the Jews‘ conditions were 
improving socially and politically and that European anti-Semitism was receding.
124
  
Others, including the wealthy banker Lord Nathaniel Rothschild,
125
 tended to agree.  
Herzl recorded in his diary that ―[Nathaniel Rothschild] did not believe in Zionism. . . . 
[Rothschild] was an Englishman and wanted to remain one.‖126  As the wealthy European 
family who had helped England secure commercial rights to the Suez Canal, the 
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Rothschilds did not want Herzl to spread news of the hardships experienced by Eastern 
European Jews. 
Russian and Eastern European Jews became political and social scapegoats for 
rising nationalist and anti-Semitic feelings.  Legal discrimination stripped Jews of voting 
and property rights as well as equal education opportunities.  Pogroms targeting Jewish 
communities and businesses led to mobs looting, publicly beating, and murdering Jews.  
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed over two million Jews fleeing 
from the East to Western Europe and to the United States.  A few Eastern European Jews 
made their way to Palestine and wished to continue doing so without attracting the 
international attention that Herzl was fomenting.  Critics of Herzl‘s methods, including 
the Rothschilds, believed that agitation would result in restrictive immigration policies 
preventing Jews from relocating in the West.
127
  The Dreyfus Affair of 1894-1895 
amplified these fears as anti-Semitic activities increased in Western Europe after Alfred 
Dreyfus was wrongfully found guilty of treason.  Dreyfus was a French military officer 
who was also Jewish.  Herzl argued that such abuses made a Jewish homeland an 
indispensable necessity.
128
 
Outside the Jewish community Herzl encountered mixed reactions to his proposal.  
In some cases, he found tacit support but always in an unofficial capacity.  The Grand 
Duke Friedrich I of Baden worried that by supporting Zionism, ―people would 
misinterpret this as anti-Semitism on his part.‖  When pressed to allow his views to be 
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shared with ―a few trustworthy men in England,‖ however, the Duke agreed.129  In other 
cases, Herzl ran into stubborn resistance.  Ottoman obstruction to relinquishing control of 
any part of Palestine thwarted any immediate plans for a Jewish state.  Despite this 
setback, Herzl wove together a network to move his ideas forward, much the same way 
as de Lesseps had done. 
As Europe‘s leading figures in the Jewish community convened the First Zionist 
Congress in August of 1897, Herzl and others realized that dissension could prove fatal to 
the movement‘s agenda.  As the World Zionist Organization proclaims on its web-site, 
―the Congress was created to organize all the Zionist ideologies under one movement, a 
political movement.‖130  To his credit, Herzl handled the proceedings with the utmost 
diplomacy.  He eased tensions, allowed delegates to speak their mind, and yielded to the 
assembly‘s decisions regarding the Zionist platform‘s content.  Yet, his frustrations 
seethed beneath this placid veneer.  Confiding in his diary, Herzl referred to some 
attendees as ―‗enemies‘‖ and even went so far as to describe one adversary as ―a real 
Judas.‖131  The Jewish physician and literary icon, Max Nordau, voiced an equal degree 
of vehemence when he took the podium at the Zionist Congress.  After describing the 
tormented existence of Western European Jews and the resiliency of the Jewish 
community, Nordau concluded, ―The opinion of the outside world had no influence, 
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because it was the opinion of ignorant enemies.‖132  What is supremely ironic about the 
approach Herzl and Nordau took is that they sought to add their voices to the world 
community by creating a new Jewish state—but they did so by shunning much of the 
very community they wished to join. 
In some respects, interesting comparisons exist between the Zionist strategy and 
those strategies used by de Lesseps and Britain‘s political leadership.  While not as 
concerned with camouflaging nationalist ambitions beneath multilateral rhetoric, Zionist 
leaders continued recognizing the importance of projecting uniform solidarity as a 
prerequisite for influencing the international community.  By 1907, members attending 
the Eighth Zionist Congress called for pressing ahead with establishing Jewish colonies 
in Palestine.  ―After that,‖ writes one scholar, ―the necessary international guarantees to 
protect Zionist colonization could be obtained.‖133  Projecting a presence of broader, 
universal support remained in the service of fulfilling self-interested ends just as it had 
been by Europe‘s entrepreneurs and politicians.  Yet, some Zionists took the 
extraordinary measure of denouncing the international community and its insensitivity to 
Jewish concerns.  During and after the Suez Crisis of 1956, Israeli Prime Minister David 
Ben-Gurion‘s foreign policy operated from the same uniquely hypocritical set of 
assumptions.  In addition to escalating the likelihood of crisis between states, this 
perspective dictated the agenda of transnational groups such as the Jews dating back to its 
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earliest foundations.  The use of ―a variety of myths,‖ as historian Michael Berkowitz put 
it, allowed ―[succeeding Zionist Congresses to act as] the single most powerful force in 
transmitting Zionist goals and ideals to the party faithful and the broader Jewish 
audience.‖134  The manipulation of an internationalist perspective reigned uncontested. 
 
VI 
 
French and British Middle East policies enacted during the First World War only 
reinforced the status quo.  Beginning in November 1916, Britain‘s Sir Mark Sykes and 
France‘s Francois Georges Picot discussed postwar plans for the region.  According to 
historian David Fromkin, despite the treaty‘s division of regional influence between 
Britain and France, British officials portrayed French rule as ―annexation‖ of Arab land 
while depicting British authority as synonymous with Arab ―independence.‖135  The 
desire to secure their own interests in the Middle East jeopardized the multilateral niche 
British diplomats had attempted to create for themselves.  Practicing these types of 
mutually exclusive tactics did little to achieve the objective of negotiating a postwar 
peace agreement. 
British officials adopted an almost identical approach when addressing Zionist 
concerns.  Mindful of their interests in the region, British officials respected the 
―international problem‖ that Palestine and the Jewish Question posed.  Failure to 
recognize Jewish claims might have made the Jewish community allies of the German 
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Empire.
136
    In addition to depriving Germany of Jewish support in the Great War, the 
British government sought to preserve Britain‘s wartime gains in the Levant.  Britain‘s 
outright ―military conquest‖ of Palestine ―would have violated the principle of non-
acquisition of territories by war enunciated by President Wilson and the Provisional 
Russian government, and alienated world opinion.‖  Left with no other viable option, 
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George authorized the Balfour Declaration, 
recognizing Zionist claims in Palestine.
137
  Once again, unilateral objectives sought 
fulfillment through multilateral means.  By proclaiming Britain‘s endearing ties to Arab 
and Jewish populations as stipulated by British interpretation of the Sykes-Picot Treaty 
and the Balfour Declaration, Lloyd George hoped to safe-guard his country‘s interests in 
the region. 
Fortunately for the British government, much of the rest of Europe as well as the 
United States was receptive to Zionist ambitions.  Like Great Britain, however, the basis 
for this support remained beholden to the respective countries‘ national interests.  The 
French Foreign Ministry‘s support for Zionist goals remained based on the condition of 
Allied success in the Great War.
138
  In historian Alan Sharp‘s estimation, French Prime 
Minister Georges Clemenceau traded greater British control in Palestine and the Middle 
East for Britain‘s future support of French interests in the Rhineland and other 
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Eurocentric issues.  Lloyd George‘s part in fulfilling this quid pro quo was not 
forthcoming, however.  Sharp attributes the reversal to changes in British and Russian 
fortunes of war.  British conquests in the Middle East late in the war bolstered British 
confidence.  Meanwhile, the collapse of Tzarist Russia in 1917 removed the threat of 
Russian expansion into the region. Where French occupation of Lebanon and Syria once 
served as a buffer, protecting British spheres of influence from a possible Russian 
incursion, French possessions now rivaled British interests in the Middle East.
139
  ―The 
bitterness resulting from this Anglo-French misunderstanding [regarding the quid pro 
quo],‖ Sharp continues, ―was unfortunate and persistent.‖140 
Indeed, the British government‘s effort to incorporate as many allies as possible 
without sacrificing any of their national interests seems naïve.  Like a diplomatic game of 
musical chairs, once the music stopped, parties would participate in a free-for-all.  This 
analogy representing the pursuit of self-interest is neither surprising nor unique.  What is 
particularly disturbing, however, was the way in which British officials continued 
misrepresenting notions of multilateral diplomacy.  The implication that everyone‘s 
interests could be met rested on policies that contradicted one another.  After the chorus 
of the Great War ended in November 1918, Jews and Arabs occupied the same seat. 
At the Paris Peace Conference, Jews and Arabs stated their case for self-
determination before the conference‘s Council of Ten in February and early March 1919.  
Jewish leaders agreed to British trusteeship provided that Britain encourage local self-
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government, respect Jewish religious traditions, enforce equal rights, and allow those in 
Palestine to freely choose to become Palestinian citizens if they so desired.  Prince Feisal 
spoke on behalf of Arab interests.  Recounting the Arabs‘ loyal service to the Allies in 
defeating the Ottoman Turks, Feisal requested fulfillment of promises made regarding 
Arab independence, contrary to the settlement reached in the secret Sykes-Picot 
proceedings.  During one exchange at the Council of Ten meeting, American President 
Woodrow Wilson asked for Feisal‘s ―personal opinion‖ if the Middle East were to be 
mandated to one of the Great Powers.  Would he [Feisal] prefer one mandatory or 
several?  Initially, the Prince deferred to wishes of Arab public opinion.  When pressed 
for his own views though, Feisal opposed ―partition.‖  As he put it, ―Arab unity‖ was his 
primary concern.  ―The Arabs,‖ he said, ―asked for freedom only and would take nothing 
less.‖141  The council largely ignored Feisal‘s opinions.142  Britain and France partitioned 
the Middle East and governed the territories they controlled. 
Britain‘s obsession with preserving order during the interwar period disregarded 
the need for establishing an internationalist network to bridge the influx of ethnic and 
cultural diversity. As early as 1921—even prior to the League of Nations officially 
recognizing the Sykes-Picot Agreement—tensions boiled over during the Nebi Musa 
riots, in Palestine.  In an effort to impose order, British officials investigated the causes 
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for the riots and limited Jewish immigration to Palestine.  Historian Anthony Best and 
others agree that ―the unrest, as well as the British response laid down the pattern for the 
rest of the mandatory period.‖143  Throughout the remainder of the 1920s, relations 
between British authorities, Jews, and Arabs were particularly opportunistic.  The Arab 
majority, represented by the Husseini faction, were highly critical of British policies, yet 
received ample funds from British sources.  The minority Nashashibis faction, espousing 
reconciliation with the Jews, won Jewish financial support.  During the Wailing Wall 
riots of 1929 where Arabs and Jews clashed over rights to religious prayer in Jerusalem, 
Arab protesters also ―accused the Jews of . . . coveting all the Arab lands lying between 
the Nile and Euphrates [Rivers].‖144 
Caught in a deteriorating situation, where instability in Palestine was the norm, 
British policies began to break down as a result of internal discontent as well as external 
disillusionment.  The British government sought to salvage reconciliation by redefining 
its explicit support for Jewish autonomy in Palestine.  In the wake of the Wailing Wall 
Riots, the 1930 Passfield White Paper called for Zionist concessions regarding the 
establishment of a national home.  Historian Peggy Mann contends that one reason for 
British reservations was due to the growing importance Arab oil played in determining 
Britain‘s economic and national security policies.  The Suez Canal‘s role as a conduit 
through which vital supplies of oil moved also impacted British policies in the region.  
This imperial asset could have become the target of Arab reprisals if British officials 
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persisted with supporting Zionist claims.
145
  Agreement on these findings, however, was 
by no means unanimous.  By 1931, Zionist supporters in Britain had mobilized public 
opinion enough for British Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald to voice his opposition to 
the Passfield report and its call for restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine.
146
  
This bout of policy whiplash left many Arabs questioning Britain‘s status as an honest 
broker in the Middle East. 
The Arab Revolt, lasting from 1936 to 1939, testified to Arab frustrations.  
General strikes and acts of civil disobedience turned to outright violence by 1937.  
During that year, British advisers, convening the Peel Commission, recommended 
partition of Jews and Arabs.  The British government shied away from this drastic 
proposal and reverted to its policy of abandoning the creation of a Jewish state.  Jewish 
immigration was curtailed again and support shifted to ―guaranteeing the achievement of 
an Arab Palestinian state within ten years.‖147  These experiences during the interwar 
years demonstrate the debilitating effects British interests had in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  In addition to failing to address the concerns of the two most contentious 
ethnic communities in Palestine, erratic British policies also sabotaged British efforts to 
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stabilize the region.  The Suez Crisis of 1956 arose and intensified as a result of similar 
circumstances. 
 
VII 
 
After the Second World War, prospects for an enlightened era of multilateral 
diplomacy seemed possible.  The Iranian crisis of 1946 provided the newly formed 
United Nations with an opportunity to capitalize from this popular attitude.  Several 
weeks after the formal surrender of the Axis Powers, Soviet forces lingered in the 
northern provinces of Iran.  When rebellion erupted in these provinces, the Soviets denied 
access to Iranian troops deployed to quell the revolt.  On 19 January 1946, the matter was 
referred to the United Nations Security Council.  While American officials did expend a 
significant amount of diplomatic pressure through the UN, they respected the 
organization‘s jurisdiction.  The United States government favored immediate UN action 
to convey a sense of strength and authority to the international community.  When 
Soviets and Iranians presented their own individual proposals to end the crisis, some 
American advisors opted for broader debate.  ―An agreement involving withdrawal of the 
Soviet and Ukrainian notes following withdrawal of the Iranian note, without full 
discussion in the Security council,‖ one undated draft telegram stressed, ―would indicate 
that the Security Council was an arena for unabashed political bargaining instead of a 
forum for free international discussion.‖148  As the Cold War consumed the attention of 
policy-makers in Washington over the course of next decade, calls for open debate 
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remained constant but the basis for such debate changed from preserving the viability of 
the United Nations to protecting America‘s global security interests. 
Other initiatives to facilitate multilateral debate after the Second World War were 
better at remaining beholden to their original sense of purpose.  The re-aligning of 
economic and political power after 1945 allowed colonized populations to demand and 
act on behalf of their independence, which helped encourage collective discourse.  As 
early as the spring of 1947, organizational efforts began with the Asian Relations 
Conference (ARC).
149
  Over 200 delegates and observers represented thirty-one countries 
ranging from Egypt to Australia and beyond.
150
  Defined as a ―cultural‖ conference, the 
ARC ―decided on as inclusive a list of invitees as possible‖ to counter ingrained trends of 
conferring within exclusive groups so as to present a unified front and thus diminish 
differences.    Diverse and openly opposed groups such as the Jews and Arabs as well as 
the Nationalist and Communist Chinese factions were invited to contribute to the ―growth 
in understanding‖ and ―maturity‖ necessary for postwar problem-solving.  Attendees 
included specialists ―from cultural organizations . . . [as well as] individual scholars.‖151 
Many conflicting assessments obscure the conference‘s significance.  In a general 
sense, the meeting met expectations, but some critics felt more could have been achieved. 
Historian A.W. Stargardt makes two key observations that accentuate success.  First, 
―many individual delegates tended to voice their own views, rather than repeat a ‗line‘ 
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and, at times, the discussions were enhanced by the diversity of views expressed by 
members of the same delegation.  For the most part, delegates agreed upon raising 
standards of living via planned economies that were ―free . . . from the influence of 
foreign capital.‖  According to analysts at the American Institute of Pacific Relations 
present during the conference, Jewish representatives, comprising the entire Palestinian 
delegation, dissented, advocating instead, ―heavily capitalized‖ partnerships with 
industrialized nations.
152
  Yet, when some delegates proposed a continental trading bloc, 
others feared the threat of Indian and Chinese dominance.
153
  Second, Stargardt noticed 
that ―looking beyond the detail, this conference was seen as a great demonstration for the 
freedom and independence of the countries of Asia which some were in the process of 
achieving and which could not long be denied to others.‖154  General consensus declared 
that imperial elements should be removed and that countries reserved the right to set ―its 
own immigration policy.‖  However, opinions splintered over the amount of support 
powerful Asian states should commit to weaker neighbors in their struggle for 
independence.  Those in favor of more ―active assistance‖ were off-set by those 
attempting isolate, not expand, pockets of conflict.
155
  More than anything else, the ARC 
served as a forum of opinion that became more institutionalized—but rather than promote 
uniformity, it accepted and reflected diversity as an alternative to rigid perceptions of 
order. 
After World War II, the world‘s political environment was such that individuals 
and newly independent countries such as India sought to embrace this diversity and 
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include those that European imperialists ostracized.  This idea grew in popularity up 
through the 1950s and had a definitive effect on multilateralsim within the United 
Nations.  Historian Akira Iriye would label ARC objectives as ―globalization‖ and 
―multiculturalism‖ that ―was . . . giving rise to [an] awareness of diversity.‖156  Extending 
beyond awareness, however, the ARC, and the numerous examples succeeding it, helped 
propel diversity into a broader sense of internationalist purpose.  As Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru, the ARC‘s chairperson, stated at the opening session: 
We seek no narrow nationalism.  Nationalism has a place in each country 
and should be fostered, but it must not be allowed to become aggressive 
and come in the way of international development. . . .  The freedom we 
envisage is not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular 
people, but must be spread out over the while world.
157
 
 
Rather than interpret multilateralism as an extension of national interests, Nehru and 
indeed much of the developing world separated the two spheres.  By 1947, Nehru and 
others wanted their new nationalist regimes to affect international debate and did so by 
accentuating diversity rather than suppressing it.  Nehru‘s approach formed the basis of 
his evolving non-aligned philosophy.  This idea of improving the socio-economic 
standing for a majority of the world‘s population took off during the 1950s and became 
the basis for the Non-Aligned Movement. 
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VIII 
 
Although the impact of the ARC‘s independent internationalist outlook affected 
some participants profoundly, others saw no place for such a perspective to their own 
autonomous pursuits.  For example, the curtailing of nationalist sentiments in favor of 
multilateral diversity failed to influence matters regarding the increasingly volatile 
Jewish-Arab dispute in Palestine.  As Britain‘s imperial domain crumbled rapidly after 
World War II, both Arabs and Jews perpetrated terrorist attacks.  Generally speaking, 
Arabs targeted Jews; Jews targeted British authorities.
158
  Jewish militants obliterated 
British military headquarters at the King David Hotel on 22 July 1946.  On 14 February 
1947, London officials announced their intent to return Palestine to the League of Nations 
successor, the United Nations.  Meeting in its first emergency session in May 1947, the 
UN General Assembly agreed to form a special committee to investigate.  Like the 
countless commissions preceding it, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) gathered information and testimony to decide on a course of action. 
 The Special Committee faced truly daunting challenges as it inherited the 
problems pervading the fate of Palestine.  One of the most crippling issues was the 
questionable quality of the committee delegates.  Ralph Bunche, representing the UN 
secretariat office during the UNSCOP mission, provided less-than flattering assessments 
of his colleagues.  In his opinion, of all the delegates from Australia, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Holland, Iran, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and 
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Yugoslavia, no one possessed the necessary appreciation of the situation, nor the 
objectivity required for constructive leadership.
159
  None of the committee members, 
including Bunche, were specialists in Middle Eastern affairs.  What Bunche possessed 
that the others lacked was an ability to balance sensitivity to the intricacies of the 
situation with the resolve necessary for maintaining perspective.
160
  The committee 
members‘ lack of this critical equilibrium was not the only challenge that confronted 
them in Palestine.  
External efforts to influence UNSCOP added to the complexities facing the UN 
delegation and its mission.  Raids, arrests, and killings continued in spite of the 
committee‘s presence in Palestine.  These activities distracted the delegates as they 
questioned whether the committee, as a whole, should comment publicly on these matters 
or keep their attention focused on the task at hand.  Debate within UNSCOP devolved 
into futile pro-Zionist, pro-Arab arguments regarding the volatile course of events 
involving British authorities, Jews, and Arabs.  In some instances, Jews and British 
authorities used ―spies and bugging devises‖ to monitor UNSCOP members.161  As the 
UN group set their itinerary for conducting interviews of various factions within each of 
the interested parties, British officials declared that UNSCOP would have to provide a list 
of the prospective interviewees, some of which included people wanted by the British 
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authorities.
162
  British attempts to manipulate UNSCOP to serve their own purposes 
threatened to derail the UN‘s efforts to engage in pluralistic diplomacy. 
Arabs and Jews devised their own strategies when interacting with the UN 
delegation.  Protesting UNSCOP‘s simple notion of acknowledging and negotiating with 
Zionist interests, Arab officials boycotted the delegation‘s fact-finding mission.  The 
Jewish population, on the other hand, carried out a well-scripted drama.  Moderate and 
hard-line Zionists, such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, often employed 
―good cop, bad cop‖ tactics to make Weizmann‘s appeals appear more amiable and 
persuasive to committee delegates.
163
  Seeing Ralph Bunche as the most capable member 
of the delegation, Zionists from the Jewish Agency wanted private access to him in order 
to make their case.
164
 
 The attempts to influence and interfere with the UN delegation combined with the 
rigors of their travels and security burdened the committee members.  Like all mediators 
in the Arab-Jewish dispute, Bunche and other members of UNSCOP grew frustrated and 
became mired in confusion and pessimism.
165
  One of the main frustrations was the fact 
that, as Bunche put it, ―there was a vacuum in [Palestine] so far as authority was 
concerned, and this was particularly true with regard to the Arabs.‖  Where Jews were 
allowed to construct a ―semi-governmental apparatus‖ consisting of hospitals, schools, 
and ―local authorities,‖ Arabs remained dependent on British authorities and were thus 
poorly prepared for the termination of Britain‘s mandate in Palestine.166  Given these 
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circumstances, the UN officials moved towards making their final recommendations.  
UNSCOP agreed upon some form of territorial partition between Jews and Arabs but 
differed as to its degree.  Bunche drafted both the majority and minority reports that 
would eventually frame the scope of debate in the UN General Assembly. 
 The Indian, Iranian, and Yugoslavian delegates represented the minority 
viewpoint which supported the idea of a federal, bi-national state.  Instead of two separate 
entities, land would be divided into Arab and Jewish sectors, but political power would 
rest in a unified central government representing the interests of both parties.  Defense, 
foreign policy, finance, and immigration would be the responsibility of the federal 
government, while the two ―states‖ comprising it would dictate education, housing, 
public health, and taxation policies.
167
  The pluralist aspects of this proposal seem clear.  
Arabs and Jews would be able to enjoy nominal self-determination of primarily domestic 
concerns while federal control set the international agenda. 
 In a lengthy explanation of his opposition to the majority, Abdur Rahman, India‘s 
UNSCOP representative, noted that support for a federated state was considerable.  
Rahman expressed how the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry, assessing the plight 
post-World War II Palestine, had rejected complete partition because of fears that it 
―would result in civil strife which might threaten the peace of the world.‖  Rahman and 
Vladimir Simic, Yugoslavia‘s delegate, acknowledged that Britain‘s maintenance of the 
status-quo led to deficiencies in education, public health, law, land reform, and taxation 
policy which resulted in a weak political infrastructure.  In spite of these shortcomings, 
Rahman argued that self-determination was indivisible and therefore must be granted to 
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the people of Palestine as a whole.
168
  UNSCOP‘s majority, however, adopted a more 
literal interpretation of the term ―self-determination.‖ 
Minus the three delegates favoring federalism and Australia‘s abstention, the 
remaining committee members called for two separate states.  Like a Salvador Dali-
inspired checkerboard, the boundaries of these two states paradoxically integrated the two 
communities together while simultaneously alternating patches of territory between 
Jewish and Arab rule.  Jerusalem and lands immediately surrounding it became an 
international enclave.  In an effort to emphasize greater cooperation, and perhaps appeal 
to the advocates favoring federation, UNSCOP would authorize official recognition of 
either state‘s independence after the signing of a treaty creating ―a formal economic 
union.‖169  Nearly six months after Nehru‘s proclamations at the ARC, where he 
espoused nationalist sentiments that respected the international community and its efforts 
to guarantee universal freedoms, UNSCOP delivered its findings to the United Nations 
General Assembly.  By October 1947, the Assembly deliberated both proposals. 
Support for United Nations Resolution 181, endorsing partition, was at best 
reluctant.  In the United States, President Harry S. Truman agonized over the Arab-
Jewish predicament.  As early as 1946, the president supported partition plans.
170
  Yet, 
according to historian Michael Cohen, ―Truman still clung to the plan for a unitary 
Palestine as advocated first by the Anglo-American Committee‖—the same committee 
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Rahman praised in his opposition of UNSCOP‘s majority ruling.  Lobbyists for Zionism 
and political reverses during America‘s 1946 mid-term elections helped Truman change 
his mind.   The Chairman of the Democratic National Committee told Truman that even 
toning down previous pro-Zionist statements could cost the president re-election in 1948.  
Likewise, high-ranking bureaucrats opposed to partition came to understand the political 
interests at work.  As the UNSCOP plan made its way before the UN General Assembly, 
Loy Henderson, a State Department official and member of the U.S. delegation to the UN 
―realized [years later] that Congress, the press, the Democratic party, and aroused public 
opinion would all turn against [Truman] should he withdraw his support for the 
Zionists.‖171  According to historian Peter Hahn‘s investigation of the close relations 
between Zionist organizations and the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Truman 
heard from yet another bloc of his constituency that was in favor of creating an 
independent Jewish state.
172
  Truman, himself, recalled years later, ―I do not think I ever 
had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this 
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instance.‖173  Much like the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, U.S. officials operated from a 
position of national self-interest that infringed upon multilateral approaches to arbitration. 
From roughly this point forward, the United States began a slow process of 
replacing Britain as the power responsible for constructing consensus in the Middle East.  
Historian Melani McAlister notes that, in spite of domestic political opposition, the threat 
of continued Soviet expansion accentuated ―the necessity not only for U.S. leadership but 
also for U.S. supremacy.‖174  One key focus for such ―supremacy‖ applied directly to the 
Arab-Jewish dispute.  Using the United Nations as a basis for consensus, American 
officials applied their own ―special pressure‖ on Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines, 
Nationalist China, Ethiopia, and Greece to get UNSCOP‘s partition plan through the 
General Assembly.
175
  Economic and military aid as well as collective security 
agreements, such as the Rio Treaty of 1947, helped ensure all but Greece‘s compliance.  
Without this effort, the two-vote cushion by which UN Resolution 181 passed the 
General Assembly would not have been achieved in all likelihood. 
In many respects, these events emulate the course taken by British officials with 
regard to the Suez Canal.  Two examples, the complete reversal of British and American 
policy regarding the Zionist agenda and the fulfilling of national interests through the 
manipulation of multilateral consensus, stand out as the most significant parallels.
176
  
                                               
173 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1956), p. 
158. 
174McAlister, Epic Encounters, p. 50. 
175 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. 261.  Heavy lobbying by non-government 
organizations such as the Jewish Agency, sympathy for Holocaust victims, Arab non-cooperation, and 
considerable political pressure from the United States all helped pass the resolution by a slim margin.  See 
also Best, et. al., International History of the Twentieth Century, p. 120. 
176 Historians Melvyn Leffler and Douglas Little describe how American policy towards creating a Jewish 
state reversed itself twice.  By the spring of 1948, senior officials at the State Department thought they had 
persuaded Truman to support a federated state.  When Warren Austin, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, 
expressed this change in policy openly, Truman bristled at the news.  The President‘s only recourse 
82 
 
Truman as well as much of the American public understood the Arab-Jewish dispute 
mainly from the viewpoint of domestic national politics rather than Middle Eastern 
stability.  As a result, the motivation for passage of UN Resolution 181 conflicted with 
efforts to establish a greater degree of interdependency between Arabs and Jews that a 
federated state may have cultivated.  National self-interest remained the dominant motive 
not only for the United States, but also for the several states that were corralled into 
voting for partition. 
While national interests are rightfully considered to be a fundamental aspect of 
international affairs, it seems equally justifiable to conclude that obsessive attention paid 
to national interests creates new and increasingly volatile problems that unfettered 
multilateral diplomacy may be better able to resolve.  Throughout the history of the of the 
Suez Canal and the myriad interests it stimulated, one subtle irony that contributed 
substantially to international crisis was the inability of interested parties to identify and 
allow for multilateral diplomacy in matters where national interests conflicted.  Officials, 
such Ralph Bunche and others, who comprehended the perilous diplomatic trends being 
established, formed a nascent minority.   As a result of the prevailing insensitivity to 
using multilateral means to achieve unilateral ends, the actions taken during 1947-1948 
and the subsequent decade contributed directly to the intensity of the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
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IX 
 
The escalation of regional tensions that factored directly into the Suez crisis began 
with abandoning the procedures established in UN Resolution 181.  According to the 
resolution, two criteria were to be met prior to official recognition of partition.  First, a 
two-month grace period between Britain‘s evacuation and Palestinian and Jewish 
independence was to be observed.  Second, recognition of independence rested on the 
economic treaty both Jews and Arabs were to ratify.  If the treaty failed to take effect 
before 1 April 1948, the UN commission was authorized to implement it.  Only after the 
partitioned states achieved independence under these conditions would either state be 
eligible for membership to the United Nations.
177
  Rather than instill a sense of orderly 
transition across Palestine, however, the UN resolution‘s promise of recognition moved 
Jews and Arabs to intensify their efforts to attain independence. 
For British authorities eager to leave Palestine, these sentiments uncorked a new 
conundrum.  On the one hand, the British were relieved of their responsibilities in the 
Levant.  On the other hand, those officials among the last to leave feared that the 
introduction of UN Palestine Commission officials would precipitate unrest and the 
targeting of British authorities.  As a result, the British kept the UN commission out of 
Palestine ―until just [before] the British were terminating the mandate.‖  UN officials 
were unable to build meaningful relationships, necessary for implementing Resolution 
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181, and therefore act as an effective intermediary between Jews and Arabs.
178
  British 
forces scheduled to leave no later than August 1948 relinquished control three months 
earlier.  The day after Britain announced the end of its mandate, Israel declared its 
independence on 15 May.  The same day, Israel‘s Arab neighbors declared war on the 
new Jewish state. 
The war continued for much of the remainder of 1948.  As the United Nations‘ 
chief negotiator, Count Folke Bernadotte secured a temporary cease-fire, during which 
time Arabs and Israelis reinforced their positions.  While it is worth noting that the 
Truman administration remained committed to supporting the UN mediation between 
Arabs and Jews, it is equally important to understand the context and limits of that 
support.  Historian Melvyn Leffler points out that Truman and his subordinates embraced 
the spirit of the negotiations conducted by Bernadotte, but American participation in 
enforcing a UN cease-fire remained out of the question.  Yet, when American and British 
officials did discuss the possibility of restoring order, the strategies proposed remained 
independent of the UN‘s jurisdiction.179  Without adequate enforcement, the UN-
sponsored arms embargo was violated repeatedly.  In one particularly ironical case, 
Czechoslovakia delivered four Nazi-built Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter aircraft to Israel 
to aid in their war for independence.
180
  The combatants rejected a 15 July United Nations 
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Security Council order to ―desist from further military action.‖181  Towards the end of 
1948, the fortunes of war turned in Israel‘s favor.  In addition to holding their ground, 
Israelis conquered another twenty-one percent of territory formerly known as 
Palestine.
182
 
Typical of twentieth century warfare, non-combatants bore the brunt of the war.  
And just as typical, both sides set about defining the context of the ensuing debate.  Fear 
of reprisals and outright evictions of Arab ethnicities drove Palestinians from their 
homes.  According to Arab-Israeli dispute specialist, Benny Morris, departure of 
Palestinian civic leaders, intellectuals, and business-owners contributed to the mass flight 
of the poor.
183
  Reports of Israelis carrying out massacres and looting cars, homes, 
businesses, and warehouses as well as destroying property added to exodus.
184
  As early 
as 1 August, Bernadotte reported the ―acute‖ degree ―of human suffering;‖ refugee 
estimates reached 550,000.  Bernadotte wanted to allow Palestinian refugees to return 
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home for those wishing to do so once peace was re-established.
185
  The Foreign Minister 
of Israel‘s provisional government, Moshe Shertok, reckoned that neighboring nations 
who had invaded Israel were responsible for mass dislocation; therefore Israel felt no 
responsibility for accommodating the refugees‘ return.  Israel remained willing to 
negotiate terms of return as a part of a peace settlement acknowledging Israel‘s right to 
exist.
186
 
Israeli leadership also stirred debate by equating the plight of Palestinians to those 
of Jews stuck in Europe‘s post-World War II relocation camps.  An estimated 250,000 
Jews resided in camps across Europe in 1948.  In a letter addressed to the UN Secretary 
General Trygve Lie, Shertok described the ―demoralizing life of camp inmates‖ despite 
the approximately two million U.S. dollars per month the Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee spent to maintain the camps and their occupants.
187
  Jamal Husseini, President 
of the Palestine Arab Delegation to the United Nations, took issue with Shertok‘s 
assessment. 
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Where Israel made broad generalizations, Arabs, such as Husseini, considered the 
plight of the two groups as utterly incomparable.  Jewish refugees in Cyprus, Husseini 
said, were not so much refugees as illegal aliens who had violated British immigration 
law.  Additionally, Arab refugees numbered nearly twice as many as Jewish refugees in 
Europe; therefore stressing the limited resources available to them.
188
  Since 1945, 
Husseini contended, Jewish organizations caring for Holocaust survivors, along with 
American funds, and the UN‘s own International Refugee Organization had provided 
hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in relief making Jewish refugees recipients of ―more 
attention and contributions then any other refugees in Europe.‖189  Arab authorities were 
not as well prepared to deal with the rush of humanity that swamped the region which 
worsened the prospects for peaceful co-existence. 
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Those individuals who persevered with fashioning peace agreements that 
jeopardized the unilateralist wartime actions, perpetrated by both sides, became targets of 
violence.  The most infamous of examples occurred when the UN‘s chief negotiator in 
the region, Count Bernadotte, called for a new partition plan requiring Jews to yield land 
won during the war to Arabs.
190
  Bernadotte‘s amendments proposed transferring the 
Negev and West Bank jurisdictions to Transjordan authorities.  The Jews were 
compensated for these losses by gaining control over the ―western Galilee‖ region.191 
Neither Jews nor Arabs endorsed Bernadotte‘s plan.  The Negev region was 
essential to Jewish plans for future population growth.  Arabs were suspicious of 
Transjordan‘s consolidation of territory and its impact on the regional balance of 
power.
192
  When Ralph Bunche was chosen to deliver Bernadotte‘s report to the General 
Assembly, both Israelis and Arabs favored postponement.  According to Bunche, Arab 
delegates wanted to await the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States.  
The Republican nominee, Thomas Dewey, was believed to harbor pro-Arab sentiments 
stemming from his close ties to Wall Street investors concerned with protecting their oil 
interests in the Middle East.  As Election Day approached, however, Arabs were crest-
fallen at the news of Dewey‘s pro-Israel declaration.193 
With the status quo unlikely to change, belligerent interests in the Levant took 
matters into their own hands.  At 2:05 p.m. GMT on the Friday afternoon of 17 
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September 1948, Count Bernadotte was assassinated by Israeli terrorists.  En route to a 
local YMCA, the UN convoy carrying Bernadotte stopped at an Israeli army roadblock.  
Two men wearing Jewish army uniforms approached Bernadotte‘s vehicle ―and fired at 
point blank range.‖194  During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Bernadotte had negotiated 
cease-fires in an effort to initiate a more stable peace, had proposed reversing the ethnic-
cleansing that had taken place, and had supported territorial concessions that might have 
provided a greater sense of security.
195
  These efforts interfered with the installation of 
unilateral order from which the Arab-Jewish War of 1948 emerged. 
What was particularly disturbing about the impact Bernadotte‘s assassination had 
on collective diplomacy was the general apathy that the international community 
exhibited thereafter.  Bernadotte and the United States government pushed Israelis for 
―substantial repatriation as part of a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem and 
the conflict.‖  Yet, American pressure lacked the ―conviction‖ necessary to impel the 
Provisional Government of Israel (PGI) to yield.
196
  Speaking before an audience at the 
National Defense University in the early 1950s, Ralph Bunche made a similar 
observation and concluded that ―if the [British, French, and American] governments take 
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an apathetic position, if they are diffident or indifferent, if they are content with drift, 
then dangerous situations [may] well develop simply by default.‖197  Bunche‘s somber 
prognostication proved highly accurate as multilateral diplomacy became the indentured 
servant of competing national security interests.  Over the course of the decade following 
the Second World War, the dominant mentality governing international relations was one 
where dialogue and interaction between various interests threatened the application of 
national security prerogatives. 
 
X 
 
While radical factions within countries, such as the one responsible for 
Bernadotte‘s death, took the most extreme of measures to repudiate multilateral 
diplomacy, governments took a more subtle approach to turn this diplomatic liability into 
an asset of national interests.  For American officials, the intensification of the Cold War 
justified this principle which determined the operational parameters for virtually all of the 
county‘s international relations.  As authors of the provocative NSC-68 report put it, ―In a 
shrinking world, . . . it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin 
design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable.‖198  In 
addition to implying that a hegemonic sense of uniform order was desirable when faced 
with the alternative of Soviet domination, policy doctrines such as NSC-68 also assumed 
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that any debating of alternatives was detrimental to America‘s national security.  The 
―absence of order‖ was the peril over which American interests obsessed. 
The aim of imposing American notions of order in contested areas of the world 
had two unintended consequences that contributed to fundamental issues surrounding the 
Suez crisis.  First, the implementation of American security interests alienated nationalist 
sentiments of self-determination popular after the Second World War.
199
  More than 
simply combating breakdowns in international order, officials in Washington associated 
any independent ideology or deviation from American expectations as a threat to 
American interests.  When the rising tide of nationalism in Egypt and much of the rest of 
the Arab world coalesced in the 1950s and challenged American efforts to reconstruct the 
West‘s hegemonic order in the region, the president‘s senior officials adopted a nearly 
irrevocable position that sought to isolate and undermine those leaders considered to be 
uncooperative.  These one-dimensional, punitive policies inspired nationalist leaders, 
such as Egypt‘s Gamal Abdel Nasser, to commit greater acts of defiance, which assured 
more stringent Western condemnation and direct intervention. 
In addition to undermining self-determination within states, American policies of 
the 1950s also sought to redefine notions of multilateral diplomacy.  The prevalent 
climate of intolerance in international affairs, aided by the imposition of a particular 
brand of ideological world order, made competing notions of order construct their own 
sense of international legitimacy.  Venues where the international community gathered 
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became susceptible to subterfuge.  During the Korean War, American policy-makers used 
the United Nations to provide a veneer of legitimacy underneath which American policy-
makers installed their own sense of order.
200
  To circumvent the Security Council, where 
a Soviet veto could nullify attempts to win world support for military intervention in a 
future conflict, the U.S. delegation oversaw passage of what came to be known as the 
―Uniting for Peace‖ Resolution.  According to this measure, when a ―lack of unanimity‖ 
existed among the Security Council‘s permanent members regarding ―international peace 
and security, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately [and make] 
appropriate recommendations . . . to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.‖201  In addition to circumventing the possibility of Soviet veto, the ―Uniting for 
Peace‖ Resolution also ―side-stepped the [UN] Charter‖ by allocating authority to the 
General Assembly ―where the United States controlled an unquestioned automatic 
majority.‖202  Much like the British had done after consolidating control over the Suez 
Canal, American officials sought to portray their national interests as universal interests.  
Nowhere was this more visible than with the ―Uniting for Peace‖ Resolution designed to 
provide international support for America‘s imposition of order. 
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XI 
 
In the roughly one hundred years marking the canal‘s construction, Zionism‘s 
ascendance, the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and the Cold War, the world witnessed the 
subjugation of multilateral diplomacy to the whim of individual national self-interest.  
Private interests, such as de Lesseps and his Suez Canal Company, misrepresented 
multilateralism by placating the desires of European and Middle Eastern leaders rather 
than foment genuine, multilateral discourse.  The masquerade continued with de 
Lesseps‘s creation of a ―multi-national‖ Suez Canal Company in which two countries 
held over ninety percent of the company‘s shares.  Under Prime Minister Benjamin 
Disraeli, the British government misunderstood and misrepresented its control over the 
canal after acquiring Egypt‘s stake in the company.  The Constantinople Convention of 
1888 reinforced these misperceptions by allowing signers of the treaty to police 
themselves.  Meanwhile, actual enforcement of the treaty‘s terms rested with the feeble 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt, a British protectorate.  In following de Lesseps‘s model, 
Theodor Herzl organized Zionist strategies for re-settlement of Palestine mainly through 
the highly effective actions of numerous private organizations.  Many of these 
organizations put significant pressure on President Truman as tensions in Palestine grew 
increasingly volatile. 
The course of Palestine‘s partition, Israel‘s independence, and America‘s Cold 
War concerns perpetuated the subordination of multilateral consensus to national interest.  
Although United Nations Resolution 181 sanctioned partition, the measure passed as a 
result of concessions the U.S. delegation made to reluctant member states.  In effect, 
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national self-interest determined the fate of the resolution rather than any serious 
commitment to the resolution itself.  Once passed, interest in seeing Resolution 181 put 
into effect disappeared, allowing Zionists to pursue their own path to independence.  The 
United Nations served a similar purpose during the Korean War as American policy-
makers enlisted the institution to endorse a particular worldview. 
Exceptions to these developments did exist; but as tensions in the Middle East 
escalated in the early- to mid-1950s, the status quo remained dominant.  Attitudes 
emerging from the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 contrast the prevailing mentality 
of misrepresenting national interest as the basis for internationalist appeal.  The ARC‘s 
attempt to bridge differences existing among competing notions of world order inspired 
additional efforts by the mid-1950s.  Coincidentally, these diplomatic anomalies 
coincided with a new, internationalist sense of purpose within the United Nations.  By 
1956, these diplomatic trends would challenge the prevailing diplomatic discourse.  
However, events in the Middle East during the early 1950s continued disguising 
unilateral ambitions as multilateralism, which contributed directly to the intensity of the 
Suez Crisis of 1956.  Successful crisis management occurred only when multilateral 
diplomacy gained the initiative. 
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Chapter II 
 
Unilateralism and the United Nations: International Affairs and the 
Rise of Dag Hammarskjöld as UN Secretary General, April 1951 
to July 1956 
 
 
The conditions emerging from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
continued to plague international relations during the 1950s.  De Lesseps and Disraeli 
became the unlikely paragons of national leaders insistent on social and political 
uniformity to ensure fulfillment of national interests.  In Iran, the populist Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mossadegh wrestled with reforming his country‘s domestic and foreign 
policies while relying on traditional methods of political corruption to retain political 
power.  The impasse resulted in disaster for Mossadegh.  From Egypt, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser observed Mossadegh‘s missteps and established his own strategy for creating a 
populist autocracy.  By 1954, Nasser was governing Egypt directly, implementing a 
nationalist agenda that catered to a broader ethno-religious populace. 
The United States also suffered from an increasingly dogmatic sense of 
conformity.  The Red Scare of the early 1950s cast suspicion on American citizens 
including those who worked for the United Nations.  While accusations of political 
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subversion subsided by 1954, many American officials pursued foreign policies that 
remained highly conditional.  The result left the Untied States government in an 
undesirable position of pursing collective security agreements that were largely beholden 
to America‘s national security interests. 
In the case of the Middle East, President Eisenhower‘s plans to create a defense 
network failed to address the concerns of America‘s potential and actual allies.  Attention 
to Cold War security matters eclipsed the Arabs‘ more immediate concerns of Israeli 
aggression.  Realizing this disconnect, Nasser interpreted America‘s collective security 
proposals as another form of imperialist exploitation.  British officials, meanwhile, 
objected to the Eisenhower administration‘s assumption of Middle Eastern initiatives.  
Desperate to maintain some influence in the region, British policy-makers entered into 
the American-inspired Northern Tier alliance.  Involvement of a Western, imperialist 
power undermined the independent intent of the agreement.  As a result, America‘s 
attempts to incorporate the Middle East into a military alliance were torpedoed by its own 
ideological inflexibility and by the ulterior motives of its principal European ally. 
The following analysis investigates not only these developments and the resulting 
development of non-aligned ideology, the Czechoslovakian arms deal, the Aswan Dam 
proposal as well as the heightened tensions surrounding the Arab-Israeli dispute, but also 
the concomitant developments taking place within the UN Secretariat‘s office.  Contrary 
to the escalation of international tensions in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, 
Dag Hammarskjöld‘s election as the new Secretary General of the United Nations and his 
astute diplomatic skills offered an alternative to the ingrained status quo.  Recognizing 
the self-destructive tendencies of competing national interests, Hammarskjöld moved the 
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organization away from endorsing a particular ordered worldview, as his predecessor had 
done, and more towards a perspective encouraging exchanges of world opinion that 
would facilitate broader, multilateral dialogue.  In the case of American pilots captured 
by the Communist Chinese and accused of violating Chinese airspace, Hammarskjöld‘s 
ideas were put to the test.  In this instance, as well as in future international crises, the 
Secretary General served as the ideal diplomat for crisis resolution due to his role as an 
honest broker.  The UN‘s renewed sense of purpose, with Hammarskjöld at the helm, 
proved indispensable during the Suez crisis and its negotiations. 
 
I 
 
When Mohammad Mossadegh became Prime Minister of Iran in 1951, it appeared 
as if he supported a greater degree of political pluralism.  As head of the nationalist party 
controlling a majority of seats in the Iranian parliament, Mossadegh called for broad 
reforms guaranteeing greater freedom and equality for all Iranians.
203
  Soon after 
Mossadegh took power, senior Truman administration officials, including Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson, recognized that Mossadegh ―had enthusiastic support from newly 
emerging groups in [Iranian] cities, including workers, shopkeepers, teachers, students, 
government employees, and some religious zealots.‖204   These groups that Acheson had 
identified as well as labor unions, women groups, and artists, organized themselves into 
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vibrant ―social, political, or cultural associations.‖205  Support from these segments of 
Iranian society provided Mossadegh with a great deal of political legitimacy.  During this 
period, Iran also benefited from a diverse, multi-party political system. 
With regard to foreign policy, Mossadegh took a hard-line approach.  He 
advocated ―‗negative equilibrium,‘‖ intent on removing all foreign influences from 
―Iran‘s social, economic, and political affairs.‖206  Indeed, there were stifling foreign 
influences with which to contend.  At the time, Western oil companies held substantial 
concessions to Iran‘s abundant oil fields.  According to some scholars, ―Iran produced 
more oil than all the Arab states combined,‖ thanks largely to Britain‘s imperial 
oversight.
207
  However, such prestige came with sacrifice.  Through the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (AIOC), leaders of Britain‘s oil industry dictated production quotas, prices, 
and revenue shares for its members, including the Iranian government.
208
  Mossadegh and 
his people demanded complete control of their nation‘s natural resources and pursued this 
course of action by nationalizing all oil operations in Iran.  For some Iranian specialists 
such as Shireen Hunter, Mossadegh‘s short-sighted policy-making contributed to an 
antagonized worldview where ―deep suspicion of great power intentions‖ resulted in a 
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hierarchical and ―polarized‖ sense of the international community divided between the 
haves and the have-nots.
209
 
Many Western policy-makers expressed concern over the precedent Mossadegh‘s 
policies set for Western concessions throughout the rest of the world.  During a cabinet 
meeting, Britain‘s Defense Minister Emanuel Shinwell wondered if the Suez Canal 
would be next as other developing countries aspired to achieve ―financial freedom.‖210  
While initially acting as a mediator between Iranian and British interests, Truman 
administration officials acted in a biased manner by drafting an Anglo-American 
proposal for Mossadegh‘s consideration.211  The proposal stipulated that if the Iranian 
government refused to relinquish control of the AIOC, then British interests were to be 
compensated for company property as well as ―the profits that would be forfeited over the 
life-time of the concession.‖212  Any remaining chance of establishing a constructive 
multilateral dialogue between Anglo-American and Iranian interests suffered from the 
boycotting of Iranian crude oil by American and British oil interests.  Desperate for a 
compromise agreement by 1953, Mossadegh hoped that ―hints‖ of Iran‘s moving into the 
Soviet sphere of influence would garner sympathy in an America reeling from 
unsympathetic McCarthyism.
213
  To skittish Washington officials, nationalization 
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smacked of socialism and Mossadegh‘s round-about rapprochement with the West only 
confirmed his weakness. 
Western officials grew impatient with the prime minister‘s unwillingness to yield 
to Anglo-American standards.  As historian Mary Ann Heiss put it, the West ―joined to 
formulate a gender-based view of Mossadegh that denigrated him for departing from 
what they considered to be acceptable Western norms—and that worked against their 
stated goal of seeking a resolution [to the oil crisis].‖  Thinking that Mossadegh‘s 
―fragile,‖ ―emotional,‖ ―impractical,‖ ―hysterical,‖ and ―neurotic‖ temperament made 
negotiations impossible and that Mossadegh‘s pro-communist leanings threatened U.S. 
interests, the newly-elected Eisenhower administration began preparing for a U.S.-
supported coup in Iran.
214
  Fazlollah Zahedi, the man the CIA chose to replace 
Mossadegh, was considered to be much more amenable.  In his biography of CIA director 
Allen Dulles, Peter Grose describes Zahedi as a Nazi collaborator during World War II 
and ―a man who would follow orders.‖215  The search for a docile candidate for prime 
minister served as part of America‘s plan to reinstate Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the shah 
of Iran, as the new head of the Iranian government. 
In the case of both Iranian and Anglo-American policy-making, initiatives 
operated from an exclusive pretext.  On the one hand, Mossadegh‘s ousting of foreign 
business interests, while perhaps justified, remained provocative nevertheless.  Over the 
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course of his term as prime minister, Mossadegh also coped with satisfying an 
increasingly restless polity.  By 1952, he had resorted to rigging Parliamentary elections, 
as his predecessors had done, in order to retain a governing majority.  As a result, those 
groups that had cheered Mossadegh‘s rise to power began questioning the sincerity of his 
commitment to reform.
216
  Support disappeared completely when the prime minister 
pressured Parliament to grant him greater control over the military in 1953.  As historian 
Richard Cottam concluded, Mossadegh‘s actions made erudite Iranians ambivalent 
enough to watch his government collapse during the August 1953 coup d‘etat.217  On the 
other hand, the West‘s most viable diplomatic effort represented British interests at the 
expense of all other considerations.  Given Iranian suspicion of Western motives, this 
proposal could only have been construed as an ultimatum.  Rather than deviate from this 
unaccommodating course of action, the Eisenhower administration simply forged 
ahead.
218
  When Mossadegh‘s actions impeded American interests, he was removed from 
power, thus setting an early precedent for the Eisenhower administration and its stand on 
independent nationalist movements.  Political power shifted from elected officials in 
Iran‘s parliament to the more autocratic office of the shah. 
Having consolidated his political control over Iran with American assistance, the 
shah dismantled the country‘s professional associations.  Rather than earn the trust of the 
middle-class only to lose it later as Mossadegh had done, the shah governed 
autocratically.  After 1953, the new regime ―either outlawed or rendered functionally 
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impotent‖ virtually all secular associations, including the Iranian Parliament.219  The 
Eisenhower administration indicated tacit approval of these measures by allocating over 
one billion dollars in economic and military aid to Iran from 1953 to 1961 despite CIA 
operatives having incited mass demonstrations during the 1953 coup.
220
  For a brief 
period, Mossadegh had benefited from an eager and engaged citizenry.  After the 1953 
coup, the shah, along with the American government, subordinated civic discourse and 
agendas to state interests.  
In foreign policy, the shah pursued a course similar to that of his domestic agenda.  
He introduced his policy of ―‗positive nationalism‘‖ which replaced ―‗negative 
equilibrium‘‖ in name only.  Nearly identical to Mossadegh‘s efforts, the shah‘s new 
policy ―meant that we [Iranians] make any agreements which are in our own interests, 
regardless of the wishes of others.‖221  From the start, the shah attempted to reconcile two 
conflicting tendencies: engaging with the West and representing the wishes of his people 
who demanded the charting of an independent course in Iran‘s foreign affairs.  With 
regard to Iran‘s oil policy, the shah agreed to re-configure the AIOC into a ―multinational 
[oil] consortium‖ consisting of only four members: Iran, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France.  According to historian Mary Ann Heiss, negotiations favored 
American interests, specifically U.S. business and national security.
222
  During a National 
Security Council meeting in 1954, Herbert Hoover, Jr., the Appointed Consultant to the 
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Secretary of State, commented that the consortium was ―perhaps the largest commercial 
deal ever put together, with assets which might be over a billion dollars.‖223  Much like 
the consolidation of Suez Canal Company shares, the sense of ―multilateral‖ consensus 
was illusory at best, shielding hegemonic ambitions behind an image of broader 
cooperation.  Like French and Egyptian concentrations of Suez stock, the United States 
and Britain dominated Iran‘s new oil consortium by controlling over eighty percent of 
Iran‘s oil production.224 
 
II 
 
Between Mossadegh‘s rise and fall in Iran, Egypt had experienced a political 
revolution of its own in 1952.  Griped by a growing sense of nationalist sentiment, 
members of the Free Officers Movement, a small organization within the Egyptian 
military, seized control of the government.   As early as the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936, the Egyptian government gained greater control over the country‘s Military 
Academy including its admission policy.  That same year, an impressionable Gamal 
Abdel Nasser entered the Military Academy as one of fewer than a dozen Egyptians 
hailing from various social and economic backgrounds.  For the most part, officer corps 
careers were reserved for those individuals of Turkish heritage and possessing an elite 
social status.
225
  As a founding member of ―the Free Officers,‖ Nasser was one of a 
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handful of military officers who ―adopted policies that tapped into the mainstream of 
Egyptian culture and society‖ and coinciding nationalist sentiments.226  In her book 
Mobilizing Islam, Carrie Wickham describes the Free Officers as an organization 
dedicated to ―egalitarianism.‖227  After Egypt‘s military debacle in the 1948 war with 
Israel, the Free Officers became more politically active as Egyptians blamed King Farouk 
for sending a poorly prepared Egyptian army off to war against the Jews.
228
  Fighting in 
Palestine introduced Nasser to like-minded individuals and ―the ideas which illuminated 
the path ahead of [him].‖229  By 1952, Nasser and other members of the Free Officers 
Movement led their country in revolution. 
Afterwards, the extent of Egyptian social discontent alarmed Nasser.  After 
consulting with ―leaders of opinion,‖ the army officers realized that only the army could 
ameliorate dangerous levels of factional tension.
230
  Roughly a week after the Free 
Officers‘ military coup, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), acting as a 
provisional government, became permanent and called for the voluntary purging of 
―undesirable elements‖ from ―parties and associations.‖  With regard to the nation‘s 
institutions of higher learning, the government outlawed non-sanctioned student 
organizations, fired non-compliant faculty and administration officials, and stationed 
security personnel on campuses nationwide.
231
  As one scholar put it, Nasser dominated 
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political thought by establishing an ―ideological consensus‖ in Egypt.232  When political 
organizations resisted voluntary assimilation, the RCC abolished political parties, 
including popular independent affiliations such as the Wafd party and the Society of 
Muslim Brothers.
233
  The Society of Muslim Brothers, also known as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, retaliated by attempting to assassinate Nasser on 26 October 1954.
234
  
Similar to the shah in Iran, Nasser and his RCC sought to forge greater uniformity across 
all aspects of Egyptian civil society. 
Nasser‘s headlong pursuit of a monolithic order generated considerable dissent 
not only between his regime and other competing factions, but also within the RCC.  By 
1954, Nasser‘s authoritarian sense of order upset leading RCC officials.  Where some 
RCC leaders including the president of the new government, General Muhammad 
Neguib, supported reconciliation with elements once opposed to the revolution, Nasser, 
the man wielding ―real power,‖ took a more absolute stand.235  By November 1954, 
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Nasser assumed complete political control after placing Neguib under house arrest.  RCC 
purges continued for some time.
236
  Complete control over every political, economic, 
social, and cultural dimension extinguished any opportunities for establishing 
connections between diverging points of view.  Without access, alienated interests were 
either absorbed by the state, perished quietly, went into self-imposed exile, or resorted to 
violence.  Refusing to acknowledge—let alone acquiesce—to alternative perspectives 
elevated despondency and insecurity not only among domestic organizations, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, but also among regional and international organizations. 
What is particularly fascinating about Nasser and his ideological assumptions is 
the degree to which he fused his ideas of order with a broader sense of international 
populism.  In his book Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser 
outlined his movement‘s basic principles.  First, Nasser explained that Egypt‘s revolution 
possessed the unique characteristic of experiencing both a political and a social 
revolution simultaneously during and after 1952.  Second, Nasser addressed Egypt‘s 
acting as an intersection for three overlapping ―circles‖ encompassing pan-Arab, pan-
African, and pan-Islamic associations and their impact on economic development and 
political cohesion.  In the Arab circle, Nasser accentuated the roots of Arab civilization, 
the Arabs‘ geo-strategic importance, and their access to cheap oil as the key strengths of 
pan-Arab identity.  Oil made the entire region indispensable to the rest of the world; 
therefore, according to Nasser, this natural resource should be used to advance the 
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interests of all Arab nations as a single bloc.  In the African circle, Nasser proclaimed 
solidarity with black populations experiencing similar strife in winning independence 
from colonial rule.  Nasser condemned imperial intrusions throughout the continent and 
expressed a desire to create ―an enlightened African consciousness‖ through a Cairo-
based ―African institute.‖  In the Islamic circle, Nasser wished to reach out to the global 
community of Muslims by establishing a ―Parliament of Islam.‖  Under this umbrella 
institution, Muslims from all professions and backgrounds would dedicate themselves to 
―mutual cooperation.‖237  Together, these spheres form the crux of the ideology bearing 
Nasser‘s name. 
Scholarly analysis of Nasserism has revealed a great deal about what inspired 
Nasser and the lasting significance of his political philosophy. For some, Nasser‘s 
realistic assessment of the Egyptian Revolution and its challenges makes his commitment 
commendable.  Few if any revolutionary figures were inclined to address their own 
shortcomings, but Nasser tackled these issues candidly.
238
  For others, Nasserist ideology 
served as the latest manifestation of an emerging Arab identity.  Notions of pan-Arabism 
dated back to the 1920s and 1930s when the term ―Arab,‖ once used to describe the 
Bedouin, began applying to all those who spoke Arabic.  Early twentieth century Arab 
intellectuals and writers, such as Muhammad Husain Haikal, had championed pan-Arab 
unity.
239
  Prior to the ending of World War II, Arabs were already beginning to organize.  
From 25 September to 8 October 1944, officials from Syria, Egypt, Transjordan, 
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Lebanon, and Iraq convened the Preliminary Conference on Arab Unity.  These five 
states along with Saudi Arabia drafted the Arab League Charter on 22 March 1945.  The 
new organization was to coordinate policies relating to ―financial and economic matters, 
communications, cultural matters, questions of nationality, social questions, [and] 
problems of public health.‖240  Ethnic solidarity proved popular with Egypt‘s bureaucratic 
elites working within King Farouk‘s old regime just prior to the 1952 revolution.241  
Nasser continued the trend by including pan-Arab visionaries such as Haikal in an inner-
circle of advisers. 
Perhaps more than any other revolutionary, Nasser had succeeded in fusing his 
autocratic mindset together with the popular socio-political notions of liberty and mass-
empowerment.  Political analyst Raymond Hinnebusch recognizes that although Nasser 
oversaw a one-party state, his ―modernization polices‖ enhanced ―the social base of 
potential political participation.‖242  Compared to the developments in 1950s Iran, Nasser 
succeeded in cultivating popular authoritarianism where Mossadegh and the shah had 
failed.  Nasser claimed to represent a diversified society both within Egypt and across 
entire regions because he had incorporated them into his unitary national interests and 
identity by dominating domestic professional associations and proposing the creation of 
various international institutes designed to synthesize regional policy-making.
243
  In 
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doing so, Nasser emulated Western leaders of the nineteenth century and the Eisenhower 
administration of the twentieth century by creating the illusion that monolithic state 
interests represented the broadest collection of values shared by the international 
community. 
Several International Relations specialists have advanced the understanding of 
this phenomenon as it applies to the formation of nationalist identity.  Benedict Anderson 
believes that states used cultural instruments to perpetuate a homogenous sense of 
nationalism.  Language, especially vernacular language; newspapers; and museums 
provide a sense of belonging by bestowing communal values to all members of a 
particular group.
244
  Theorist Ernest Gellner abides by this constructionist view of 
nationalism, adding that ―nations are not given, but are created by states and by 
nationalists.‖245  Other scholars, such as Partha Chatterjee, contend that embracing 
Anderson‘s ―models‖ helped distinguish ―Third-world nationalisms‖ such as 
Nasserism.
246
  Indeed, Nasser‘s actions reflected these tendencies precisely.  As a leading 
specialist in Arab political philosophy, Adeed Dawisha understood that ―the application 
of Egypt‘s values to the Arab world gave rise to Egypt‘s aspirational goal . . . of ‗Arab 
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unity.‘‖  This sense of solidarity would satisfy the need for political and ideological 
legitimacy as well as ―the psychological needs of prestige‖ in the Arab world.247   What 
was best for one‘s own state was best for the world as a whole, and both revolutionaries 
and reactionaries alike set about promoting a brand of world order that required 
conforming to certain cultural standards. 
 
III 
 
During America‘s Red Scare of the early 1950s, socio-political paranoia affected 
perceptions on an international level in ways that paralleled those events in Egypt and 
Iran.  As Cold War scholar Elaine Tyler May contends, Senator Joseph McCarthy‘s anti-
communist rampage across national politics blamed the burgeoning ―cosmopolitan urban 
culture‖ for the supposed demise of the country‘s ―self-reliant entrepreneurial spirit.‖  
Tyler and others often associate McCarthyism with domestic purges.
248
  According to 
David Reynolds, McCarthyism ―helped stabilize the country in a new conformity.‖249  
Yet, McCarthy‘s actions simultaneously bred contempt and ―disunity‖ between the 
United States and Western Europe.
250
  As in Egypt and other regions of the world, quests 
for conformity within American society negatively affected the international arena. 
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Unlike other individual civil servants who had their loyalty questioned by the 
government they served, United Nations‘ employees who happened to be American 
citizens lay outside this domestic jurisdiction.  According to historian Peter Heller, UN 
Secretary General Trygve Lie accommodated McCarthyism by dismissing twenty-one 
American employees who invoked their Fifth Amendment rights.  By mid-1953, Dag 
Hammarskjöld‘s election to succeed Lie made it so that he now had ―to reconcile a 
member states‘ demand for a certain standard of national loyalty‖ with the international 
organization‘s demand for non-partisan objectivity.251  Gingerly, Hammarskjöld faced off 
against America‘s policies challenging not only UN integrity, but also the institution‘s 
identity. 
 Hammarskjöld‘s record during this event is mixed.  On the one hand, he won 
concessions from the U.S. government whereby the Secretary General acted as ―the final 
arbiter‖ regarding ―the validity of evidence‖ as to an employee‘s loyalty.  In his first two 
and half months as Secretary General, Hammarskjöld stated explicitly how ―a truly 
international civil service, free from all national pressures and influences, should be 
recognized, not only in words, but in deeds.‖  Sadly, he remarked, this ―principle‖ so 
fundamental to UN effectiveness was over-shadowed by the organization‘s member 
states.
252
  Of the points contested, Hammarskjöld‘s winning the right to evaluate 
                                               
251 Peter Heller, The United Nations Under Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1961 (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow 
Press, 2001), pp. 30-31.  Interestingly, one of McCarthy‘s biographers, Thomas Reeves, argues that 
McCarthy‘s motive for investigating UN employees was nothing more than a feint to target ―two leftist 
New York attorneys‖ in an attempt to disbar them.  See Thomas Reeves, The Life and Times of Joe 
McCarthy: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1982), pp. 511-512. 
252 Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, ―Annual Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Work of the Organization: 1 July 1952 – 30 June 1953,‖ 15 July 1953, Doc. A/2404, p. xi.  It should be 
noted that for many American employees of the UN, investigations continued under Eisenhower‘s U.S. 
Civil Service Commission‘s International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board.  Historian Robert 
Harris describes how the board investigated and ―cleared [over 1,700 U.S.] citizens employed at the United 
Nations.‖  High-profile UN employees, including Ralph Bunche, appeared before the board in-person.  
112 
 
employee loyalty under UN standards and not U.S. standards remained the most 
significant.
253
  On the other hand, some critics say that Hammarskjöld differed little from 
his predecessor.  ―Hammarskjöld bowed,‖ self-proclaimed socialist and former UN 
employee Conor Cruise O‘Brien writes, ―more gracefully and inconspicuously than 
Trygve Lie, but bowed none the less, to prevailing American opinion.‖254  Hammarskjöld 
may have yielded to the whim of America‘s political climate, but he also recognized the 
corresponding decline of multilateral diplomacy and prepared the UN for filling this role. 
As cultural expressions of UN member states became the standard in 
conceptualizing international order, Hammarskjöld focused on defining the relationship 
between rigid connotations of world order and the dynamics of multilateralism.  During 
the same speech in which he called for an independent international civil service, the 
Secretary General proclaimed that ―the constructive will of the Member nations to put the 
common international interest before national demands‖ determined the extent of the 
UN‘s influence.  In addition to developing an independent cohort of international civil 
servants, Hammarskjöld called on UN Member States to re-engage in the organization‘s 
―open debates‖ where perspectives of national interests could be scrutinized and 
evaluated.  Hammarskjöld argued that ―the debates generally tend in the long run to 
reduce the differences between [diverging] positions.‖255  Contrary to the self-serving 
trends dominating world affairs, Hammarskjöld‘s philosophical approach quietly 
reminded the international community of the fundamental need for governments to 
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understand world order in terms of interests that extend beyond the fulfillment of national 
interests. 
 
IV 
 
Unfortunately, key diplomatic figures ignored Hammarskjöld‘s unique approach.  
Beginning in August 1954, tensions escalated between Communist and Nationalist 
Chinese regimes regarding the sovereign status of Quemoy and Matsu, two islands 
located in the Formosa Strait between the communist-controlled mainland and the 
nationalist holdout of Formosa Island.  United States Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles sought to use the UN Security Council to distort international perceptions of 
Soviet and Chinese activities.  Bringing the matter before the Security Council, Dulles 
hoped, would put the Soviet delegates in an untenable situation.  If they vetoed a proposal 
to have UN officials act as lead negotiators, then the Soviets would be seen as obstructing 
international peace.  If the Soviets supported the proposal, then the Chinese Communists 
would be seen as the ―international outcasts.‖256  Instead of interpreting the UN‘s 
potential as an independent organization that could add a new dimension to international 
discourse, Dulles disregarded it by using the UN Security Council as an instrument for 
endorsing an anti-communist agenda. 
Roughly a year after Hammarskjöld‘s remarks calling for a more robust UN role, 
another international problem concurrent to the Formosa crisis permitted the Secretary 
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General to put his ideas into practice.  Before stalemate yielded to armistice in the Korean 
conflict, Chinese forces had captured eleven American airmen who had allegedly violated 
Chinese airspace.  On 14 November 1954—twenty months after their capture—a Chinese 
military tribunal sentenced the airmen to prison.  Resolution of this crisis made its way 
quickly to the United Nations for a number of reasons.
257
  First, the United States did not 
officially recognize Communist China as a legitimate state.  Therefore, American 
officials could not negotiate without losing face by tacitly recognizing Communist 
China‘s existence.  Second, since armed forces involved in the Korean War operated 
under United Nations auspices, American officials felt comfortable supporting UN-
sponsored negotiations.  As a result, Hammarskjöld negotiated not on behalf of the 
United States, not on behalf of the General Assembly that had mandated his participation, 
but rather on behalf of the constitutional merits afforded him under the United Nations 
Charter to maintain international peace.
258
  Lastly, by characterizing his mission in a 
constitutional context, Hammarskjöld served as the only viable mediator acceptable to 
both Eastern and Western powers.
259
  In early January 1955, Hammarskjöld spearheaded 
the international effort to reach a compromise. 
From the start, the Secretary General displayed a tremendous amount of deference 
and inclusiveness to build consensus.  From New York, the Secretary General and his 
entourage flew to London, Paris, and Delhi before heading on to Canton, Hankow, and, 
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finally, Beijing.  All along the way, Hammarskjöld conferred with British Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden; French Premier, Pierre Mendes-France; and Indian Prime 
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.  Hammarskjöld said of these meetings that ―they represented 
. . . a more complete picture of how matters looked from other angles—something which 
is essential if this job is to be done properly.‖260  One journalist said of Hammarskjöld‘s 
approach, the resourcefulness of personal diplomacy mirrored ―the old fashioned skill 
that averted many world crises.‖261  Yet, important characteristics differentiated the 
secretary general‘s approach from the diplomatic methods of Ferdinand de Lesseps.  
Rather than fabricate consensus to fit a particular agenda, as de Lesseps had done in his 
quest to construct the Suez Canal, Hammarskjöld met with national leaders to gather 
advice and procure a more holistic view of the problem at hand. 
Hammarskjöld‘s methods also hoped to foster greater harmony between 
multilateral diplomacy and the fulfillment of individual national interests without 
sacrificing one for the other.  In a paradoxical sense, the Sino-American standoff 
provided Hammarskjöld with the diplomatic leverage he needed to gain credibility as an 
impartial party.  According to Richard Miller, both China and the United States detested 
the idea of backing-down.  ―In this somewhat frozen state of affairs,‖ Miller continues, 
Hammarskjöld ―served as an honest broker,‖ communicating Chinese and American 
perspectives, while earning ―the confidence of both sides in the process.‖262  During a 
press conference on 14 January 1955, the Secretary General declared, ―There was need to 
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exchange information . . . so that the facts might be brought out clearly and possible 
misunderstandings might be straightened out.‖  Hammarskjöld believed that by engaging 
in what he called ―open diplomacy,‖ he had succeeded in providing both parties room for 
diplomatic maneuvering.  Any ―final decisions,‖ he continued, ―will emerge as unilateral 
decisions and as part of a general development, more than as the result of any kind of, so 
to say, settlement.‖263  Indeed, Hammarskjöld‘s analysis proved correct.  In May 1955, 
Chinese officials released the first of the American flyers.  Rather than having conflicting 
national interests heighten the sense of crisis, Hammarskjöld hoped to enlist their support 
in resolving it by giving them an opportunity to appear as protagonists, advancing the 
cause of world peace.  Regrettably, no government proved very willing to continue this 
trend of easing tensions either in the pacific or elsewhere in the world. 
 
V 
 
To the contrary, relations were strained not only among Cold War adversaries, but 
also among allies.  In matters pertaining to the Middle East, the earliest signs of 
discontent between friendly nations emerged during the negotiations regarding the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954.  Under the terms of this arrangement, all British military 
personnel were to evacuate Egypt by 1956.  This included the gargantuan military base 
that defended the Suez Canal Zone.
264
  After the evacuation, the Egyptian military would 
assume responsibility for canal security.  Daily operation of the canal, however, remained 
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in the hands of the Suez Canal Company, whose largest share-holder was Great Britain.  
According to modern Middle East scholar Douglas Little, U.S. officials encouraged these 
concessions in order to prepare for American installation of security agreements with the 
Egyptian government.  Winning Nasser‘s support was necessary for preventing 
communist infiltration into the Middle East.
265
  Yet, at one point during the negotiations 
of 1954, Prime Minister Churchill argued, ―The situation must be avoided in which 
people would think that the United States had driven the United Kingdom out of 
Egypt.‖266 
Attempts to forge a regional security agreement also suffered from fundamental 
discrepancies regarding basic regional boundaries.  In the negotiations that culminated in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization‘s (NATO) creation in 1949, American officials 
refused to include Greece and Turkey as founding members of the organization.  
According to political scientist, Douglas Stuart, ―extension of the alliance into the Eastern 
Mediterranean would blur the regional identity of NATO.‖  Instead, U.S. State 
Department officials looked to involve Greece, Turkey, the United States, and Great 
Britain in a larger Middle East Command (MEC) that would be associated with 
NATO.
267
  The implied sense of autonomy that the MEC was supposed to enjoy 
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disappeared as the Cold war intensified.  From 1951 onward, British and, to some extent, 
American officials campaigned to have NATO assume the lead in crafting the West‘s 
Middle Eastern defense policy.
268
 
To complicate the context of Middle East security arrangements, shifts in political 
power in both the United States and Egypt altered policy priorities.  Guaranteeing the 
terms necessary for creating a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) that involved 
Egypt meant including provisions for the selling of weapons to the Egyptian government.  
As early as November 1952, prior to Nasser‘s assuming complete control over Egypt, 
General Naguib had agreed to America‘s terms.269  That same month, however, 
Eisenhower won the presidency and, soon afterwards, began enacting his ―New Look‖ 
diplomacy.  Instead of funding conventional weapons development and manufacturing, 
the Eisenhower administration diverted funds to pay for nuclear weapons systems.
270
  
Therefore, the ideal opportunity for including Egypt in a collective security arrangement 
occurred at a time when senior U.S. officials were least likely to take interest. 
Efforts made to initiate some degree of collective security suffered from 
additional hurtles.  During U.S. Secretary of State Dulles‘s meetings with Egyptian 
officials in May 1953, the divide between American interests of containment and Arab 
interests of improving Arab armed forces came into sharp focus.  According to Adeed 
Dawisha, Egyptian officials supported ―strengthening the already existing Arab 
Collective Security Pact‖ to defeat potential communist threats.  Contrary to the 
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Americans, Egyptians believed that communist infiltration of the Middle East would 
originate from domestic sources instead of coming from an overt act of aggression in the 
Caucasus region located some five thousand miles away.
271
  In his analysis of U.S.-Arab 
relations, Salim Yaqub identifies how ―the United States and the Nasserist movement 
applied their shared values inversely.‖  Where American officials wanted unquestioned 
support for their Cold War objectives and reconciliation of matters relating to the Arab-
Israeli conflict and Western imperialism, Arabs sought diplomatic independence in Cold 
War relations and stronger pledges of American support for the Arab struggle against 
Zionism and Western imperialism.
272
  These perspectives are important in understanding 
not only the scope of the divisions surrounding discussions of collective security, but also 
in understanding the respective fixation on national interests that remained sacrosanct in 
the eyes of those responsible for creating defensive alliances.  Given this context, the 
likelihood of success for constructive multilateral diplomacy was minimal. 
Once Nasser consolidated political power in 1954, he began distancing himself 
from any alliance with the West.  Egypt‘s new nationalist leader considered any ―arms-
for-alliance‖ deal as American neo-imperialism.  Eisenhower‘s insistence on American 
leadership in any collective security organizations only reinforced Nasser‘s 
apprehensions.
273
  The same could be said for plans to have NATO assume a more direct 
                                               
271 Dawisha, Egypt and the Arab World, pp. 10-11. 
272 Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, p. 20. 
273 For analysis of Eisenhower‘s perspective regarding collective security arrangements see Richard 
Saunders, ―Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency,‖ Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 1, (Spring 1985), p. 100.  In a 21 November 1951 memorandum, U.S. officials 
summarized and responded to Soviet arguments criticizing any Arab-American military alliance.  Soviet 
officials equated the stationing of western troops in Middle Eastern states with an imperialist occupation.  
Additionally, they expressed concern over the proliferation of weapons and the overall deterioration of 
regional peace and security.  American policy-makers stressed the defensive objectives of any military 
alliance and its mission to protect national independence.  Nearly three years later, as debate over a 
collective security agreement intensified, some American officials noted that the US was ―preparing to 
120 
 
role in Middle East security issues.  Yet, even after Nasser‘s coming to power and his 
successful Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in 1954, rank and file State Department officials 
believed that Nasser would participate in America‘s collective security efforts in 
exchange for U.S. weapons.
274
  These assumptions were erroneous.  As historian Peter 
Hahn put it, ―having just arranged the departure of British troops, [Nasser] would not 
consider signing any agreement requiring the presence of American officers [in Egypt] 
under any conditions.‖275  Additionally, the French sale of jet fighter aircraft to Israel in 
late 1954 only reinforced Nasser‘s anti-imperialist suspicions of Europe‘s persistent 
interference in the region.
276
  The following year relations among all parties deteriorated 
further. 
 Stymied by Nasser‘s intransigence, U.S. diplomats succeeded in having Iraq sign 
a mutual defense agreement with Turkey on 24 February 1955.  Doing so deprived the 
Soviet Union of gaining access to the Middle East by force without risking an expansive 
war.  Nasser was concerned that Iraq‘s participation in a regional defense pact might 
challenge Egypt‘s control of pan-Arab loyalties.277  Determined not to be excluded, 
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British officials joined what came to be called the Northern Tier alliance on 5 April.  
British participation dashed American hopes of incorporating anti-imperialist countries 
such as Egypt into any Cold War-oriented collective security arrangement.  Many, 
including officials in Washington, equated British participation with British command 
and control of American-supplied armaments.
278
  Arab nationalists would not tolerate this 
type of command structure.  As a result, the alliance became, in the words of one scholar, 
―quite toothless.‖279  This game of one-upmanship among Arab leaders as well as Anglo-
American allies accentuated international instability that remained characteristic of the 
entire period of the mid-1950s. 
Speaking at the Fifth Annual All-Jesuit Alumni Dinner, U.S. Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles expounded on American perceptions of world peace and security.  As 
if to refute Hammarskjöld‘s efforts to negotiate among differing views of world order, 
Dulles stressed the adversarial relationship pitting ―peace versus liberty.‖  He proclaimed 
―that the craven purchase of peace at the expense of principle can result in destroying 
much of the human spirit.‖  Should this happen, he continued, ―peace, under certain 
conditions, could [cripple] the capacity for moral and intellectual judgment.‖  While 
Dulles acknowledged the difficulty in attaining consensus in an increasingly 
interconnected world, he concluded that the United States contributed to ―human 
freedom‖ through active participation in the United Nations and by entering into ―mutual 
security arrangements . . . with more than forty nations [worldwide].‖280  By advertising 
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American principles as universal norms, Dulles perpetuated the misrepresentation of 
multilateralism.  Contrary to Hammarskjöld‘s view where the UN acted as a forum for 
the exchange of principled perspectives to attain world peace, Dulles argued that peace 
processes that sacrificed a nation‘s principles set a dangerous precedent.  Indeed, Dulles‘s 
generation feared the repercussions of unchecked appeasement, and perhaps rightfully so.  
However, Dulles‘s Orwellian logic of representing ―human freedom‖ based on the 
American model suggested that liberty was attainable if only the world conformed to 
American perceptions of it.
281
 
The differences with regard to world order began to encroach on one another—so 
much so that they fostered international instability.  The fact that Eisenhower based his 
mutual security program on the desire to demonstrate American solidarity with ―the 
independence and self-determination of all peoples‖ only agitated British officials and 
their efforts to maintain an image of imperial omnipotence.
282
  Yet, the Eisenhower 
administration‘s empathy for Nasser‘s anti-colonial sentiments also had limits.  Dulles 
proved reluctant to encourage nationalist pursuits beyond fulfilling Cold War 
objectives.
283
  Reacting to the diametrically opposed views of British imperial policies 
and Egypt‘s nationalist agenda, the Eisenhower administration decided to forge ahead 
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with securing its own (myopic) interests.  As a result, America‘s alliances were not as 
stable as Dulles had assumed when he attempted to portray American principles as the 
basis for interdependency. 
Dulles‘s remarks were part of a coordinated media campaign by the Executive 
branch to garner Congressional support and appropriations for the mutual security 
program.  Like his Secretary of State, President Eisenhower equated peace with achieving 
America‘s national interests.  ―We [Americans],‖ Eisenhower surmised, ―are convinced 
that our own continued economic, cultural, and spiritual progress [is] furthered by similar 
progress everywhere.‖284 During a 20 April speech to Congress, the president called on 
legislators to reallocate money earmarked for Europe‘s continued post-World War II 
reconstruction and move it to fund economic, technological, and military development in 
Asia.  The president proposed transferring over $3.5 billion dollars—roughly two-thirds 
of which went to military support—to friendly countries stretching from Japan to Turkey.  
The injection of funds would, Eisenhower hoped, spur ―private overseas investment and 
private enterprises abroad‖ and, thus, encourage ―loans rather than grants whenever 
possible.‖285  Officials at the Bureau of Economic Affairs endorsed the president‘s 
foreign aid policy.  ―While recognizing and respecting the diversity of values and 
institutions in other countries,‖ one report proclaimed, ―[the U.S.] must foster the 
adoption of policies conducive to local investment and initiative . . . . [without] the 
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appearance of ‗intervention.‘‖286  Though sensitive to the self-determination of states, 
Eisenhower‘s efforts to extend America‘s influence in Asia upset the supposedly 
harmonious relations existing between the United States and its established allies in 
Europe.  Additionally, the recommendation that the U.S. government engage in foreign 
investment without ―intervention‖ demonstrates the indirect efforts made to extend 
influence that began more commonplace after the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
 
VI 
 
America‘s deteriorating relations with Israel also suffered during this period.  
After taking office in 1952, President Eisenhower distanced himself from the once cozy 
relationship with the Jewish State and the ―Israel lobby‖ within the United States.  As one 
historian put it, ―Dulles admired the Israelis for their pioneering spunk and their 
anticommunist zeal but resented their uncompromising approach toward the Arabs and 
their unabashed involvement in interest group politics on Capitol Hill.‖287  Leading 
Jewish advocates created the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations to streamline their message so as not to antagonize the president further.  
Conference participants grew frustrated, however, over the loss of influence within the 
Eisenhower administration.  As historian Peter Hahn put it, Jewish leaders ―discovered 
their ineffectiveness limited by the need to arrive at a consensus before each visit‖ with 
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Eisenhower.
288
  The Zionist Movement intensified efforts to mobilize other means of 
support.  According to the analysis of U.S. State Department officials, Zionist 
organizations affiliated with the World Zionist Congress strengthened ties with ―non-
Zionist supporters of Israel.‖  Cooperation included large-scale bond campaigns where 
interested Americans could help off-set gaps resulting from U.S. government cuts in aid.  
Previous Israeli bond drives had generated approximately $150 million in revenue.
289
 
The Eisenhower administration‘s handling of relations with Israel demonstrates 
the various complexities facing the increasingly diversified field of foreign policy-
making.  To their credit, administration officials moderated what had been America‘s 
decisively pro-Israeli stance.  The influence of powerful Jewish lobbies had been checked 
in order to curry favor with Arabs.  Yet, the means by which it was accomplished in some 
ways perpetuated the rising tide of intolerance that was being expressed elsewhere.  
Similar to the situations in Iran and Egypt, where national leaders were taking a hard-line 
against outspoken interest groups, senior American officials began withdrawing from 
outspoken groups which held dissenting opinions.  While not as totalitarian as either the 
shah‘s eradication of special interest groups or Nasser‘s infiltration of them, the 
Eisenhower administration disengaged nonetheless.  As a result, Israeli officials 
responded with a heightened sense of foreboding. 
News of London‘s eventual military evacuation from Suez and Washington‘s 
extension of Cold War-oriented military aid to Iraq in 1954 delivered concussive blows 
to Israel‘s foreign policy agenda and fueled support for the nation‘s political hardliners 
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such as David Ben-Gurion.  These events threatened the security of Israel so severely that 
Israeli officials disregarded Egypt‘s refusal to join America‘s mutual security program.290  
As Michael Handel argues in his essay on Israeli security strategy, Israel‘s attention to 
―short-range survival‖ and ―military solutions,‖ based on ―preemptive strategy,‖ 
disregarded ―longer-range planning and diplomatic options.‖291  Douglas Little offers a 
more nuanced argument by acknowledging that Israel‘s moderate Prime Minister Moshe 
Sharett attempted to establish secret negotiations with Nasser but that Israeli hard-liners 
succeeded in derailing Sharett‘s plan.292 
Similar to the terrorist activities used in 1947 and 1948, Israeli hard-liners 
initiated plans to achieve their interests by escalating international tensions in the region.  
In July 1954, an Israeli unit attached to the psychological warfare branch of Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF) intelligence, activated an ―Egyptian-Jewish network . . . in Cairo 
and Alexandria‖ to bomb ―American and British cultural centers and other sensitive sites 
[in Egypt].‖293  The objective was to weaken American-Egyptian relations and thus   
sabotage international support for Sharett‘s peace initiative.294  In the wake of the foiled 
plot, Israeli public opinion was ―infuriated by the torture of their agents‖ as well as the 
sentencing and execution of some of the conspirators.
295
  Instead of criticizing the 
                                               
290 David Tal, ―Israel‘s Road to the 1956 War,‖ International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, No. 
1, (February 1996), p. 64. 
291 Michael Handel, ―The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for 
Absolute Security,‖ in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, eds. Williamson Murray, 
MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 534 and 538. 
292 Little, American Orientalism, p. 90.  Benny Morris uses Sharett‘s term ―‗activist‘‖ to describe Zionist 
hard-liners.  According to Sharett, ―Israeli activists adopted a Judeo-centric view that was unsympathetic to 
and uncooperative with Arab negotiators.‖  See Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 280. 
293 Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 282.  See also Shamir, ―The Collapse of Project Alpha,‖ p. 76. 
294 Little, American Orientalism, p. 90. 
295
 Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 282. 
127 
 
surreptitious nature of the operation and its intent to thwart peaceful negotiations, Israelis 
expressed their solidarity with perpetrators acting in the name of national security. 
The Israeli press was complicit in manufacturing this sense of public unity.  Press 
censorship and state-operated radio gave Ben-Gurion and other ideologues ample 
opportunities to edit events to the point where they became ―wholly fictitious.‖296  
Recording his memoirs years later, the Chief of Staff for the UN Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO), Canadian General E.L.M. Burns described how the Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF) instigated border disputes to galvanize Israeli opinion and thus 
stimulate Israel‘s militarist mentality to enact strong defense policies.297  Jacob Blaustein, 
President of the American Jewish Committee, warned Secretary of State Dulles of 
Israel‘s domestic political condition and implored the secretary to support Sharett.298  
Unfortunately, Blaustein‘s plea proved ineffective.  The prime minister‘s conciliatory 
approach to international affairs seemed increasingly untenable as Israelis gravitated 
towards more reactionary policies.
299
 
Israel‘s antagonistic outlook helped fuel persistent border clashes that occurred all 
along Israel‘s frontier.  Guerrilla activity from both Arabs and Israelis had occurred 
periodically since the 1948 armistice.  For the most part, the belligerents remained 
content with targeting civilians in the countless raids which occurred between 1948 and 
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1955.
300
  Wanting to appear resolute in the face of mounting security concerns, however, 
Sharett yielded to Israeli hard-liners when he appointed David Ben-Gurion as the new 
Defense Minister.
301
  Within two weeks of taking office, Ben-Gurion amended the IDF‘s 
rules of engagement to retaliate directly against Arab military personnel.  The night of 28 
February 1955, two Israeli paratrooper platoons infiltrated the Gaza Strip inflicting nearly 
seventy casualties, most of which were Egyptian soldiers.  Despite what some historians 
might label ―historical determinism,‖ this new Israeli policy made Nasser realize that he 
could no longer guarantee his troops‘ security against raids and therefore could not 
enforce strict orders preventing Egyptian retaliation.
302
  Egypt‘s president also associated 
Israel‘s action with a larger, Anglo-American conspiracy designed to overthrow his 
government.
303
  To keep his grip on political power, Nasser grew increasingly determined 
to up-grade the nation‘s arsenal. 
Sharett also looked to bolster his own sense of security by forming an alliance 
with the United States.  During Truman‘s presidency, the Tripartite Declaration created 
an Anglo-French-American alliance designed to maintain the status quo in the Middle 
East following the 1948 armistice.  Under the declaration‘s terms, these three Western 
powers vowed to help defend either Arabs or Israelis against the aggressor in the event of 
another Arab-Israeli war.  To help prevent hostilities, the Western powers agreed to 
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enforce an arms embargo on any Middle Eastern state planning aggressive military 
action.  Unable to procure weapons directly in 1954, Sharett requested the Tripartite 
Declaration of 1950 be broadened to include an American pledge to protect Israel‘s 
borders.  If Sharett could not import weapons from the West, then he would attempt to 
gain their allegiance in a collective security agreement.  Amidst a period of intense Cold 
War tensions, however, the United States was disinclined to become pre-occupied with 
Arab-Israeli border disputes.
304
  Sharett‘s lack of diplomatic success combined with his 
citizens‘ hard-line sympathies not only contributed to Sharett‘s political defeat in the fall 
of 1955, but also served as key examples of the extent to which unilateralist policies 
dictated international affairs.  Under Ben-Gurion‘s leadership, the Israeli government 
took to securing its own interests regardless of the consternation caused to the 
international community. 
 
VII 
 
Newly independent countries struggled with similar inclinations as they asserted 
themselves into world politics more effectively.  The Asian Relations Conference of 1947 
had laid some of the groundwork, but later meetings in the mid-1950s solidified an 
independent sense of world order known as non-alignment.  The Bandung Conference, or 
Asian-African Conference, of 1955 marks the definitive origins of the non-aligned 
movement and its foray into international politics.  Located approximately one hundred 
and twenty miles southwest of Indonesia‘s capital, Jakarta, Bandung hosted 
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representatives from twenty-nine African and Asian nations.
305
  Agenda items focused on 
strengthening relations among the participants, discussing strategies for solving ―social 
economic and cultural problems‖ facing these new nations, examining ways of promoting 
―world peace,‖ and exchanging views regarding the challenges of surmounting the biases 
and stigma great powers attached to post-colonial powers.
306
  Disinterested in the bi-
polar, Cold War paradigm, non-aligned countries such as India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, 
Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, Egypt, and many others sought to reverse the manipulative 
behavior that imperial world powers exploited. 
In coming together as they did, many conference delegates shared a suspicion of 
an imposed sense of world order, especially one emanating from the West.  Historian 
Peniel Joseph describes the Bandung conference as ―part of an emerging Third World 
solidarity that challenged white supremacy at the global level,‖ free from ―the Cold 
War‘s ideological restrictions.‖307  Conference observers such as Australian journalist, 
C.P. Fitzgerald, and expatriated African-American activist, Richard Wright, also realized 
to varying degrees that the conference minimized the role ―doctrine and ideology played‖ 
favoring instead a greater ―breadth of mind.‖  Both men agreed that the West should be 
sensitive to the perspectives expressed at Bandung.  Yet, where Fitzgerald expressed 
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some skepticism over non-alignment‘s idealistic rhetoric, Wright advocated the 
―transnational humanism that [exceeded] narrow nationalisms of any kind.‖  Fitzgerald 
worried that the divide was growing between Asian democracies, such as India, Ceylon, 
and, at the time, Burma, on the one hand, and Western democracies, on the other.  Asia‘s 
free and independent electorate, he said, contested the ideological and economic allure of 
Western democracies.  Although these Asian democracies remained critical of Western 
policies in many respects, Fitzgerald warned against Westerners categorizing non-aligned 
ideology as communist infiltration.
308
  Official reaction among American policy-makers 
justified Fitzgerald‘s fears. 
American reactions to the Bandung Conference confirmed the backhanded 
attention paid to post-colonial nations.  For the most part, U.S. officials viewed the event 
only so far as it directly impacted Cold War interests.  Particular attention dissected 
Communist China‘s participation and statements made relating to Taiwan.309  With 
regard to other agenda items such as decolonization, the Eisenhower administration‘s 
opposition to immediate liberation placed, as one historian put it, the ―First World . . . on 
a collision course with the goals of Third World nationalists.‖310   The Eisenhower 
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administration refused to send official observers to Bandung and failed to send official 
greetings to the conference members as was customary for such occasions.
311
  
Furthermore, Eisenhower‘s Mutual Security Program was unveiled in an attempt to up-
stage the conference, by portraying the Northern Tier countries as allies in the fight to 
contain communism.  It was precisely this type of mentality that irritated non-aligned 
leaders and provoked non-aligned fears of Cold War exploitation. 
Although the participants at Bandung wished to advance their national interests, 
these influences failed to dominate the proceedings.  United States Representative Adam 
Clayton Powell (Democrat-New York), another of America‘s unofficial observers, 
testified to the rhetoric that both the Indian and Chinese delegations sometimes used in 
unsuccessful attempts to control the proceedings.
312
  According to scholar David Kimche, 
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru convened the Bandung Conference in part to 
check China‘s emergence as a regional power.  Earlier in 1954, these two Asian giants 
agreed bi-laterally to Panch Sheel, or ―five principles‖ emphasizing non-aggression, 
equality, respect for territorial sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, and 
peaceful co-existence.  At Bandung, Nehru hoped to extend Panch Sheel to others.  
However, not everyone agreed with these principles.  Krishna Menon, leader of India‘s 
delegation to the United Nations and Nehru‘s trusted emissary, described the ―five 
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principles‖ as poorly written.  Nasser remained uninterested in them, too; other delegates 
from Iraq and Turkey said they went against the United Nations Charter.
313
  In other 
cases, Indian and Indonesian attempts to spread ―‗positive neutralism‘‖ met with anti-
communist rhetoric from other delegates.
314
  While en route to Indonesia, Richard Wright 
noticed that the Egyptian delegation boarding the plane to the archipelago nation was 
obsessed with winning support for the Arab cause.
315
  Nasser even threatened to boycott 
the conference if Nehru invited Israel.
316
  As the conference opened, Wright described the 
scene as ―brooding, bitter, [and] apprehensive . . . . Everybody read into it his own fears; 
the conference loomed like a long-buried ghost rising from a muddy grave.‖317  Wright‘s 
vivid metaphor seemed not only ominous, but also unjustified.  
The remarkable characteristic of the Bandung Conference was that, despite 
several attempts, the interests of no single delegation dominated the proceedings.  
Participants agreed upon the representation of diverse interests and demanded respect of 
that diversity.  In a gesture of multilateral solidarity, the delegates issued an eleven-page 
document listing recommendations for fulfilling non-aligned objectives.  Known as the 
Bandung Communiqué, the document called for strengthening mutually beneficial trade 
agreements and facilitating cultural exchanges in areas such as education.  Support for 
human rights and ―the principle of self-determination of peoples‖ also commanded 
considerable attention.  With regard to world peace and cooperation, attendees called 
upon the United Nations to expand its membership.  According to the Bandung 
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Communiqué, nearly a quarter of the nations represented at Bandung were ready for 
immediate induction into the world organization.  Additionally, the conference supported 
UN-sanctioned self-defense, ―universal disarmament,‖ and ―abstention from . . . 
collective defense [designed] to serve any particular interests of the big powers.‖318  
Contrary to Iranian, Egyptian, American, British, or Israeli policy-making of the early 
1950s, the conference‘s recommendations provided a more genuine and multilateral 
consensus to which the participants were committed.  Whether intentional or not, these 
general recommendations symbolized a more constructive alternative in world politics by 
contesting unilateralist perspectives attempting to represent a more multilateral agenda. 
 
VIII 
 
Multilateral diplomacy receded once again after the conference had concluded.  
Returning to Egypt, Nasser focused on the country‘s security matters.  In his biography of 
Dag Hammarskjöld, Brian Urquhart argues that Nasser remained conciliatory towards 
Israel in the wake of the February 1955 attack.  By April, however, Nasser had opened 
arms deal negotiations with the Soviet Union‘s Ambassador to Egypt.  Keen on not 
seeming beholden to the West‘s benevolence, Nasser decided to open a dialogue with the 
Soviets and members of the Eastern bloc.  The new Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, 
was also eager to improve relations with Third World nationalists to broaden the scope of 
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the Cold War.  In doing so, Khrushchev reversed his predecessor‘s guarded attitudes 
towards Egypt.
319
   
The United States and its staunchest allies, Britain and France, realized the 
destabilizing effect Nasser‘s request could have on the region, but the members of the 
Tripartite Declaration differed on how to handle the escalating tensions.  In June 1955, 
American Ambassador to Israel, Edward Lawson, met with Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe 
Sharett.  The prime minister confirmed ―that unless the United States, United Kingdom, 
and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) were able to prevail upon the 
Egyptians to stop shooting at Israelis inside Israeli territory‖ Israel would take matters 
into its own hands.  British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and Britain‘s Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Harold Macmillan, wanted to pressure Nasser by having the 
Tripartite allies make a show of force communicating the West‘s determination.320  
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles disagreed, opting instead to act 
through the United Nations‘ Security Council.  At a June 16 meeting in New York City 
of the American, British, and French officials, both Dulles and American Ambassador to 
the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., stressed the need for Security Council recommendations 
to legitimize economic pressure.
321
  American officials deserve some credit for their 
willingness to recruit UN help in the event of an Arab-Israeli war.  However, the motives 
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for doing so remained centered around the imposition of a Western sense of world order 
instead of facilitating a greater sense of multilateral diplomacy. 
To a degree, the very nature of the West‘s Middle East foreign policy was 
fundamentally flawed.  On the one hand, the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 wished to 
perpetuate the status quo.  On the other hand, however, the Eisenhower administration‘s 
desire to create a collective security organization in 1954 bred contempt among Arabs 
and Israelis alike, which upset the status quo.  Egyptians feared American intrusion.  
Israelis feared American abandonment.  And, as if to bring the conundrum full circle, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Henry Byroade, reported to his superiors that should the U.S. 
deny weapons to Egypt, the Arabs would ―interpret [America‘s actions] as being totally 
partial to Israel.‖  Rather than admit the pitfalls of their own policies, senior officials in 
Washington responded to Byroade‘s warning by reiterating the collective security 
agreement necessary for any arms accord with Nasser.
322
 
Denied help from the West, Nasser turned to the Soviets for assistance.  Unlike 
the diplomatic quagmire American and Egyptian officials encountered in their arms deal 
negotiations, relations between the Egyptians and the Soviets began improving as early as 
1954.  Egyptian negotiations with the communist bloc proceeded throughout the spring 
and summer of 1955.  Commensurate with these talks, border clashes between Egyptians 
and Israelis became more aggressive.  By September 1955, the Egyptian government had 
resorted to training and equipping the fedayeen, a militant group emerging from within 
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populations of disenfranchised Palestinian refugees.  Israeli forces retaliated by seizing 
―the Demilitarized Zone of El Auja, the strategic key to both the Negev and Sinai.‖323  On 
12 September 1955, Egyptian and Czechoslovakian officials concluded an arms deal 
agreement. 
For Nasser, the arms deal tackled several of Egypt‘s chronic strategic and 
economic problems simultaneously.  First, Egypt succeeded in modernizing its military 
forces.  Nasser arranged to take delivery of 200 Soviet-built MIGs half of which were to 
arrive by December 1955.  Of these initial aircraft, thirty-seven were ―‗medium‘ bombers 
(presumably IL-28s)‖ with the remaining sixty-three being MIG-15 fighter planes.  Also 
included in the cache of weapons were ―one hundred heavy tanks [including Joseph 
Stalin Mark IIIs and Czech T-34s], six torpedo patrol boats, and two submarines.‖324  
Russian technicians were to provide a ninety-day training course to Egyptian 
personnel.
325
 
Second, the Czech arms deal helped revive Egypt‘s flagging economy.  Instead of 
having to pay cash as it would have done with any purchase of weapons from the United 
States, cash-strapped Egypt agreed to pay for Soviet weapons with one of its few natural 
resources dating back to the nineteenth century—cotton.  The economic boost the arms 
deal delivered to Egypt came none too soon for Nasser.  In her assessment of Middle 
Eastern economies, Robin Barlow notes that, after Egypt‘s 1952 revolution, ―general 
stagnation‖ hit the country where agricultural output floundered as a result of abrupt land 
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reforms and Egypt‘s fiscal obsession with maintaining balanced budgets to avoid 
accruing additional debt.
326
  Early in 1955, American officials were also learning through 
their embassy in Cairo that Nasser had trouble selling his country‘s current cotton crop, 
which was necessary prior to planting for next year‘s harvest.327 
After years of haggling with various world powers, Nasser finally concluded an 
arms deal.  The event was significant for several reasons.  Nasser had achieved a 
diplomatic coup that reverberated throughout the international community.  The Egyptian 
leader gained access to weapons systems that outclassed any others in the region without 
sacrificing Egyptian autonomy.  During a United States Special National Intelligence 
Estimate (SNIE) meeting on 12 October 1955, various department heads agreed that 
Egypt‘s purchases from Czechoslovakia tipped ―qualitative and quantitative superiority‖ 
in Egypt‘s favor in both tanks and planes.  They also agreed that Egypt required a year or 
so to integrate these weapons into his armed forces and use them effectively.
328
 
While by no means an example of multilateral diplomacy, the Czech arms deal 
showed that the Soviets had proven themselves to be more effective at mastering the 
appearance of multilateralism.  Quickly after consolidating political control in Russia, 
Khrushchev began improving relations with nationalist leaders in the developing 
world.
329
  Unlike American proposals, the Soviets‘ terms for an arms agreement benefited 
Egypt in several ways, not only in the more obvious strategic, political, and economic 
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areas, but also, and more importantly, in catering to Nasser‘s sense of Arab 
empowerment and pan-Arab solidarity.  In Guy Laron‘s words, ―Nasser was able to 
regain what the Baghdad pact was supposed to take away: his dominant position in the 
Arab world.‖330  By 1 October 1955, the Arab League, Egyptian Bar Association, 
Egyptian Army and police commands, Chamber of Commerce, Cairo‘s Greek and 
Cyproit communities, the rector of Cairo‘s Al Azhar University, and Saudi Arabia‘s 
Ambassador to Egypt all expressed their support.
331
   Khrushchev could appreciate 
Nasser‘s perspective to a greater degree than Western diplomats dared.  For Nasser, the 
Soviet‘s appreciation and accommodation of pan-Arabism paid high dividends. 
 
IX 
 
Securing a supply of modern armaments allowed Nasser to deliver on promises 
made in support of anti-colonial liberation movements.  Since 1 November 1954, the 
Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front, or FLN) had launched raids 
nationwide against French colonial forces in Algeria.  Within weeks, Nasser was shipping 
rifles and heavy weapons to FLN-friendly intermediaries in Tripoli.
332
  Introducing 
additional weapons to the region, French officials feared, would help transform the 
Algerian War into a war of attrition.  If that happened, the war could attract greater 
international attention, requiring the French government to expend additional resources to 
justify its intervention. 
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Egypt‘s involvement, as well as the various diplomatic strategies that each side 
pursued, convey a substantial amount of international interest.  Almost immediately, 
French and pro-FLN factions began lobbying segments of the international community 
for help.  The French government had the paradoxical task of portraying the insurrection 
as an internal matter that did not warrant the international community‘s attention, while 
simultaneously soliciting military and diplomatic support from its Western allies.
333
  
Meanwhile, anti-colonial FLN sympathizers sought to bring international attention to the 
inhumanity Algerian Muslims were experiencing.  Proposals to debate the Algerian 
Question in the General Assembly had had been circulated since 1954, but the UN 
Steering Committee had voted against it.
334
  On 30 September 1955, three days after 
news of the Czech arms deal with Egypt went public, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations agreed to put the Algerian Question on the agenda. 
 French officials were appalled.  Editorials in France‘s Le Monde newspaper 
decried the hypocrisy of nations voting in favor of airing debate whose ―own conduct 
[over what was considered to be domestic matters of state] was primitive.‖335 As historian 
Matthew Connelly put it, the French thought U.S. diplomats ―could . . . command a 
majority in the [UN‘s] General Assembly.‖336  Perhaps thinking back to UN Resolution 
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181, where the United States corralled UN member states, French officials thought that 
American influence was irresistible.  When the opposite proved true and the UN voted to 
debate the Algerian Question, French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay blamed his 
American allies.  Pinay also thought that ―the U.S. had not fully recognized the dangers 
inherent in the fusion of the Bandung and Soviet blocs, which he considered the greatest 
threat to the stability of the world.‖337  French officials looked to monopolize institutions 
representing diverse perspectives in order to legitimize unilateral action.  According to 
New York Times reporter, Harold Callender, French officials tried desperately to project a 
unified front in maintaining order in Algeria; but it was political divisions within France 
that led the UN to act.  Unable to exercise its influence effectively in the General 
Assembly, the French delegation withdrew rather than admit its own limitations.
338
  
Similar to American involvement in UN Resolution 181, the Iranian government‘s 
coercion of professional associations, Nasser‘s plans for pan-Arab unity, and British 
efforts to remain relevant in the Middle East through the Baghdad Pact, French policy-
makers required a high degree of conformity in order to manipulate international 
perception.  During the height of the Suez crisis in October and November 1956, officials 
from virtually every country suffered a similar lack of influential conformity. 
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X 
 
President Eisenhower adopted a parallel strategy to that of his French allies when 
he attempted to fuse Western-led collective security arrangements with UN efforts to 
maintain international security in the Middle East.  While convalescing from a heart 
attack in Denver, Colorado, Eisenhower delivered a 320-word statement on 9 November 
1955 that affirmed his support for the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 as an instrument of 
security.  Later in the same statement, however, Eisenhower backed UN efforts to 
institute a peaceful settlement serving as the basis for ―true security.‖339  The President‘s 
dual endorsement proved counter-productive.  Where the Tripartite Declaration enforced 
the status quo of armistice, efforts—both UN-inspired and not—to achieve a Middle East 
settlement depended upon hefty concessions.  Dulles presented one such proposal 
whereby Israel relinquished a sizable portion of southern territory to Arab control.
340
  
Additionally, any context involving execution of the Tripartite Declaration would involve 
re-deployment of European forces to a region ardently anti-imperialist in its outlook.  As 
a result, Western-inspired coalitions would destabilize the region rather than bring a 
sense of calm and order that UN officials were attempting to facilitate.  Unfortunately, 
Eisenhower continued to insist that these two initiatives remain interchangeable. 
Fallout emerging from the Egyptian government‘s arms deal with the Soviets also 
complicated an already intricate diplomatic scene in the Middle East.  In addition to 
perpetuating anti-colonial independence movements and elevating international attention, 
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Nasser‘s actions armed him with additional diplomatic leverage to which American and 
British negotiators responded.
341
  With help from the World Bank, British and the 
American policy-makers agreed to finance the Aswan Dam project designed to 
modernize Egypt‘s economy and utilities.  Putting the dam‘s significance in historical 
terms, U.S. Undersecretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. said that the project would be in 
comparable economic terms ―larger than the total of all U.S. public works of this type 
produced since 1900.‖342  The dam would tame Nile flooding, add nearly 1.3 million 
acres of arable land—―equivalent to about 1/3 of the total acreage [cultivated in all of 
Egypt in 1955,]‖ generate 10 million kilowatt hours of electricity per year, and stimulate 
industry.
343
  In particular, Egypt‘s cotton industry stood to benefit mightily from the 
enormous public works project. 
The prospect of a cotton glut on the world market upset an already unstable cotton 
industry.  During a meeting with the interested parties involved in the Aswan Dam 
proposal, Hoover admitted that the increased cotton production which would result from 
the dam‘s completion gravely concerned U.S. cotton growers.344  America‘s cotton 
surpluses throughout the 1950s undercut prices to the point where farmers could no 
longer make a decent living.  By 1955, eighty percent of North Carolina‘s acreage 
allotment for cotton was measured in increments of six acres or less.  On Capitol Hill, 
politicians proposed a two-price system raising domestic prices to offset lower prices 
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necessary for competing on in international market.
345
  Hoover ―hoped‖ that the world‘s 
cotton glut would dissipate by the time of the dam‘s completion.  Eisenhower believed 
that U.S. population growth would compensate the world‘s cotton producing capacity.346  
In addition to potentially upsetting America‘s domestic cotton growers, who lobbied for 
federal subsidies, U.S. involvement in the Aswan Dam project also challenged the 
administration‘s basic principles of foreign aid policy. 
 Since 1954, the Eisenhower administration had grappled with the Cold War 
dimensions of the socio-economic strategies of developing nations.  Ideally, Eisenhower 
wished to reserve foreign aid for private enterprises in what has been described as 
traditional ―liberal international political economy.‖347  As a result, the president‘s 
economic philosophy scuttled initiatives doling Western aid out to the governments of 
developing countries.  The administration even opposed ―multilateral development grant 
funds‖ that the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld supported.  Eisenhower feared 
that developing countries would become dependent upon UN grants.
348
  During a 1 
December 1955 National Security Council meeting at Camp David, Maryland, 
Eisenhower‘s advisers debated the details of an Aswan Dam proposal.  U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Charles Wilson proposed recruiting Egypt‘s private investors to help fund 
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construction.
349
  Although palpable to Western capitalists, supporters of Wilson‘s 
recommendation ignored long-held Egyptian resentments toward capitalist exploitation. 
Failure to consider the Egyptians‘ economic philosophy made capitalist-oriented 
motives moot.  Nasser‘s contempt for private enterprise harkened back to his helping lead 
Egypt‘s revolution.  Along with foreign exploitation, high concentrations of wealth and 
land ownership prior to the 1952 revolution resulted in government corruption, unfair 
taxation, and exploitation of Egypt‘s lower social classes.350  Wilson and others in the 
Eisenhower administration also over-estimated the strength of Egypt‘s private sector and 
under-estimated their loyalties to the state.  As a Fulbright scholar living in Egypt during 
the 1950s, Richard Mitchell observed that ―the capitalist, placing his own interests before 
those of the nation, fails to use wisely the natural and human resources of the state.‖351  
The governments of developing countries were often the only institutions capable of 
handling massive infrastructural projects.  In some cases, social elites in developing 
countries ―preferred‖ state-sponsored modernization.352  Presumably, Egyptian 
entrepreneurs could profit from new national infrastructure without taking any initial 
investment risk. 
Other administration officials questioned the ideological wisdom of any deal.  
Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey raised concerns over providing funds for 
enhancing Nasser‘s socialist-based economy.  Making an unintended pun, Humphrey 
understood the Aswan Dam as ―a case of ‗damned if you do and damned if you 
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don‘t.‘‖353  On the one hand, the project stood to strengthen Egypt‘s economy 
tremendously, reduce the nation‘s poverty, and thus reduce the chances of its shift to the 
Soviet sphere.  On the other hand, raising Egypt‘s cotton production only increased its 
ability to procure additional Soviet weapons if necessary, while simultaneously 
competing with U.S. cotton growers.  Hoover also expressed reservations about the 
extent of the dam‘s actual impact upon Egypt‘s socio-economic standing.  He worried 
that any arable land development would simply off-set Egypt‘s population growth and, in 
the end, offer no improvement in the nation‘s standard of living.  Smiling, Eisenhower 
responded by quoting a memorable World War I cartoon: ―If you knows a better ‘ole, go 
to it.‖354 
The exchange at Camp David demonstrates both the potential success and 
inherent failure of Eisenhower‘s foreign aid strategy.  Remarkably, Eisenhower‘s 
decision to go ahead with the loan proposal demonstrated a willingness to work with 
national-socialist regimes while simultaneously fulfilling Cold War objectives of 
containing communism‘s spread.  Regrettably, however, the aid package proved 
incompatible with Nasser‘s economic philosophy.  The administration understood how to 
strengthen relations with the Egyptian government through socio-economic development, 
but it lacked the philosophical flexibility necessary for sustaining successful negotiations. 
U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, announcement on 19 December 1955 
that American loans would be extended to Egypt to help finance the Aswan Dam project.  
The United States and Great Britain proposal included an initial offer of a combined $200 
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million in loans while the World Bank pledged another $200 million.
355
  As early as 
1953, the World Bank had re-defined itself as a ―conservative institution,‖ extending 
loans on a highly conditional basis.
356
  Terms for the Aswan Dam project proved to be no 
exception.  The World Bank, working through the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), presented Nasser with terms, forming a partnership between 
the bank and Egypt to ensure stability of the country‘s ―inflation‖ and ―creditworthiness‖ 
and to monitor Egypt‘s foreign debt.357  Conscious of Ismail‘s sale of Suez shares in 1875 
which resulted in the sacrificing of Egypt‘s sovereignty to British officials, Nasser 
interpreted the West‘s Aswan proposal as an infringement upon Egypt‘s self-
determination.  In a New Year‘s Day telegram to the State Department, Ambassador 
Byroade explained the prime minister‘s hesitation: 
Documents would become published and they would simply say on their 
face to public opinion here that Egypt had surrendered its sovereignty and 
independence in economic and financial fields to [the] World Bank.  
[Nasser] talked at length as to why Egyptians are unusually sensitive, in 
view [of] their history, to matters involving large foreign debt.
358
 
 
Tapping the Western-established World Bank resources meant agreeing to Western-
oriented terms.  The stipulations were perfectly logical and moderate.  According to 
Byroade, even Nasser ―realized [that the] bank must have safeguards upon its 
investment.‖  Not wanting to have Aswan Dam funding slip away, Nasser offered several 
                                               
355 Senior US officials such as Treasury Secretary George Humphrey estimated costs at $1.3 billion to 
complete the project in 15 years.  See FRUS, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Vol. XIV, p. 814. 
356 Adamson in The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War, p. 
50.  See also Jeffery Chwieroth, ―International Liquidity Provision: The IMF and the World Bank in the 
Treasury and Marshall Systems, 1942-1957,‖ in Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations Since 
Bretton Woods, ed. David Andrews (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 53.  Chwieroth refutes 
Adamson‘s conclusions by arguing that although the US held considerable influence over the World Bank, 
―the selection of the second Bank president [Eugene Black] facilitated a significant degree of autonomy for 
the Bank management and staff.‖ 
357 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Dept. of State, 1 January 1956, FRUS: Arab-Israeli 
Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, Vol. XV, p. 1.  See footnote at the bottom of the page. 
358 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Dept. of State, 1 January 1956, FRUS: Arab-Israeli 
Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, Vol. XV, p. 2. 
148 
 
counter-proposals from changing World Bank procedures to using the bank‘s money 
during the latter stages of the project.
359
  Both sides understood the impact the project 
would have upon Egypt‘s modernization, but neither side was willing to make the 
necessary concessions. 
 
XI 
 
 This inability to interact with diverging opinions became symptomatic for 
international affairs in general throughout 1956.  By January, an earlier agreement among 
U.S., French, and British officials regulating weapons shipments to the Middle East was 
collapsing.  Pressure from Israel for arms to counter those Egypt received from the Soviet 
bloc continued to affect adversely U.S.-Israeli relations.  Israeli Prime Minister Sharett‘s 
inability to negotiate an arms agreement isolated him politically.  Like an Israeli Disraeli, 
Israeli Defense Minister Ben-Gurion manipulated deteriorating relations with Arab 
neighbors and used ―officials and party functionaries, who played highly dubious roles 
involving questions of dual loyalty‖ to weaken Sharett‘s position further.360  Where 
Sharett clung to the hope of allying with and receiving arms from the United States, Ben-
Gurion implemented a more unilateral approach.
361
  Despite some difference of opinion, 
historian David Tal agrees that Israel‘s growing belligerency, evident since Ben-Gurion‘s 
return to government, alienated the Arabs.  As American ambassador to Israel, Edward 
Lawson, reported from Tel Aviv, Ben-Gurion grew ―extremely nervous‖ over Egypt‘s 
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access to modern armaments while the West deprived Israel equal access.
362
  The 
growing sense of anxiety felt throughout much of Israeli society led to Ben-Gurion‘s 
becoming Prime Minister on 2 November 1955.  Only after Ben-Gurion‘s victory did the 
U.S. allow France and others to supply weapons to Israel.  Once this happened, status quo 
agreements such as the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 lost all meaning. 
 Nasser also pursued an increasingly unilateral agenda once both Mid-East peace 
and Aswan Dam negotiations stalled.  As a personal friend of the president and a former 
deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Anderson became Eisenhower‘s special 
representative to the Middle East.  Two trips to the region in early 1956 convinced 
Anderson, Eisenhower, and Dulles of Nasser‘s uncooperativeness.  Much like the 
controversy surrounding the Aswan Dam, Nasser could not agree to the open, formal 
Arab-Israeli negotiations Anderson intended.  Direct meetings would cost Nasser 
politically at home—a price, Nasser suspected, he could not afford.  In an October 1955 
State Department communiqué, one Foreign Service Officer reported that Nasser‘s hard-
line with Israel was popular with the working class and labor leaders.  Nasser used this 
political momentum, but he did not trust it.
363
  Even as late as 1956, Nasser continued to 
fear ―overthrow and assassination.‖364  However, if properly enticed and supported by the 
West, Egypt and Nasser would make unilateral and clandestine progress toward settling 
Israeli-Egyptian disputes.  Dulles interpreted the prime minister‘s view as a subtle form 
of diplomatic blackmail to give Egypt time to stockpile weapons without having to 
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formally recognize or participate in negotiations with Israel.
365
  Nasser would control the 
form and pace of Middle East peace and would be the sole pan-Arab representative. 
 As a result of Nasser‘s position, the West tried to isolate him while 
simultaneously providing arms to Israel.  Known as the Omega initiative, the United 
States began covertly undermining Nasser‘s pan-Arab aspirations.  Among other things 
the plan denied Egypt the sale of Western-manufactured weapons, delayed Aswan Dam 
negotiations as well as food shipments and other aid to Egypt, interfered with Egyptian 
interests in Yemen and elsewhere in the Middle East, and generated support for Saudi 
Arabia‘s leadership as an Arab alternative to Nasser.366  Meanwhile, the same day Dulles 
expressed these views, he met with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Abba Eban.  
Dulles told him of America‘s unhappiness with Nasser and supported Israel‘s acquiring 
arms from France and other Western suppliers.
367
  All of this, however, happened in 
secret.  During an April Fools Day meeting with the British Ambassador to the United 
States, Dulles unveiled his plans.  He remained committed to pledging American 
cooperation with Britain ―on a secret basis,‖ avoiding an ―open break with Nasser,‖ and 
allowed French and Canadian arms shipments to Israel to proceed.
368
  The Secretary‘s 
strategy represented the country‘s private actions regarding Middle East policy.  Publicly, 
the Eisenhower administration supported Hammarskjöld‘s efforts to ease Arab-Israeli 
tensions. 
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XII 
 
 Shortly after the New Year, the Secretary General made his first of two trips to 
the Middle East.  His maiden trip was part of a larger world tour designed to better 
understand the international issues facing the United Nations.  Three days after 
Hammarskjöld‘s 24 February return to New York, he shared his initial impressions at a 
press conference focusing predominately on conditions in the Middle East.  With the 
calculated candor that accompanied all his public statements, the Secretary General 
believed that the Arab-Israeli dispute was ―dramatized‖ to the point of obstructing 
compromise.  When asked of the Cold War‘s impact upon the region, Hammarskjöld 
replied: 
I think the basic fact in the understanding of that area is that irrespective of 
the side—Israel or Arab—there is a very strong wish to be independent 
and to mould one‘s own fate according to one‘s own ideas.  By 
implication, you can see that pressures or imprudent discussion, from 
whatever side it comes, is unhelpful. 
 
Instead of ―imposing [its] will,‖ the organization could help foster ―reasonable progress 
toward‖ all-purpose objectives ―to keep people from rushing into a conflict because they 
cannot get everything at once or cannot get it in just the form that they would like.‖369  
Rather bluntly, he identified national self-interest as a leading culprit in escalating Arab-
Israeli tensions not only regionally, but globally as well.  Hammarskjöld‘s second trip in 
April suffered as a result of these myopic international conditions. 
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 By the end of March 1956, Security Council members convened to address rising 
Arab-Israeli tensions.  According to one of Nasser‘s closest confidents, Mohamed Heikal, 
Israel‘s protest of an alleged 180 border incidents near Gaza during the previous four 
months demonstrated the region‘s volatile instability.370  On 4 April, the Security Council 
unanimously authorized Hammarskjöld to negotiate directly with the concerned parties to 
re-establish ―the [1949] armistice demarcation lines,‖ and allow UN policing of those 
borders.
371
  As if to emphasize the point even more, the day before Hammarskjöld‘s 
departure to the Middle East, Israeli artillery shelled Gaza killing 59 people and 
wounding 93 others.  Egyptian-endorsed fedayeen raids followed.  Similar to UN 
involvement following the 1947 partition, Hammarskjöld‘s mission functioned as a tool 
for imposing order.  Yet, as witnessed in 1947, the most ardent UN member states calling 
for order also served as the ones most involved in pursuing their own interests in the 
region. 
 As Hammarskjöld hop-scotched around the Middle East, various interests 
continued implementing contradictory policies.  American activities serve as an excellent 
example.  In a 9 April telegram to Nasser and Ben-Gurion, President Eisenhower 
expressed his full support for the Hammarskjöld mission calling upon both leaders to 
practice ―high statesmanship.‖372  Ambassador Byroade even encouraged Nasser‘s full 
disclosure to Hammarskjöld and Chief of Staff for the UN Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO), General E.L.M. Burns regarding Egypt‘s involvement in the 
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fedayeen raids so as not to upset any possible cease-fire agreement.
373
  Between these two 
communiqués, however, the White House received a message from Saudi Arabia‘s King 
Saud pledging his cooperation with the United States, thus setting in motion America‘s 
plan to shift support away from Nasser.
374
  While the United States backed UN efforts to 
instill order on the one hand, the American Superpower cultivated instability by 
challenging Nasser‘s authority in the Arab world.  American officials undermined the 
legitimacy of the Arab world‘s chief representative at the exact moment that he engaged 
in legitimate negotiations working toward a Middle East peace. 
 Sadly, the United States was not alone in these foreign policy follies.  On 18 
April, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden opened meetings with Soviet leaders Nikolai 
Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev.  In Heikal‘s words, ―Eden was anxious to get Russia to 
become a signatory to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 to ration the supply of arms to 
Middle Eastern countries.‖  Nasser feared Russia‘s compliance with the declaration and, 
with it, the potential threat to Egypt‘s steady supply of munitions.  These fears played a 
pivotal role in Nasser‘s search for alternative weapons suppliers and Egypt‘s official 
recognition of China‘s Communist government on 16 May.375   In turn, Egypt‘s move 
alarmed U.S. officials who considered it further evidence of Nasser‘s shift to the 
communist sphere. 
 Realizing the need for reconciliation with the West, Nasser acquiesced to the 
terms accompanying the Aswan Dam offer.  ―By the end of June,‖ writes historian Steven 
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Freiberger, ―Dulles knew that Nasser had dropped the objections he had raised to the loan 
in February.‖  Dulles also knew that Nasser had solicited the Soviets for a loan proposal.  
Despite reassurances to the contrary, the Secretary‘s patience with Nasser expired.  He 
wanted to make an example of Nasser to others who considered practicing international 
opportunism.
376
  On 19 July, Dulles withdrew U.S. funding for the dam.  Britain followed 
suit shortly thereafter.  Dulles legitimized his action by citing the lack of Congressional 
support for allocating the funds.
377
  While true, Dulles‘s explanation was not presented as 
the official reason for the loan cancellation.  The official announcement blamed Nasser 
for killing the loan proposal.  ―Agreement by the riparian states,‖ the announcement 
declared, ―has not been achieved, and the ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to 
assure the project‘s success has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was 
made.‖378  Why the Eisenhower administration let a chance to publicly chastise the 
Democratically-controlled Congress slip away in an election year remains a nagging 
question and reinforces the prevailing trend towards minimizing internal dissent by 
focusing attention on international differences. 
 Nasser received word of Dulles‘s announcement as the Egyptian President left the 
Brioni Conference.  Unlike the more inclusive Bandung Conference, the Brioni summit 
included Nasser, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Yugoslavian President 
Josip Broz Tito.  In H.W. Brands study of the non-aligned movement, this triumvirate 
constituted ―the big three of the neutralist world.‖379  Continuing the work of the 
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Bandung Conference, the Brioni gathering sought greater coordination of policies among 
these distinguished leaders.  According to Nasser‘s adviser, Mohamed Heikal, Tito also 
wished to inform his colleagues of changes within the Soviet Union and its international 
outlook resulting from what Tito had heard at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party earlier that year.
380
  Nasser and Nehru were en route to Cairo when they learned of 
the Eisenhower administration‘s decision to withdraw funding for the dam.381  Heikal 
argues, however, that Nasser was already aware of the Americans‘ plan nearly two weeks 
prior to the official announcement.
382
  A week after Dulles‘s reversal, Nasser proclaimed 
Egypt‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal to generate the extra revenue necessary for 
constructing the Aswan Dam. 
 During this time of rising tensions in the international arena, Secretary General 
Hammarskjöld made a second trip to the Middle East.  This second journey had two 
enlightening effects.  First, it proved substantially more inclusive in its diplomatic 
approach.  As Richard Miller makes clear, the mission gave Hammarskjöld a first-hand 
perspective and personal contact with the region‘s leaders.383  The Secretary-General‘s 
testy but durable relationship with David Ben-Gurion and Hammarskjöld‘s more 
amicable relationship with Egypt‘s Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi allowed for ―the 
utmost frankness.‖384  An honest exchange of views and concerns accompanied these 
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friendly meetings which approached the heart of genuine constructive dialogue rather 
than add to the entrenched exchange of rhetorical noise. 
 Second, Hammarskjöld‘s trip demonstrated the highly complex forces at work 
within the international community as a whole.  Hammarskjöld remained reasonably 
optimistic when reporting his findings to the Security Council in early May.  His 
observations revealed that the general intransigence came not from stubborn governance 
but from the impracticality of the peace itself.  According to a summary of the report, 
―the demarcation lines [between Arab and Israeli lands] had . . . no basis in history or in 
the distribution of population or private property and had to be observed in a situation of 
great political tension.‖  Later, he requested that governments, people, and world opinion 
at-large refrain from inciting unjustified animosity that would erode the confidence and 
goodwill of the negotiations.  Instead of participating in unilateral behavior that escalated 
tensions, Hammarskjöld called for the concerned parties to engage in ―coordinated 
unilateral moves‖ for the sake of compromise.385  As a master of his craft, Hammarskjöld 
showcased the diplomacy necessary for an international environment that could sustain 
negotiation.  He understood that national interests dictated foreign policy, but he also 
realized that these interests could be as destructive as they were constructive.  Without a 
multilateral objective intent on establishing regional peace in the Middle East, little 
chance lay in achieving any negotiated settlement. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Levey, ―Israel‘s Quest for a Security Guarantee from the United States, 1954-1956,‖ pp. 47-49; and Tal, 
―Israel‘s Road to the 1956 War,‖ pp. 60, 64-65. 
385 ―Summary of the Reports by the UN Secretary-General a Compliance with the Near East Armistice 
Agreement,‖ 2 and 9 May 1956, American Foreign Policy, 1956, pp. 595, 597-598. 
157 
 
XIII 
 
 By the summer of 1956, government officials worldwide began applying 
Hammarskjöld‘s internationalist perspective to serve their own purposes.  Nationalist 
leaders in the Middle East took an early lead in instilling greater domestic conformity to 
convey steadfast solidarity on the world stage.  The strong bonds between Iranian 
nationalist Mohammad Mossadegh and Iran‘s professional associations deteriorated 
rapidly as Mossadegh‘s regime resorted to corrupt political practices.  After the 1953 
coup, Iran‘s new leader, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, relegated civic associations to serving 
the interests of the state.  Monopolization of similar groups also occurred following the 
Egyptian revolution of 1952.  Once in power, the Revolutionary Command Council 
pursued social uniformity by infiltrating or disbanding organizations.  Additionally, 
Egypt‘s revolution embodied the independent desires of Egyptians, Muslims, Arabs, and 
Africans.  This dimension of Nasser‘s nationalist philosophy spread conformity not only 
within a given society, but also across societies, thus internationalizing efforts to 
synthesize anti-imperialist rhetoric and dominate the agenda of the broader movement. 
 American society experienced purges of its own during the McCarthy Era of the 
early 1950s.  Prior to McCarthyism‘s demise in 1954, American citizens serving as 
international civil servants in the United Nations endured increasing amounts of scrutiny.  
As the new UN Secretary General, Hammarskjöld exhibited a good deal of diplomatic 
finesse between preserving the organization‘s non-partisan practices and catering to the 
desires of its members.  The experience altered the organization‘s sense of purpose from 
reflecting a particular sense of world order to representing a genuine multilateral 
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perspective in international matters.  With Hammarskjöld at the helm, the United Nations 
was going to re-dedicate itself to practicing multilateral diplomacy.  He challenged UN 
delegations to place the international interest above any particular national interest. 
 Attendees at the Bandung Conference grappled with the difficulties of putting 
Hammarskjöld‘s ideas into effect.  Leading delegates wished to influence the proceedings 
to endorse specific interests that would enhance the international clout of a select few.  
As a result, several observers noted that many delegates were initially suspicious about 
the motives and agendas of their fellow participants.  In spite of the agendas individual 
delegations had set for the conference, the plenary session succeeded in establishing a 
clear set of multilateral, non-aligned interests.  Much like Hammarskjöld‘s philosophical 
approach, the recommendations proposed in the Bandung Communiqué offered a more 
genuine consensus that served as a constructive alternative to the imposition of order by a 
single source. 
 Instead of realizing the significance of accomplishments such as these, 
governments continued to portray national interests as emblematic of broader 
international interests.  Senior U.S. officials, such as Secretary of State Dulles, clung to a 
principled version of world order that required a high degree of conformity.  
Unfortunately, Dulles‘s efforts succeeded in fostering international instability.  Nasser 
grew frustrated over America‘s obstructionist policies regarding arms deals, collective 
security arrangements, and socio-economic development.  Israel‘s government plotted an 
increasingly unilateral course in foreign policy due in part to the Eisenhower 
administration‘s tepid relations with the Jewish state.  A lack of good faith also 
permeated Israeli foreign policy.  In the words of Israeli historian Shimon Shamir, ―It 
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must be borne in mind that the contacts in search for [an Arab-Israeli] settlement were 
always by-products and side-shows of greater dramas.‖386   Frustration and alienation 
upset Arab and Israeli relations not only with the United States, but also exacerbated the 
already volatile tensions existing between Arabs and Israelis.  Bloody border clashes in 
the eastern Sinai and Egypt‘s arms deal with Czechoslovakia added to the sense of 
foreboding.  Meanwhile, Cold War allies such as Great Britain and France questioned 
America‘s commitment to maintaining the status quo in the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
 Imitations of multilateralism persisted as American and British policy-makers 
appealed to Nasser‘s infrastructural needs through the Aswan Dam loan proposal.  The 
combination of Nasser‘s initial unwillingness to agree to the loan‘s terms and the 
Eisenhower administration‘s insensitivity to Egypt‘s nationalist perceptions led to the 
proposal‘s cancellation.  Equally important, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development ignored Nasser‘s pleas to re-structure the loan proposal for the sake of 
preserving Egypt‘s sense of fiscal autonomy.  In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal.  As a result, the universe of unilateral activity proved to be expanding not only 
within the world‘s societies, but also between them. 
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Chapter III 
 
The Mismanagement of Multilateral Diplomacy: National 
Leadership and Its Short-Sighted Policies, February to October 
1956 
 
 
 
 
The familiar diplomatic trends displayed in the long lead-up to Nasser‘s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 continued to feed the likelihood of crisis as 
summer turned to autumn.  The lack of a more multilateral perspective on nearly 
everyone‘s part triggered two crises that defined the year in the international arena.  As 
Egyptian officials squared off against Western interests, the Soviets imposed their 
ruthless brand of autocratic order in Poland and Hungary.  Behind the Iron Curtain, 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev experienced political unrest after his attempt to coat 
Communist party principles with a more palatable sense of pluralism.  Mass protests in 
Poland during the summer of 1956 spread to other countries behind the Iron Curtain and 
turned into outright revolution in Hungary by November of that year.  During this same 
period, the international community responded with varying degrees of indignation and 
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indifference to Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal.  Those countries most 
concerned with canal control met in London to discuss alternatives.  Although the 
London Conferences of August and September 1956 represented a broader array of 
international interests, the pretext for peaceful resolution to the crisis reflected the 
interests and agendas of only eighteen nations.  Failure to address the Egyptian 
government‘s sovereignty meant that Nasser boycotted the proceedings.  As a result, the 
London Conferences lost nearly all legitimacy as a diplomatic gathering that brought 
opposing sides together.  In many respects, presentation of conference recommendations 
to Nasser in Cairo generated considerable resentment that only amplified the severity of 
the crisis.  Deadlock led British and French officials to enlist the United Nations‘ help to 
reduce the tension, but these initiatives masked their preparations for war.  Additionally, 
though many scholars credit the Eisenhower administration with instigating UN 
participation in resolving the conflict, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and other 
senior officials hoped to steer clear of the organization.  Investigating the circuitous 
diplomacy occurring between February and October 1956 helps in recognizing when 
negotiations should not only involve UN officials but should also be orchestrated by them 
as well. 
 
I 
 
Much like the numerous British, Egyptian, and American examples of portraying 
respective national interests as universal interests during the early to mid-1950s, the 
Soviets also devised their own strategies for representing a broad array of perspectives.  
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Building on its success resulting from the Czech arms deal of 1955 and with it the 
Soviets‘ improved international image as a world power genuinely interested in the socio-
economic development of poor countries, the Presidium unveiled a new approach to 
promote communist ideology worldwide.  At the 20
th
 Congress of the Soviet Communist 
Party, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev declared a return to a more pluralistic pursuit of 
a communist utopia.
387
  Early in his 25 February closed-door plenary session speech, 
Khrushchev called for restoring Leninist principles by renouncing Stalin‘s ―cult of the 
individual‖ and Stalin‘s brutal abuse of power.  Khrushchev embraced the level of 
opinionated debate Lenin had encouraged.  Party Congresses under Lenin convened 
regularly and debated ―at length all the basic questions‖ pertaining to domestic, foreign, 
party, and state policies.  ―Stalin,‖ Khrushchev continued, ―ignored the norms of party 
life and trampled on the Leninist principle of collective Party leadership.‖388  Taking this 
through to its logical conclusion, Khrushchev allowed for the possibility of pursuing 
socialism by way of a variety of paths.
389
  Like Eisenhower‘s attempt to associate the 
West‘s Tripartite Declaration with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, 
Khrushchev made it the Soviet Union‘s responsibility to try to represent broader interests 
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by permitting greater input from rank-and-file Communist Party members.  Interestingly, 
as historian William Taubman points out, Khrushchev consulted only a few Soviet 
officials prior to his delivering the speech.  Among those kept out of the loop were 
leaders in Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary.
390
 
Simultaneously, Khrushchev needed to expand his own political base of support 
by converting opponents to his cause.  To accomplish this, Khrushchev yielded 
increasingly to the pressures of maintaining the status quo.  According to historian 
Richard Immerman, ―Khrushchev had actually developed second thoughts about [his 
speech to the 20
th
 Congress] shortly after delivering it.‖391  Part of this regret originated 
from the fact that Khrushchev saw a need to appease his elder comrades within the Party.  
The First Secretary‘s rise to power benefited from the support of younger party members, 
but, outside this cadre, Khrushchev remained politically isolated.
392
  To gain the 
confidence of his peers, Khrushchev wrestled with the faulty paradoxes of his doctrine.  
The Soviet leader, writes historian John Lewis Gaddis, wanted ―to civilize Soviet society 
by eliminating Stalin‘s worst abuses‖ on the one hand, while on the other hand 
attempting ―to disassociate himself and his colleagues . . . from the discredited tyrant.‖393  
Much like the chagrin American officials expressed following Great Britain‘s entrance 
into the Baghdad Pact, Khrushchev discovered that gestures of unity could become 
political liabilities when calls for coalition-building took on a life of their own. 
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Khrushchev‘s recognition of more than one route to socialism created ample 
international acrimony.  The new doctrine of ―hybrid socialism‖ contributed not only to 
the growing Sino-Soviet split, but also inspired protests in Eastern Europe.
394
  After 
researching newly-opened Soviet archives, Mark Kramer reexamines the repressive 
policies Soviet leaders exacted on Polish and Hungarian protesters in 1956.  Soviet-led 
Polish troops crushed Polish workers on strike for higher pay and better working 
conditions.  By late June, Poland‘s Pozan riots left over fifty dead and hundreds 
wounded.  Soviet leadership was particularly concerned about the spread of unrest 
―unless strict ideological controls were re-imposed.‖395  Incidents such as these show the 
conditions Khrushchev attached to multilateral perspectives.  Though more totalitarian in 
their response to dissent, Soviet actions share similar characteristics with both Western 
and Middle Eastern leaders and their desire to convey a greater sense of pluralism while 
maintaining a firm grip on its manifestations. 
 
II 
 
Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal sought a similar objective.  The night 
before his 26 July speech, Nasser shared his intentions with his cabinet ministers and 
RCC members.  As Mohamed Heikal recalled years later: 
Nasser told assembled ministers that he could have followed a different 
course and asked [his advisers] for their opinions, but he had rejected this 
idea, partly because he was absolutely convinced in his own mind that the 
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decision he had come to was the right one, and partly because what he was 
proposing to do involved calculations outside the scope of their 
departments. 
 
Some subordinates applauded the news; most, however, sat stunned and offered 
alternative proclamations to help allay their own fears.  The prime minister would not 
hear of it.  The next day, speaking for the most part extemporaneously, Nasser‘s 
announcement filled thirty-three pages of translated text.
396
 
Justification for seizing control of the canal lay in Nasser‘s reaction to the West‘s 
biased policies and Egypt‘s pursuit of equality among nations based upon Bandung 
principles.  Specifically, Nasser accused the United States of extending far greater 
technical, commercial, and financial aid to Israel than to the Arab world, creating an 
imbalance of power.  He also accused the U.S. of supporting French imperialist efforts in 
Algeria at the expense of Arab lives.  Given these circumstances, Nasser proclaimed, 
Egypt must marshal the few resources at its disposal for the betterment of the country and 
its citizens.  He argued that if the West reneged on deals such as the Aswan Dam loan 
proposal, then Egypt reserved the right to seize alternative revenue sources such as the 
Suez Canal to fulfill the nation‘s socio-economic development.397 
Recounting the canal‘s imperial legacy, Nasser aimed to transform the structure‘s 
image from one of exploitation to one of opportunity for Egypt.  He told of Ferdinand de 
Lesseps‘s promise that the canal would serve to benefit the country and its people, but 
Nasser argued that the Frenchman had propagated a lie to fulfill an imperialist agenda.  
The prime minister equated de Lesseps‘s actions with those of the World Bank‘s 
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chairperson, Eugene Black.  Both men desired to meddle in Egypt‘s internal affairs to the 
detriment of the country‘s sovereignty.  In Nasser‘s view, this opportunistic exploitation 
was at an end.
 398
  The uttering of de Lesseps‘s name in the speech served as the 
codeword for Egypt‘s military commanders to move into the canal-zone and seize 
control.
399
  Like nearly every other aspect of the Suez controversy, history, too, was 
drafted into service in the battle between inclusive and exclusive notions of diplomacy.  
The man who helped demonstrate the effectiveness of monopolizing multilateral 
perspectives in the nineteenth century served as the codeword for Nasser‘s own 
harnessing of the multilateral pan-Arab, anti-imperial initiative in the twentieth century. 
Indeed, the impulse to enlist history in this way was nearly ubiquitous.  In her 
book Eye on Israel, Michelle Mart describes how Americans throughout the 1950s 
identified with Israeli settlement in a hostile land and its historical parallels to the 
Puritans‘ hardships in the New World.400  During a private 31 July conversation with 
American diplomat Robert Murphy, Britain‘s Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold 
Macmillan expressed his country‘s determination not to experience ―another Munich‖ 
even if it meant ending up as ―perhaps another Netherlands.‖401  Rather than appeasing 
another megalomaniacal dictator as Britain had done with Hitler in Munich in 1938, the 
British government and its people were willing to sacrifice their empire as the Dutch 
Hapsburgs had done in the sixteenth century in an attempt to retain their relevance as a 
world power.  The truly fascinating aspect of these developments shows how the leaders 
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of various countries took history and interpreted it to fit a particular national context.  
British policy-makers adapted history‘s lessons to provide a particularly bleak outlook.  
Rank-and-file Americans identified with and took solace in the rugged durability of the 
Israelis—a kindred spirit in an unkind world.402  For Nasser, historical experiences of 
exploitation united Arabs, from which Nasser hoped to capitalize politically.  In the case 
of all three countries, governments and citizens alike incorporated the experiences of 
others to fit their own historical perspective and encouraged others to think similarly. 
In addition to empowering Egypt‘s citizens, Nasser used his nationalization of the 
canal to unite the cause of all Arabs as well as those populations yearning for liberation 
from colonialism.  ―My own destiny,‖ he exalted, ―is tied to that of my brother in Jordan, 
Syria, the Sudan . . . .  That is how we are born in this part of the world with inter-related 
destinies.‖403  By proclaiming solidarity with his fellow Arabs and Africans, Nasser used 
the nationalization of the canal not simply as an opportunity for Egypt to unilaterally 
thumb its nose at the declining empires of Europe, but more importantly as an 
opportunity to serve as universal inspiration for all people struggling with freeing 
themselves from their colonial past.  A paradox emerged where Nasser hoped to 
galvanize regional support and embody the nationalist zeal of the non-aligned world 
without consulting those whose support he wished to enlist.
404
 
These efforts extended to Western powers too.   According to Mohamed Heikal, 
Nasser‘s efforts to win ―wider world opinion‖ included attempts to drive a political 
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wedge between British and American leadership.  In the weeks following Nasser‘s 
nationalization of the canal, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden pressured U.S. 
Secretary of State Dulles and other American officials into adopting a more aggressive 
stance against Nasser.  Careful not to lend any additional legitimacy to Eden‘s argument, 
the Egyptian leader refrained from associating his seizure of the Suez Canal with Dulles‘s 
abandonment of Aswan Dam funding.  Instead, Nasser stated that his actions were a part 
of a more long-term agenda.
405
  Nasser‘s motives, however, were purely political, 
focusing on generating as much international support for his actions as possible. 
To a degree, Nasser succeeded in influencing many of his Arab allies.  Initial 
responses by other leaders in the Arab world idolized his political genius.  In Syria, the 
U.S. embassy reported that newspapers called the move ―‗historic‘‖ and that the 
government ―proposed that all Arab states resign from [the] IBRD (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) and International Monetary Fund and set up purely 
Arab institutions to finance development [in] Arab countries.‖406  Populations in Lebanon 
and Libya also cheered the event.
407
  Nasser won new admirers in Kuwait and Morocco 
where prior support had been non-existent.
408
  Supporters in Sri Lanka also expressed 
their solidarity.
409
  Nasser even garnered support from within Iraq—Egypt‘s chief rival 
for Arab loyalties.  According to U.S. State Department officials, influential opinion-
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makers, such as the ―Iraqi press and political leaders,‖ approved of the canal‘s 
nationalization.
410
  Nasser‘s political move was, for the most part, a public relations 
triumph.  However, dissenting voices were heard in Arab, non-aligned, and Western 
camps. 
Heads of state in Iraq, India, and elsewhere expressed their concerns over the 
event.  The same day Nasser delivered his speech; British Prime Minister Anthony Eden 
honored visiting Iraqi dignitaries with a dinner party in London that evening.  Hearing of 
the Suez canal‘s fate, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, advised Eden to strike back 
with abrupt force against Nasser.
411
  Because he was Nasser‘s rival for Arab loyalties, 
Said‘s response is understandable.  He stood to gain significantly from any weakening of 
Nasser‘s position—but at what cost?  Said‘s quest for solidarity clashed with a sizable 
segment of his fellow Iraqi citizens.  By 1958, these festering resentments boiled over 
during Iraq‘s revolution, but in 1956 they proved that unity within supposedly 
homogeneous groups was by no means a certainty in spite of efforts to demonstrate the 
contrary. 
Indian officials also balked at Nasser‘s unilateral maneuver.  Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru conveyed his concerns to Nasser in a delicately worded 
personal letter on 3 August.  Later, communicating through his ambassador in Cairo, 
Nehru cautioned Nasser ―that he had acted hastily and that public opinion in India was 
likely to be unfriendly.‖412  Nasser‘s good friend and advisor, Muhamad Heikal, 
remembered his boss‘s keen sensitivity toward gaining Indian support.  India‘s position 
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as ―the most important member of the Commonwealth, as well as of the Afro-Asian 
community,‖ made it extremely valuable.  The fact that Nasser‘s announcement followed 
soon after meetings between Nehru, Nasser, and Yugoslav Prime Minister Josip Broz 
Tito had concluded in Broni, Yugoslavia hinted at India‘s possible collusion in Egypt‘s 
nationalizing the canal.  As a result, Nehru was placed in a situation where he was 
required to deny any prior knowledge of Nasser‘s plans in order to save face in the 
international community.
413
  While understanding Nasser‘s intent and respecting Egypt‘s 
sovereign rights, Nehru also realized the international ramifications and urged Egypt‘s 
lead in smoothing relations with the world‘s canal users. 
Nasser took these comments seriously and quickly sought to ease his friend‘s 
fears and those of the international community.  He believed that without India‘s support, 
the rest of the non-aligned world would turn their backs on Egypt.
414
  In certain cases, 
this seemed to be a plausible threat.  Officials from developing countries expressed 
consternation equal to if not greater than that of Nehru.  In one instance, a Nigerian Emir, 
passing through Cairo, shredded a message he was asked to sign endorsing the 
nationalization of the canal.  In another instance, the Sheikh of Kuwait offered his strong 
rebuke of Nasser‘s act.415  Consensus in the West, opposing the canal‘s nationalization, 
seemed equally unstable. 
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III 
 
Beginning 27 July, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden insisted on resolute 
opposition to Nasser‘s action.  At an emergency cabinet meeting, Eden shifted his 
attention away from legal technicalities to favoring direct economic and political 
pressure.  Cabinet members agreed that from the perspective of jurisprudence, Nasser had 
not violated any prior agreements.
416
  To allay their trepidation, the advisers began 
redefining the canal as ―an international asset‖ that was too important to be controlled by 
a single country.  Subsequent discussions during the meeting, however, led to severe 
lapses in logic.  On the one hand, British officials supported the idea of transforming the 
issue into an international dilemma.  On other hand, Eden chided efforts calling for the 
UN Security Council‘s involvement.  Instead, Cabinet officials sought to confer with 
French and American officials exclusively.  Also noteworthy was the fact that once 
British officials reached a consensus that Nasser‘s nationalization was a breech of 
international trust, discussion focused more intently on the use of force.  In essence, Eden 
and his staff concluded that the British, French, and American governments would 
determine the international interest, negotiate on its behalf, and decide on the appropriate 
circumstances and application of military force.
417
 
Convincing members of his own government was not enough for Eden.  Later the 
same day, he drafted a letter to Eisenhower to coordinate policy responses.  Eden took the 
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liberty of presenting his interpretation of Nasser‘s move as a ―defiance of international 
agreements‖ which, if dealt with quickly, would ―have the support of all the maritime 
powers.‖  Seizure of the canal threatened ―the free world,‖ Eden argued, and its most 
vital commodities such as oil.
418
  According to British estimates, sixty million tons of oil 
representing two-thirds of Western Europe‘s annual supply made its way through the 
Suez Canal.
419
  Using this argument of Western interdependence as a basis for action, the 
prime minister alluded to the possibility of military intervention in his message to 
Eisenhower, but left it as an option of ―last resort.‖420  Of interest here is the fact that 
British officials passed off military force as a last resort when, according to historians 
Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, they had already taken steps to create an 
―overwhelmingly hawkish‖ sub-committee to handle the crisis.421  Besides perpetuating 
the double-dealing that occurred among Western allies, Eden‘s actions exhibited classic 
characteristics of mistaking unilateralist policy-making for multilateralism.  The day after 
his talk with Macmillan, American diplomat Robert Murphy recollected in his memoirs, 
―Eden was laboring under the impression that a common identity of interest existed 
among the allies.  That was not the American view, and I [Murphy] gave no 
encouragement to that idea.‖422  As with Eisenhower‘s experience negotiating collective 
security agreements in the Middle East, Khrushchev‘s experience in handling mounting 
dissent following his ―secret‖ speech, and Nasser‘s experience following his 
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nationalization of the canal, Eden‘s policy-making was built on political quicksand.  In 
every instance, each individual failed to represent accurately the multilateral perspective, 
which only succeeded in escalating international tensions. 
Britain‘s European neighbors as well as members from within the British 
Commonwealth took a more accommodating view of the Suez crisis.  As the ―seventh 
largest user [of the] canal, Dutch officials were optimistic that Nasser would make some 
effort to honor ―international commitments.‖423  Indeed, Nasser had promised to 
compensate shareholders owning stock in the Suez Canal Company at fair market 
prices.
424
  Like the Dutch, Canada‘s Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester 
Pearson believed that Egypt‘s control of the canal did not warrant alarm as long as 
maritime transit remained undisturbed.
425
  Officials in Washington also expressed their 
reservations regarding military invasion during a 31 July meeting at the White House.  
Among Eisenhower‘s circle of advisors, Secretary Dulles noted England‘s favoring 
―ultimatum‖ over ―conference.‖  The Secretary‘s brother and Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, reported the British people‘s feverish support for 
some sort of military response and numerous references equating Nasser‘s act with that 
of Hitler and his re-militarization of the Rhineland twenty years earlier.
426
 
Allen Dulles‘s assessment of the British citizenry was a bit premature.  Several 
scholars have investigated British public opinion and its enthusiasm for Eden‘s policies.  
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―For most of a public life spent largely in the resolution of diplomatic conundrums,‖ 
writes Eden biographer David Dutton, ―it was Eden‘s particular skill to move those 
around him towards consensus forming the basis of action.  But in the case of Suez Eden 
began with a near consensus—at least in the domestic context—and had the misfortune to 
see it fade away in the weeks which followed.‖427  Other historians differ with Dutton 
only in a matter of degree.  Within a week of Nasser‘s announcement, high-profile British 
politicians such as Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell argued in the House of Commons 
that force could only be justified after its endorsement by ―the public opinion of the 
world‖ embodied within the United Nations.428  Britain‘s popular press echoed parallel 
points of view.  According to historian Ralph Negrine, by 5 August British newspapers 
such as The Observer, The Guardian, and The Daily Mirror advocated UN 
involvement.
429
  Despite Eden‘s efforts to spread his particular perspective, he seemed 
aware enough of the fact that the successful return to an acceptable sense of world order 
relied entirely upon U.S. endorsement.  When it came to assuming a lead role, however, 
the Eisenhower administration demurred. 
By early August 1956, Eisenhower had begun imposing his own limits on 
multilateral diplomacy.  The same day Gaitskell advocated UN involvement in the Suez 
crisis, British, French, and American allies condemned Egypt‘s ―unilateral seizure‖ of the 
canal and its effect on ―the freedom and security‖ of all nations.  The statement went on 
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to call for convening an international conference to reinstate the canal‘s status as an 
international asset.
430
  Egypt and the international community were to negotiate 
independently of the United Nations.  During an 8 August press conference, President 
Eisenhower continued to distance himself from any efforts made to involve the world 
organization.  When asked if he supported Egypt‘s referral of the Suez issue to the United 
Nations, the president expressed skepticism.  Eisenhower raised the possibility of a 
Security Council deadlock resulting from British and French veto powers and then 
questioned the organization‘s overall ability to handle the matter with due haste.431 
Given this lack of confidence, it is easy to identify the misunderstandings and 
misrepresentations that occurred between Eden and Eisenhower.  Where Eden interpreted 
UN involvement as an impediment to his sense of British national security, Eisenhower 
dismissed UN involvement because of the impediments resulting from his allies‘ national 
security interests.  Both men reached the same conclusion as a result of diametrically 
opposed perspectives.  For the next several weeks, however, Eden and Eisenhower 
misconstrued each others motives.
432
  For Eden, American endorsement of an 
international conference meant that U.S. officials remained receptive to military options.  
American policy-makers, on the other hand, took British participation in the conference 
as a sign of good faith.  The faulty basis on which these presuppositions were based 
contributed to a false sense of multilateral diplomacy.  Furthermore, the West‘s refusal to 
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engage in negotiations through the United Nations thwarted a more genuine 
internationalist alternative that would have included Egypt‘s support. 
For Dag Hammarskjöld, the lack of confidence hurt.  Throughout the late summer 
of 1956, the secretary general continued grappling with problems facing enforcement of 
the General Armistice Agreement in the Middle East; but new frustrations emerged after 
Western leaders decided to exclude UN officials from mediation over Suez.  When 
reporters asked Hammarskjöld to comment on the canal‘s nationalization and the West‘s 
response, he pointed out that apparently his advice was unimportant.
433
  Signs of 
aggravation appeared as early as 24 and 25 July, when border clashes between Israelis 
and Jordanians erupted once again.  Hammarskjöld threatened to dump the entire Arab-
Israeli dispute on members of the Security Council as stipulated by Article 99 of the UN 
Charter, if the violence persisted.
434
  These half-nelson tactics had limited success, each 
time resulting in diminishing effectiveness.  As the head of UN operations in the region, 
General E.L.M. Burns notes in his memoirs, from roughly the end of July to the end of 
September, Israeli officials reported fifty-nine complaints of incursions along its borders, 
leaving nineteen Israelis killed and dozens wounded.  Jordan registered sixty-three 
complaints against Israeli actions leading to seventy-two Jordanian deaths.
435
  Finally, in 
a letter to Hammarskjöld, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion charged ―that the UN 
observation posts in Gaza had been useless and that Israel would be unlikely to accept 
them after 31 October.
436
  Besides foreshowing the ominous events that played out in the 
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fall of 1956, Ben-Gurion‘s unilateral motives were indicative of world leaders for much 
of August. 
The general malaise expressed towards the United Nations by leaders of countries 
both great and small also limited the scope of policy debate.  As early as 9 August, 
Eisenhower and his senior advisors expressed their fundamental opposition to Nasser‘s 
nationalization of the canal.  During a lengthy National Security Council meeting, the 
president concluded that ―Egypt had gone too far.‖  Contrary to his own deliberative 
approach to race relations, where he considered himself to be the representative of 
moderates of all races, Eisenhower feared that ―chaos‖ would dominate the region if 
Nasser got his way.
437
  According to historian Michael Hunt, ―[Eisenhower] thought 
‗dependent peoples‘ should submit to several additional decades of Western tutelage.‖438  
As the National Security Council‘s discussion addressed the history of the Suez Canal, 
analysis yielded to increasingly orientalist thinking.  Secretary of Defense Charles 
Wilson‘s observation that the Egyptian government once held substantial shares of canal 
stock but sold them led Eisenhower to respond, ―harems were expensive.‖439 
                                               
437 See Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, pp. 92-93.  For Eisenhower‘s views on Nasser and 
his success in the Middle East, see ―292nd Meeting of the National Security Council,‖ 9 August 1956, 
D.D.E. Papers as President of the United States, Ann Whitman Files, NSC Series, Box #8, D.D.E. Library, 
Abilene, KS.  See also Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1987), p. 164  Additional evidence of Eisenhower‘s masking racial biases with portrayals of him as a 
prudent centrist in race relations can be seen in Andrew Rotter‘s investigation of the president‘s relations 
with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.  According to Rotter, Eisenhower and Nehru got along well 
together despite the president‘s view that Nehru was somewhat effeminate and ―‗emotional.‘‖  See Andrew 
Rotter, ―Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947-1964,‖ in Empire 
and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945, eds. Peter Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss 
(Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2001), p. 205-207.  For additional analysis of Eisenhower 
and his senior staff and their perceptions of Nehru and other Third World leaders, see Borstelmann, The 
Cold War and the Color Line, p. 112. 
438 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 164. 
439 ―292nd Meeting of the National Security Council,‖ 9 August 1956, D.D.E. Papers as President of the 
United States, Ann Whitman Files, NSC Series, Box #8, D.D.E. Library, Abilene, KS. 
178 
 
By the end of the meeting, the president instructed the State and Defense 
departments to lead the formulation of U.S. policy responses.  Specifically, Eisenhower 
stated that both departments ―should be jointly studying all possible contingencies which 
might develop out of the [Suez crisis].‖  Seven contingency papers were drafted by mid-
September, but much diplomatic jockeying took place over the course of the intervening 
weeks. 
A 12 August meeting between America‘s bi-partisan Congressional leaders, the 
president, and his senior staff included a lop-sided discussion that obstructed the nation‘s 
objective involvement in any international diplomatic discourse.  In a scene reminiscent 
of Nasser‘s informing his advisers of his intention to nationalize the Suez Canal, 
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles reported to the legislators assembled 
that France and Britain had agreed to America‘s setting a diplomatic course to resolve the 
crisis.  Beginning 16 August, an international conference was scheduled to convene in 
London which would negotiate acceptable terms for international control of the canal. 
 Yet, in the discussions that followed this announcement, Eisenhower and Dulles 
scarcely veiled their contempt for Nasser and their sympathetic support for America‘s 
two NATO allies.  Contrary to their quest for a diplomatic solution, the president, 
secretary of state, and at least one member of Congress equated Nasser‘s usurpation of 
the canal to Hitler‘s aggressive acquisition of territory during the 1930s.  Less-than-
diplomatic French and British officials had expressed identical arguments as early as the 
spring of 1956.
440
  Operating from this pretext, opportunities for open debate suffered 
significantly. 
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Eisenhower and Dulles stonewalled legislators who viewed the crisis through a 
broader, more unbiased perspective.  Representative Charles Hallack (Republican—
Indiana) and Senator Leverett Saltonstall (Republican—Massachusetts) inquired about 
possible United Nations participation.  Like the president‘s 8 August response to the 
press, Dulles replied that a Security Council veto could halt progress and the General 
Assembly held no authority to act on its own recommendations.  As a result, the best the 
world body could achieve was ―inconclusive debate and [general acquiescence] 
amounting to de facto recognition of what Nasser has done.‖441  The fact that the 
Eisenhower administration refused to recognize Nasser‘s basis for action casts further 
doubt on America‘s diplomatic intentions.  Additionally, Dulles conveyed 
Hammarskjöld‘s own concern over British and French disregard for UN intervention.  
Hammarskjöld, according to Dulles, was agreeable to partnership between the UN and 
―any international board‖ established as a result of the London Conference.  Yet, Dulles 
conceded, Hammarskjöld‘s gravest concern lay with ―answers [that] were lacking with 
respect to possible developments should no peaceful solution be obtained.‖  
Hammarskjöld‘s reservations exemplify the crux of conflict on which the Suez Crisis 
teetered. 
Dulles‘s inability to recognize the relationship between the administration‘s 
continued disregard for Nasser‘s perspective and Hammarskjöld‘s reservations regarding 
viable arbitration served as another example of the discrepancies occurring between 
national interests and multilateral diplomacy.  Some Congressional members attempted to 
show the folly of Dulles‘s perspective.  For example, Senator Theodore Green (D-RI) 
raised the prospect of internationalizing all the world‘s waterways.  Dulles parried this 
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thrust saying that it would conflict with America‘s national interests in the Panama Canal.  
Green retorted, ―if everybody took that position no progress would ever be made.‖  
Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D-TX) asked about Nasser‘s intentions and the 
likelihood of his closing the canal.  Both Eisenhower and Dulles said that canal closure 
was not inevitable, but Dulles continued by saying that the Europeans‘ argued that Nasser 
was not trustworthy.
442
  Rayburn‘s question was the closest this eclectic group of policy-
makers came to addressing the practicality of Nasser‘s closing the canal.  Denying access 
would hurt Egypt‘s economic prospects as much as Europe‘s.  Nasser‘s preoccupation 
with socio-economic development might have offset the West‘s paranoia.  Yet, few if any 
government officials on either side of the Atlantic cared to consider these 
(interdependent) connections. 
These biased views doomed negotiations before they had begun.  Evoking the 
well-established practice of concealing national interests beneath the cloak of 
international legitimacy, the London Conference lost credibility as a forum for mediation.  
The same day that U.S. officials met in the White House, Nasser declined his invitation to 
the London Conference.  ―The proposed conference has no right whatsoever,‖ Nasser 
proclaimed, ―to discuss any matter falling within the jurisdiction of Egypt or relating to 
its sovereignty over any part of its territory.‖443  Instead, the conference became the latest 
manifestation of mutually-exclusive tendencies that dominated diplomacy. 
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IV 
 
Delegates from twenty-two nations attended the London Conference.
444
  For one 
week in mid-August 1956, the conference set about drafting a multilateral agreement 
designed to re-establish international authority over the Suez Canal.  In his opening 
remarks, Dulles repeated claims that ―the [canal], by reason of its internationalized 
character, both in law and in fact, is the last place wherein to seek the means of gaining 
national triumph and promoting national ambition.‖445  The basis of Dulles‘s argument 
simultaneously encapsulated and ignored the history of the canal. 
Prior to its construction, de Lesseps had operated from a quid pro quo context, 
guaranteeing economic and political empowerment to any and all governments that 
supported his ambitious project.  The resurrection of the Ottoman Empire, a revival of 
French pride, English economic dominance, Egyptian independence, all of these 
inducements were unstable enough without de Lesseps‘s attaching a sense of multilateral 
recognition of these promises by the international community.  For Egypt, the allure of 
independence served as the main reason for Ismail Pasha‘s concession.  Nasser was 
simply following through on that promise.  Disraeli‘s purchase of Suez Company shares 
satisfied Britain‘s national security concerns by providing economic peace of mind.  
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Eden wanted to maintain that commercial insulation.  During the summer of 1956, these 
conflicted chickens were coming home to roost. 
Analogous to the UNSCOP decision on Palestine in 1947, two views emerged at 
the London Conference in 1956.  The majority endorsed America‘s plan for outright 
―international control and operation of the canal‖ and raised the prospect of using 
military force if Nasser remained defiant.  Presenting his proposal as the most inclusive 
of opinions, reflective of ―actual conditions,‖ and projecting ―confidence for the future,‖ 
Dulles dismissed more accommodating alternatives and thus undermined the chances for 
successful negotiation.  ―Although [the secretary] certainly would have been happy to 
have his plan implemented,‖ writes historian H.W. Brands, ―he knew that Nasser could 
not accept it.‖446  Eugene McCarthy concurs, ―Dulles generally proceeded without 
consulting, or even caring about, the opinions of other nations.‖447  Given Dulles‘s 
disposition and these interpretations of it, the chances for a negotiated settlement 
plummeted.  Dulles‘s lack of faith may have been forgiven had others not felt similarly.  
Contrasting the eighteen-nation majority, delegations from the remaining four 
countries supported an alternative proposal.  Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and the Soviet 
Union would have allowed Egypt to retain ownership of the canal while simultaneously 
forming an international board of canal users capable of exercising ―‗advisory 
functions.‘‖448  India‘s delegate, Krishna Menon, devised the plan, which paralleled 
Nehru‘s earlier idea for drafting a new convention to replace the Treaty of 1888.  Though 
somewhat more attuned to Nasser‘s view, discord resonated regardless of Egypt‘s desire 
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to appease India.  Like the majority proposal, the minority‘s plan still imposed 
stipulations upon Egypt.  Nasser was willing to negotiate with the international 
community, but he refused to yield to any agreement that imposed concessions as a 
prerequisite.  Consequently, neither the majority nor the minority views were particularly 
inclusive despite their efforts to appear so. 
To complicate matters, personality conflicts detracted from the London 
Conference proceedings.  Historian Hugh Thomas laments how ―India who could have 
exercised an influence for compromise was unfortunately represented by Menon, who 
always maddened British Conservative politicians and who acted as Egypt‘s 
advocate.‖449  Some Egyptian officials themselves, however, took umbrage with Menon‘s 
proposals and considered him ―a prima donna‖ at high-profile conferences such as the 
one in London.
450
  Poor personal relations also plagued the diplomatic mission sent to 
Cairo to negotiate directly the terms of the London Conference with Nasser. 
The Menzies Mission, named for Australia‘s Prime Minister Robert Menzies who 
headed the delegation, arrived in the Egyptian capital to explain the conference‘s 
majority proposal and prepare for its implementation.  A specter of foreboding 
overshadowed the initial proceedings of 3 September and for good reason.  Menzies 
seemed, at best, a dubious choice to head the mission.  Prior to leaving for Cairo, 
Menizes had gone on public record opposing Nasser‘s nationalization of the canal on 
legal as well as moral grounds.
451
  Picking up on this, Nasser, ―noting that Menzies 
sounded even more like a nineteenth-century imperialist than British Prime Minister 
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Anthony Eden, complained that the Western powers were trying to back [Nasser] into a 
corner.‖452  An antagonistic tone overwhelmed the negotiations.  Tensions infiltrated 
discussions establishing the schedule of meetings.  Menzies wanted a morning and 
afternoon meeting each day; Nasser rejected this idea saying ―Mr. Menzies it looks as if I 
may have a war on my hands and in the morning[s] I must be preparing for it.‖453 
Scarcely hiding his contempt for Menzies, Nasser proceeded the next day to 
explain his views.  He began by questioning the validity of Dulles‘s view ―that the canal 
must be insulated from the politics of any one nation.‖  The crux of Nasser‘s argument 
rested on two key claims.  First, he stuck by his view that the canal was within Egyptian 
sovereignty and therefore outside the jurisdiction of international input.  Second, Nasser 
noted the hypocritical parallel between the political motives for Nasser‘s seizing the canal 
and political dimensions of the London Conference proposal which threatened economic 
and military retaliation if Egypt failed to comply.
454
  In Nasser‘s opinion, the proposal‘s 
ultimatum-like demeanor further justified his taking control of the canal.  He refused to 
yield to what he labeled ―‗international colonialism‘‖ and its Western sponsors.455   
Nasser‘s reference to colonial exploitation exposed the sensitivity Western 
diplomats had to this infamous legacy.  On one occasion, Nasser and Menzies sparred 
verbally over the issue.  Nasser alluded to ―trouble‖ should the international community 
―impose‖ its will on Egypt.  Menzies saw trouble as inevitable if Nasser failed to 
relinquish the canal to international authority.  As if to make his point more emphatic, 
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Menzies packed his papers and prepared to walk out of the proceedings.
456
  H. W. Brands 
credits Loy Hendreson, the American delegate to the Menzies Mission, with single-
handedly salvaging the situation by interjecting his own sense of the mission‘s 
significance as an avenue through which progress could be made to mediate between 
Egyptian sovereignty and international commitments.
457
  As a first-hand eyewitness, 
Nasser‘s adviser, Mohamed Heikal, remembers the scene differently.  Henderson took 
this conciliatory tone after the delegates from Iran and Ethiopia objected to the use of 
threatening rhetoric.  Moments later, the Swedish delegate voiced his commitment to 
negotiating with Nasser.
458
  Contrary to Brands‘s analysis, Heikal cites this consensual 
vote of confidence as the reason for the mission‘s continuance. 
The efforts of Loy Henderson and his fellow delegates were not the only 
examples of the West‘s attempt to ease Nasser‘s suspicion.  On 5 September 1956, as the 
talks in Cairo continued, President Eisenhower also reacted to Nasser‘s sense of colonial 
encroachment.  Isolating Menzies even further, Eisenhower proclaimed that the United 
States would not support the use of force in resolving the Suez crisis.
459
  Menzies‘s hard-
line tact lost its meaning after news of Eisenhower‘s statement spread.460  On his return 
trip to Australia after talks with Nasser had ended in failure, Menzies met with President 
Eisenhower in Washington.  According to Hugh Thomas, Menzies told Eisenhower that 
America‘s refusal to use force ―‗pulled the rug clean out from under [Menzies‘s] 
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feet.‘‖461  The mission‘s official final report, however, blamed Nasser for his irrational 
intransigence.
462
  The more likely culprit seems to have been Menzies‘s unwillingness to 
negotiate.
463
  In many respects, the Menzies Mission accentuated the ruptures that not 
only further debilitated relations between jaded adversaries, but also marked the 
deterioration of trust between allies.  This breakdown in diplomacy outside the United 
Nations served as further evidence of the international organization‘s indispensability as 
an alternative for multilateral diplomacy. 
 
V 
 
  In spite of the unraveling of solidarity that was taking place, Western leaders 
continued to act as if they enjoyed the full support of their allies.  By early September 
1956, the leaders of the various countries interested in resolving the Suez crisis attempted 
to do so by their own means. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles rallied support 
for a second London Conference.  Dulles hoped to create a Suez Canal Users Association 
(SCUA) to provide qualified canal pilots, collect tolls from SCUA members to be divided 
between Egypt and the association, and, if possible, determine the canal‘s traffic 
patterns.
464
  British Prime Minister Anthony Eden planned to have this second conference 
serve his own purposes.  Indeed, although Eden announced the convening of a second 
conference of canal users, Dulles masterminded the concept.  Eden understood his 
country‘s participation as nothing more than a show of unity.  Where Dulles hoped to 
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allow time for reasoned negotiation to re-assert itself, Eden believed that his support of 
Dulles would be reciprocated should force be necessary to resolve the crisis.
465
  Not only 
did the first London Conference fail to bridge the gap between Egyptian and international 
concerns relating to the canal, it did not even change the mindset Western allies held 
towards one another.  As historian John Campbell put it, ―The discipline of both [Eastern 
and Western] blocs seemed to be breaking down.‖466  Yet, each leader remained 
convinced that the disparate course they pursued enjoyed the support of their allies.   
Multilateral diplomacy had reached its lowest ebb. 
Although some U.S. government officials began favoring UN participation, 
Eisenhower‘s senior advisers continued to limit the organization‘s role to one of rubber-
stamping Washington-based policy.  Anonymous bureaucrats began understanding the 
dispute as more than a simple matter of bloc politics.  According to a New York Times 
article, ―Western diplomats‖ had recoiled from the prospect of UN deliberations for fear 
of an Asian-African-Latin American coalition that could dominate the proceedings in the 
UN General Assembly.  Witnessing the diversity of opinion within the Afro-Asian bloc, 
however, eased America‘s fears to the point where they could accept referral of the 
matter to the world body.  Discipline among Asian nations had been particularly elusive 
during the first London conference.  Where Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan had aligned with 
the 18-nation proposal during the first London Conference, India, Indonesia, and others 
had dissented.
467
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Dulles hoped to capitalize from the re-alignments that were taking place to direct 
the UN‘s course of action.  During a 6 September meeting with Congressional leaders, 
Dulles expressed his intention of using the Security Council to legitimize his plans for 
international operation of the canal.  International administration of the canal remained 
―the fundamental issue‖ for Dulles, which automatically precluded him from considering 
alternative perspectives regardless of their source.  With little equivocation, Dulles 
envisioned the role of the United Nations much as the Truman Administration had—an 
instrument designed to endorse a particular brand of world order.  Yet, the next day, he 
accused his European allies of conspiring to use the UN in precisely the same manner.  
After listening to British and French proposals to bring the Suez question before the 
Security Council themselves, Dulles communicated his concern that the Security Council 
would simply ―impose on Egypt a new treaty in the form of the 18-power proposal.‖468  
Dulles deserves equal amounts of credit and criticism for his analysis.  His suspicion of 
British and French motives was credible; but Dulles failed to recognize similar pitfalls 
within his own policy-making.  Dulles‘s subordinates within the State Department were 
more observant. 
Rather than remain anonymous, Loy Henderson, the American member of the 
Menzies Mission, voiced his opposition to Dulles‘s ―user‘s association.‖  Amidst efforts 
to revive negotiations with Nasser over the original London Conference proposal, 
Henderson reported to the State Department the ―difficulties and friction‖ caused by any 
new proposals coming from Washington.  Hearing of Dulles‘s Suez Canal Users 
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Association (SCUA), Henderson said that it ―would be even more unpalatable . . . than 
the 18-nation proposal.‖469  Dulles‘s views proved incompatible among allies, 
congressional legislators, State Department subordinates, and even contested the 
multilateral identity Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld wished to construct for the 
United Nations. 
To complicate matters, NATO allies also began to re-consider referring the Suez 
crisis to the United Nations.  Prior to the diplomatic fireworks occurring during the 
Menzies Mission, a 2 September 1956 New York Times article described the multiple 
majorities present at the London Conference.  ―A majority of the twenty-two nations 
favored international operation of the [Suez] canal,‖ writes Harold Callender, ―but 
[another] majority opposed the use of force to impose this or anything else on Egypt.‖  
The most vocal advocate for both majorities was the United States.
470
  Rather than affirm 
overlapping majorities that the United States could influence and lead as Callender 
implies, these fluid perspectives proved how delicate and complex the entire crisis had 
become.  Countless fissures such as these led Canada‘s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson 
and Belgium‘s Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak to endorse UN action in the Security 
Council.  Speaking before the NATO Council, Pearson believed ―that a majority opinion 
at the Security Council, even if it was vetoed there as it would be, might be an important 
and valuable support for subsequent negotiations or action.‖471  For the first time in the 
Suez crisis, senior-level governmental officials understood the pivotal role the United 
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Nations could play in resolving the dispute.  These opinions formed the foundation upon 
which eventual compromise would be reached. 
Soon afterward, other journalists picked up on variations of these multilateral 
themes.  Tracing the relationship between the U.S. and Great Britain, the iconic Walter 
Lippmann identified numerous occasions where each ally had served to restrain the other 
to benefit broader alliance interests.  For example, Britain filled this restraining role when 
the United States considered expanding the Korean War and the Indo-Chinese War after 
the Dien Bien Phu debacle.  ―In . . . these instances,‖ Lippmann writes, ―American 
opinion was divided.  And official Washington was sharply divided.  The British stand 
did much, it may have been decisive, to ensure the victory of the moderates.‖472 
Lippmann‘s analysis implies the often overshadowed value multilateral 
diplomacy possesses in times of tremendous crisis.  Unlike the course of events 
contributing immediately to the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the even longer history 
surrounding the canal‘s nineteenth century controversies, contested opinions were not 
abhorrent.  Indeed, in Lippmann‘s opinion, they proved vital to international mediation.  
―The old conventional weapons are ineffective against guerillas fighting with the support 
of the native population. . . ., Lippmann concludes.  ―Some day and somehow the 
Atlantic nations and the liberated nations will have to come to a new understanding and 
into a new relationship.‖473  Lippmann, Hammarskjöld, and even Loy Henderson 
comprehended the new multilateral effort and sensitivity that crisis resolution required.  
Policy-makers obsessed with advancing national interests, however, were not to covet 
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multilateralism an as independent alternative unto itself, but rather as a means to a more 
myopic end. 
 
VI 
 
Indeed, the intractable habits of key leaders remained unyielding.  Like many 
American, British, and French officials, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser also 
turned to the United Nations for affirmation of his interests.  After the Menzies Mission 
failed, Nasser welcomed UN arbitration of canal disputes between Egypt and the canal‘s 
users.  According to historian Hugh Thomas, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and 
French Prime Minister Guy Mollet rejected Nasser‘s proposal.474  Similar to Dulles‘s 
strategy, Nasser sought to embellish his image as a facilitator of multilateral interests 
while simultaneously accentuating British and French imperialist belligerency. 
As Nasser joined in the various efforts attempting to usurp multilateral initiatives, 
so too did he have to mollify growing discontent from within the Arab world.  Nasser 
was eager to remain at the forefront of his pan-Arab cause, but his unilateral actions 
regarding the nationalization of the canal threatened the political stability of key Arab 
states.  In Syria, the Cabinet resigned as a result of internal disagreements between its 
Socialist and Nasser-inspired Nationalist elements.
475
  King Hussein of Jordan expressed 
his resentment regarding Nasser‘s cavalier interference throughout the Middle East.  
Hussein grew ―increasingly perturbed‖ by Nasser‘s self-appointed role as Arab 
spokesperson; Nasser‘s unilateral actions, such as nationalizing the Suez Canal; and 
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Nasser‘s subversive propaganda campaigns to undermine Arab rulers who opposed him.  
By September, the Jordanian King shared his views with President Camille Chamoun of 
Lebanon and President Shukry al-Kuwatly of Syria in an effort to subvert Nasser‘s 
influence.
476
  President Chamoun also had to contend with mounting tensions between 
Lebanese Christian and Muslim communities.  Christian Arabs grew ―uneasy‖ about 
Islam‘s dominance in Arab nationalism.  In some cases, Arab Muslims looked to turn 
these suspicions to their advantage.  On one occasion, Muslims accused Arab Christians 
of burning the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian flags at a Lebanese festival in an effort to 
isolate the Arab Christian community.
477
  Ethiopia‘s Ambassador to Egypt conveyed his 
frustration ―that small nations in the Red Sea area were completely at Egypt‘s mercy and 
felt uncomfortable.‖478 
One country‘s support that Nasser could not afford to lose was that of Saudi 
Arabia.  On 23 September, Nasser traveled to meet with King Abdul Aziz bin Abdur 
Rahman Al Saud.  Oil was the main concern of the Saudi sovereign.  With so much of 
Western Europe‘s oil supply transported by naval tankers, the Suez Canal occupied a 
vital ―part of the broader Middle East oil complex.‖  King Saud requested that Nasser 
remain mindful of Egypt‘s commercial responsibilities and of the dire consequences any 
stoppage in oil shipments or oil payments would have on Saudi Arabia.
479
  Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his ―concern that the Saudi Arabian government is 
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in grave danger of a Communist coup if its oil revenues should be denied or substantially 
reduced.‖480 
By mid-September a growing chorus calling for UN involvement resonated across 
the Atlantic; but it did little to affect the diplomatic initiatives of major world powers.  
United Nations officials continued to carry out their duties as stipulated in the Armistice 
Agreement.  These efforts provided UN officials with valuable, first-hand experience 
from which they made astute observations.  For example, Chief UN mediator, General 
Burns, expressed concern over the escalating Suez crisis and its detrimental effect on the 
already tense Arab-Israeli dispute.  Should Europeans and Egyptians go to war, Burns 
cautioned that Israel may join the fight in a series of ―arbitrary retaliations‖ against its 
neighbor without fear of rebuke from the Security Council.  Hammarskjöld agreed, but 
the circumstances as they existed left the United Nations powerless.
481
  To a limited 
degree, Britain‘s Defense Minister Walter Monckton felt similarly.  During an 11 
September British Cabinet meeting, Monckton believed that ―any premature recourse to 
force‖ would ―alienate‖ domestic and international public opinion.  Monckton‘s primary 
interest was gaining American endorsement of any military actions Britain made against 
Egypt.
482
  Admittedly, American approval narrowed ―international public opinion‖ 
severely, but at the very least Monckton‘s assessment demonstrated some sensitivity to 
the international community and its impact on domestic support. 
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The same cannot be said for the Eisenhower administration.  President 
Eisenhower and his senior staff remained steadfast in their handling of Suez Canal 
negotiations.  Although Eisenhower realized in a letter to Eden that ―the most significant 
[American] public opinion . . . seems to think that the United Nations was formed to 
prevent [the Suez crisis from flaring into war,]‖ the president and his Secretary of State 
continued to follow a diplomatic course outside the UN‘s jurisdiction.483  Dulles unveiled 
his Suez Canal Users Association during the Second London Conference, which began 
on 19 September.  Contrary to calls for UN involvement, Dulles questioned the 
organization‘s ―authority‖ over drafting and implementing a new agreement.484  Dulles 
also disagreed with General Burns over the notion that a potential war in Suez could 
expand into a wider Arab-Israeli conflict.
485
 
Rather than continue to assign credit to Dulles for his ability to identify occasions 
when the United Nations was being manipulated to serve a particular set of interests as 
was the case with British and French initiatives, Dulles took to undermining the integrity 
of the organization directly.  This included not only questioning the UN‘s capacity to 
mediate crises, but also refuting the analysis of its officials in the field.  Refusing to 
consider referral of the Suez crisis to the UN simply because it conflicted with the U.S. 
government‘s own proposals tarnishes the sincerity of the administration‘s commitment 
to productive negotiations.  As if to amplify the point, King Saud wrote President 
Eisenhower criticizing Dulles‘s ―‗Users‘ Association‘‖ for its imposition of terms without 
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addressing Egyptian needs.
486
  Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru echoed these 
sentiments during an address to India‘s lower house of Parliament.487  The Prime Minster 
of Ceylon, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike described Dulles‘s idea as a ―‗giant step towards 
war.‘‖488  Given this sense of foreboding, the Eisenhower administration‘s consideration 
of alternative perspective remained mixed at best. 
On 17 September, the same day Eisenhower received King Saud‘s letter, the 
president‘s National Security Council unveiled its seven contingency plans in preparing 
for any eventualities in the Suez crisis.  One plan titled ―‗The Suez Canal Situation is 
Referred to the UN in the Absence of Military Action,‘‖ called for ―side-stepping the UN 
Security Council in favor of either forming a UN subcommittee to resolve the crisis or 
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relying on the ―intervention of the Secretary-General.‖  Another contingency, forecasting 
British and French military intervention in Egypt, recommended reversing the president‘s 
opposition to invasion and providing ―political and logistical support‖ for its two NATO 
allies.
489
 
Given the scope of these strategies, it is clear how disjointed the U.S. approach to 
the Suez crisis had become.  On the one hand, the Eisenhower administration remained 
open to a broad spectrum of responses.  This provided the U.S. with a good deal of 
flexibility in policy-making.  On the other hand, these recommendations contradicted 
earlier proclamations, including objections to military intervention, which Eisenhower 
had already endorsed publicly.  Dulles‘s reservations regarding the extent of independent 
UN involvement in negotiations serves as another contradictory example.  By September 
1956, Dulles was more inclined to use the organization to endorse his own brand of 
compromise. 
As the calendar turned to October, solidarity surrounding the SCUA proposal 
remained highly conditional.  France remained adamant about the association‘s non-
interference in internationalizing the canal.  In fact, French Foreign Minister Christian 
Pineau refused to sign the final report of the Second London Conference that officially 
―proposed an association of canal users.‖  Pineau was of the opinion that French policy-
makers ―should retain freedom of action to refuse measures deemed contrary to [their] 
interests.‖490  Japan and Pakistan sent observers only; and Ethiopia flirted with the idea of 
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joining them.  Iran agreed to participate with the condition that the SCUA refrain from 
―any use of force against Egypt.‖491  According to a 6 October New York Times article, 
objections to force included ―economic . . . or any other kind of warfare [used] to break 
Egypt‘s control [over] the canal.‖492  British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd admitted in a 
private meeting that ―the Scandinavians would not come into SCUA without the UN 
having been involved.‖493  Nevertheless, the users‘ association was agreed to.  When 
Nasser heard the news, he declared that any attempt made to implement the SCUA 
through force of arms would be interpreted by Egypt as an act of war.
494
  This tepid 
response from America‘s allies and Nasser‘s unequivocal reaction to the SCUA allowed 
others to follow through with their own strategies for crisis management. 
Beginning on 5 October, British and French officials began presenting their case 
to the UN Security Council.  In their opening statements, Selwyn Lloyd and French 
Foreign Minister Christian Pineau repeated the position taken by those eighteen nations at 
the London Conferences by emphasizing the international rights of unfettered access to 
the canal and demanding a degree of international authority over its administration.  
Lloyd conceded that nations retained the right to nationalize ―undertakings,‖ but argued 
that the canal‘s status as an international artery made any discussion of nationalization 
―irrelevant to the matter before the Security Council.‖495  Framing debate in such a way 
automatically disqualified Egypt‘s claims.  In doing so, Lloyd attempted to steer the 
Security Council to support the course of action set by the 18-nation proposal. 
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Additionally, Lloyd explained that ―if one government is to have the power to control the 
canal, the confidence of those countries that the present patterns of their trade and 
economies can be maintained will be sadly shaken.‖496  Here, Lloyd isolated Egyptian 
interests while insisting that Britain‘s commercial interests were synonymous with those 
of the international community.  
The French Foreign Minister‘s remarks were blunt and bleak compared to his 
British counterpart.  According to Pineau, the Suez crisis represented ―the limits‖ placed 
on national sovereignty.  These restrictions, Pineau continued, stemmed ―from treaties 
freely concluded.‖  Therefore, ―international treaties must be respected.‖  In other words, 
the Egyptian government had an obligation to abide by the terms of the 1888 Convention.  
That obligation superseded unilateral actions taken on behalf of national interests.  As a 
result, Pineau concluded, no negotiation was necessary because the Egyptian government 
had breached international law, which the United Nations was required to uphold.
497
 
Pineau‘s argument is intriguing for a couple of reasons.  First, he interprets 
international treaties as a restraining influence on countries engaged in pursuing 
unilateral objectives.  Yet, French and British policy-makers, including Pineau, had 
plotted their own interventionist course to take back the canal and were planning to use 
the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 as the basis for the intervention.  Ironically, this 
international agreement was originally designed to maintain the status quo, as American 
officials had tried to do in 1954-1955.  Pineau sets a dangerous double-standard where 
one treaty restrains Egypt‘s intervention in Suez while another treaty authorizes British 
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and French intervention.  Second, by presenting his case as an ultimatum, Pineau set the 
stakes for peace at all or nothing.  If the Security Council approved the British and 
French proposal and Nasser refused the terms, then Britain and France would be within 
their rights to invade Egypt in an effort to enforce the international community‘s will as 
expressed through the Security Council.  As Anthony Nutting put it in his own 
recollection of the Suez crisis 
If in a world which had undertaken to respect the Charter of the United 
Nations, [the British and the French] were going to revert to nineteenth-
century methods to settle a dispute, they must find a twentieth-century 
pretext for doing so.  If they were going to commit an assault, they must 
appear to be wearing a policeman‘s uniform.498 
 
This forecast satisfied the key prerequisite of attaining the moral authority that British 
Prime Minister Anthony Eden had requested prior to any use of force.
499
  It also 
demonstrates exactly how British and French officials used the United Nations to serve 
their own national interests, thus undermining any hopes of genuine multilateral 
diplomacy. 
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VII 
 
The full extent of this deception emerged during a series of private meetings 
between, Lloyd, Pineau, Hammarskjöld and Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi.  
From 9 to 13 October this quartet met in the secretary general‘s office and signified the 
first direct talks between the ―main protagonists‖ since the nationalization of the canal.500  
Hammarskjöld mediated which was ―beneficial to the individual nations and  . . . 
consonant with the opinion of the larger world community of the United Nations.‖501  
The secretary general set an objective tempo by asserting himself when the ministers 
encountered deadlock.  For example, when Lloyd introduced five principles as a basis for 
negotiation, Fawzi objected to their being a simple re-statement of the principles agreed 
to at the London Conferences.  Hammarskjöld declared that their origin should not 
preclude them from mere discussion.  Fawzi concurred that, presented ―in a new 
context,‖ the principles may be acceptable.502  By the time these private talks concluded, 
a total of six principles served as the skeletal framework for compromise.  The principles 
were as follows: 
 
(1) there should be free and open transit through the canal without 
discrimination, overt or covert—this covers both political and 
technical aspects; 
 
(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected; 
 
(3) the operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of 
any country; 
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(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by 
agreement between Egypt and the users; 
 
(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; 
 
(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal 
Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by 
arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions 
for the payment of sums found to be due.
503
 
 
Although the United Nations served as the ―new context‖ through which the principles 
could be agreed to, Lloyd and Pineau reverted back to the unacceptable context of the 
London Conferences. 
On Sunday, 14 October, Lloyd and Pineau introduced a draft resolution re-stating 
the six principles to which Lloyd, Pineau, and Fawzi had agreed.  However, credit for 
these principles went to the eighteen-nation proposals coming from the First London 
Conference.  Furthermore, the draft resolution legitimized the rights of the SCUA to 
collect canal tolls and function as stipulated by the Second London Conference.  These 
latter portions of the draft resolution betrayed the spirit of the UN proceedings by 
sabotaged compromise for the fulfillment of national interests.  The British and French 
governments saved face by portraying the Egyptian government as having acquiesced to 
the London Conference recommendations.  The Soviet Union‘s Foreign Minister, Dmirti 
Shepilov, and Yugoslavia‘s non-permanent representative on the UN Security Council, 
Kosa Popovic, protested these efforts as an affront to world public opinion.  Popovic 
argued that ―this part of the draft . . . based on the 18-power proposals . . . [has] already 
proved unable to make agreement possible.‖  Instead, Popovic offered an alternative draft 
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resolution that omitted references to the London Conferences.
504
  Ten minutes before 
midnight on 14 October, the Security Council ―unanimously approved‖ the six principles 
while the Soviets, backed by the Yugoslavs, vetoed proposed resolutions that would have 
established international control over the canal.
505
 
Throughout the entire proceedings, progress was always kept in check.  In his 
memoirs, Selwyn Lloyd recalls ―[the French] thought that the exercise at the United 
Nations would be futile but they agreed to act in concert with [England].‖506  Once in 
New York, Pineau shared his pessimism with U.S. Secretary of State Dulles and took the 
opportunity to lobby for Nasser‘s removal from power.507  British Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden had expressed the same sentiments as early as 3 October during a Cabinet 
meeting.  Lloyd remained somewhat out of the loop with regard to his superior‘s 
perspective.  The British Foreign Minister had left for New York to attend the opening 
session of the Security Council the day before Eden shared his thoughts.
508
  On the other 
hand, Pineau remained fully informed of the British and French plans for armed 
intervention in Egypt. 
Indeed, events at the United Nations were to deflect international attention while 
military plans were finalized for implementation if negotiations in New York collapsed.  
Pineau, and later Lloyd, carried out that responsibility.  As late as 11 October, Reuters 
news service reported Pineau as saying there was ―no basis for negotiation.‖509  By the 
final day their private meetings with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi, Pineau and, now, 
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Lloyd, under instructions from Eden, thwarted compromise by equating the six principles 
to the London Conference proposals.
510
  Any diplomatic breakthrough, short of Egypt‘s 
complete agreement to international control of the canal, would have scuttled their true 
intentions of using the UN to justify military action. 
Since September 1956, French, Israeli, and British heads of state and senior 
officials met in secret outside Paris.  Details surrounding military intervention called for 
an Israeli attack on the Sinai region in response to persistent cross-border fedayeen raids.  
Once initiated, these hostilities would provide a context for Anglo-French forces to seize 
the Suez Canal and guarantee its continued operation as stipulated by the Anglo-Egyptian 
Agreement of 1954.  Thirty-six to forty-eight hours after the war began, Britain and 
France would issue their appeal to have Egyptian and Israeli forces withdraw ten miles 
from either side of the canal to allow for Anglo-French units to take control of the 
waterway.  Though straightforward in theory, British, French, and Israeli officials 
disagreed over the political conditions necessary for war in addition to the wartime 
strategic priorities. 
Israel‘s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and its Military Chief of Staff Moshe 
Dayan grew increasingly frustrated by their allies‘ pettiness.  As late as 22 October, Eden 
set exacting terms to which his co-conspirators were to comply.  The first condition 
required a ―legal, political, and moral justification for the invasion of Egypt by Britain 
and France.‖  Achieving this mandate became the motive for taking the Suez controversy 
                                               
510 Although Selwyn Lloyd served as England‘s Foreign Minister, several historians note that Eden dictated 
foreign policy.  Lloyd was only required to carry out policy.  See Lindsay Braun, ―Suez reconsidered: 
Anthony Eden‘s Orientalism and the Suez Crisis,‖ The Historian, Vol. 65, No. 3, (Spring 2003), p. 552.  
See also David Reynolds, ―Eden the Diplomatist, 1931-1956: Suezide of a Statesman?‖ History, Vol. 74, 
No. 240, (February 1989), p. 77; and Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser 
and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesman (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 
76-77. 
204 
 
to the United Nations Security Council.  As Anthony Nutting so eloquently phrased it, 
―aggression was less likely to be interpreted as such if those committing the act were 
considered enforcers of international consensus.‖511  The other condition said that, 
although, England would not join Egypt in an attack against Israel, the British 
government retained the right to come to Jordan‘s aid if Israel attacked it.  Ben-Gurion 
took issue with the notion that Israel should act as the ―aggressor, while the British and 
French appeared as angels of peace to bring tranquility to the area.‖512  Israel would not 
play the stooge to enhance the image of others. 
Differences of overall strategy also plagued the final round of discussions.  As 
Selwyn Lloyd‘s secretary remembered decades later, where the Europeans wanted 
Israel‘s invasion to pose sufficient threat to the canal thus warranting Anglo-French 
intervention, the Israelis ―main objective‖ was conquering Shram al-Sheikh.  Securing 
this post at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula would open Israeli access to the Gulf of 
Aqaba and transform the Israeli port of Eilat into a major center of commerce.
513
  
Contrasting the Western Europeans‘ focus on limited war aims, namely taking back the 
canal, Ben-Gurion and Dayan took this opportunity to sell the idea of re-defining the 
balance of power throughout the entire Middle East.  Their plan‘s most ambitious act had 
Israel and Iraq splitting Jordan in two, each absorbing a portion for itself.  As the Israeli 
leadership saw it, Iraq‘s new authority would serve Britain‘s interests through the 
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Baghdad Pact; and France could possibly re-impose itself in Lebanon and Syria.  
According to Dayan, war in Suez would initiate a series of steps in fulfilling Israel‘s 
vision of a new order.  However, French and British concerns over the canal shelved the 
scheme.
514
 
As a result, relations remained far from chummy.  Dayan observed that ―it [was] 
possible that [the allies‘] very inability to tune into each other‘s wavelengths made [the 
Israelis on the one hand and the British and French on the other] feel it was useless to 
engage in further clarifications or mutual attempts at persuasion.‖515  Later, Dayan 
confesses, ―Britain‘s behavior toward [the Israelis], hardly ‗gentlemanly,‘ also aroused 
suspicion and mistrust.‖  As if to reinforce the point, Dayan changed Israel‘s battle plan 
to secure the southern portion of the peninsula before seizing the northern and most direct 
route to the canal along the Mediterranean shoreline.
516
  Altering this detail undermined 
the validity of the proclamation British and French officials had scheduled after hostilities 
had commenced.  How could the Anglo-French concern for canal security be accurate 
when Israel‘s main thrust was to take such a circuitous route across the peninsula?  
Britain, France, and Israel coordinated plans only on the shallowest of levels.  The 
alliance remained one of convenience rather than conviction.
517
 
Still, in spite of these considerable differences, the three parties patched together a 
superficial agreement.  Known as the Sevres Protocol, Britain, France, and Israel scripted 
courses of action.  After Israel‘s initial invasion operations began on 29 October, the 
British and French governments planned to submit an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt 
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calling for a cease-fire and access to the canal-zone.  Israel was to secure routes to the 
Gulf of Akaba and refrain from attacking Jordan.  Lastly, these ―arrangements‖ were to 
―remain strictly secret.‖518 
Although these invasion plans remained secret, U.S. officials had authorized its 
NATO allies to supply Israel with weapons.  U.S. Secretary of State Dulles encouraged 
French and Italian officials to supply weapons to the Israelis as early as May 1956.
519
  By 
June, French officials promised delivery of six-dozen Mystere-class warplanes and forty 
Super Sherman tanks to the Israeli government.  During a 15 October meeting of senior 
State Department officials, American intelligence-gathering revealed that Israel 
―[possessed] sixty of the seventy-two French jets, far in excess of the twenty-four that 
had been reported officially.‖520  While discussing the rising tensions between Israel and 
Jordan and prospect of war, U.S. officials noted how, as a fighter jet, the Mystere would 
be virtually useless in any Israeli-Jordanian conflict since ―Jordan has no aviation.‖521 
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By mid-October 1956, American officials wrestled not with the conspiratorial 
actions of there allies but rather with their own self-inflicted bewilderment.  The 
Eisenhower administration longed for the best of both worlds where it sanctioned the 
shipment of arms to aid Israel on the one hand while remaining adamantly opposed to 
any justification for war on the other hand.  Additionally, while officials in Washington 
refused to participate directly in the arms race between Egypt‘s Soviet armaments and 
Israel‘s Western-manufactured weapons, Eisenhower and Dulles reserved the right to 
control the flow of munitions through America‘s NATO allies.  This might have 
succeeded had the United States required NATO‘s compliance with the arms embargo.  
Instead, U.S. officials enlisted its allies for provisioning the Israeli military.  The 
schizophrenic nature of these policies was the greatest challenge the U.S. government had 
to surmount. 
 
VIII 
 
Many other governments faced similar circumstances where independent courses 
of action plotted for the sake of multilateral benefit provoked crisis rather than preventing 
it.  Soon after the Soviet Union‘s 20th Congress, Khrushchev realized that in his haste to 
seize the political initiative by appealing to a broader spectrum of socialist ideology, he 
had to devote greater amounts of time and energy to containing the forces he had helped 
unleash.  Poland‘s Pozan riots tested the limits of Khrushchev‘s tolerance, but more vocal 
dissent followed in the fall of 1956.  Next to front page headlines of the Soviet‘s UN veto 
of the British and French proposals regarding operation of the Suez Canal lay news of 
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Hungary‘s and Poland‘s continued experimentation with broadening communism‘s party 
line.  Local party newspapers in Hungary forecast the return of ―rehabilitated comrades‖ 
such as Imre Nagy and the pursuit of independent ideas.  In Poland, the government 
acknowledged the injustice of past purges and began reconciliation by honoring the 
memories of those political outcasts who had paid with their lives.
522
  Before the end of 
October, Imre Nagy returned to power in Hungary. 
British and French officials also experienced political turbulence as they 
attempted to manipulate multilateral forums to justify the use of force.  After Nasser‘s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal, British, French, and American policy-makers 
coordinated their response.  Reminiscent of de Lesseps‘s dependence on quid pro quo 
agreements that satisfied European, Ottoman, and Egyptian interests, British policy-
makers used similar means to influence the Eisenhower administration in 1956.  By 
agreeing to participate in the London Conferences, British and French officials thought 
they had earned American support for military operations if diplomacy failed.  When it 
seemed as if negotiations might succeed with UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld 
acting as the lead mediator, the British and French Foreign Ministers sabotaged the 
proceedings.  Like the Americans and the Soviets, the British and French suffered from 
the catch-22 brought about by their own policy-making.  The British and French became 
entangled in their own efforts to have international organizations, convened for the 
purpose of keeping the peace, authorize the use of military force. 
Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser suffered from the same self-
deluding policies.  Nationalization of the canal was a unilateral act Nasser could use to 
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win the favor and represent the plight of anti-imperialist, non-aligned interests 
worldwide.  In many respects, however, Nasser‘s action upset some of Egypt‘s staunchest 
allies.  Having acted without consulting even his closest advisors, Nasser was quick to 
rehabilitate relations.  For example, Nasser traveled to Saudi Arabia to speak directly 
with King Saud and address his concerns regarding oil shipments through the canal.  
Nasser also showed greater receptivity to the international community as a whole when 
the United Nations began debating the Suez issue.
523
  Nasser‘s government stifled ―press 
attacks on the U.S. in the hopes [that the American government] would work out [a] 
solution which Egypt could accept.‖524  Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi 
reflected his superior‘s amiable nature at the UN.  Although meetings with the British 
and French Foreign Ministers were brusque, Fawzi had a better rapport with Terry Duce, 
chairman of the massive Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO).  Duce represented 
Western oil interests ―as well as some of the large banks‖ who wished to negotiate with 
the Egyptian government.  According to Mohamad Heikal, Duce considered tankers 
―more reliable‖ and less vulnerable than pipelines.  As a result, access to Suez remained 
vital.
525
  Unfortunately, these constructive exchanges, made possible in part by the United 
Nations, yielded to less compromising alternatives. 
The subjugation of the United Nations to the national interests of particular 
member states not only demoralized the most stoic of international civil servants such as 
Hammarskjöld, but also ignored the value of the institution as an objective analyzer of 
international affairs.  Contrary to the foresight exhibited by UN officials, the Eisenhower 
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administration‘s unwillingness to acknowledge connections between Arab-Israeli 
disputes and the Suez situation resulted in a debilitating lapse in awareness of diplomatic 
deterioration.  When the Suez War began on 29 October and the full scope of British and 
French involvement was revealed, Eisenhower was incensed.
526
  Yet, as early as 4 
September New York Times reporter Dana Adams Schmidt described ―Washington‘s 
misgivings about the continued British-French military build-up [in the Eastern 
Mediterranean].‖527  Eisenhower may not have known the extent of military planning that 
had been set in motion, but he was aware of the preparations and the threat it posed to 
maintaining peace.  Additionally, in the weeks preceding the conflict, America‘s attempt 
to achieve national interests through multilateral means at the London Conferences 
undermined the basis for negotiations and contributed to the Eisenhower administration‘s 
inaccurate assessment of the entire crisis.  In spite of these developments, many scholars 
credit the U.S. government with leading world opinion in condemning the Suez War.
528
  
Yet, rather than craft the pivotal UN resolutions responsible for resolving the conflict, the 
Eisenhower administration merely endorsed the measures set forth by other delegates. 
British and French policy-makers also severely miscalculated the crisis and 
opportunities for multilateral diplomacy.  By late October 1956, senior advisers ignored 
the fact that the United Nations provided Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi with a 
diplomatic environment where he could accept negotiated terms that Hammarskjöld 
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presented.  British and French posturing had become so fixated on their own national 
interests that any role the United Nations assumed other than the one stipulated by the 
British and French governments was intolerable.  Such preoccupation dictated not only 
the terms of compromise, but also the diplomatic venues that were to receive credit for 
compromise.  Examples such as these confirm the detrimental effects national interests 
had on multilateral diplomacy—especially when government officials attempted to 
impose prescribed principles on the international community.  As experienced in the past, 
these efforts helped precipitate crisis rather than avert it.  By the end of October 1956, the 
mismanagement of multilateral diplomacy resulted in war. 
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Chapter IV 
 
The Midnight Hour: The Suez War and Diplomatic Efforts to Halt 
Its Expansion, October to November 1956 
 
 
 
 
 With the birth of the Atomic Age a group of American scientists created the 
Doomsday Clock to represent humanity‘s flirtation with self-destruction.  Since the end 
of the Korean War, the hands remained at an ominous two minutes to midnight.  Four 
years after the Suez crisis scientists reset the clock to read 11:53 p.m.  As their web site 
contends to this day, one reason for stepping away from the brink lay in quarantining the 
Suez War and keeping it from mutating into a larger conflict.  The scientists‘ summary 
timeline credits the superpowers for their willingness to compromise, but nothing is said 
of the UN‘s role in facilitating successful crisis management.529  Yet, as witnessed in both 
the Hungarian crisis and the Suez crisis, superpower influence played a central role in 
escalating each crisis.  Detailed examination of the transcripts of late-night General 
Assembly speeches, meticulous negotiations, as well as the international reactions to the 
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UN‘s flurry of activity reveals a veritable multitude that should share in the laudatory 
praise traditionally heaped upon so few.  By December 1956, these combined efforts, 
represented by nearly all-night debates on the floor of the United Nations‘ General 
Assembly, kept the one clock that should never reach midnight from doing so. 
Contrary to the UN‘s facilitation of inclusive, multilateral negotiations that 
ultimately led to resolution of the Suez crisis, diplomatic initiatives of the countries 
directly affected by the crisis had placed national interests before the collective interests 
of the international community.  In many respects, leaders of the various countries 
involved had little recourse.  Escalating tensions triggered policy-making that was more 
reactionary in nature.  Call it realpolitik or simple human nature, these actions and 
reactions were justifiable.  When national leaders attempted to enlist the support of the 
international community to suit their own purposes, anxiety continued to fester. 
Throughout the 1950s and during the height of the Suez crisis, national leaders 
had improved upon well-established practices of presenting national interests as being 
emblematic of a broader set of international interests.  Following in the footsteps of 
Ferdinand de Lesseps, Eisenhower, Eden, Nasser, and others seemed unlikely to separate 
unilateral and multilateral agendas.  Eisenhower administration officials had attempted to 
use Cold War bi-polarity to justify creation of a defensive military alliance in the Middle 
East.  British officials seized on collective security as a means of continuing some 
measure of their own presence in the region despite the growing nationalist backlash 
against the West‘s imperial powers.  In the non-aligned camp, Nasser and others tried to 
harness the movement‘s universal agenda to serve their own purposes. 
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 By the mid-twentieth century government officials worldwide had developed a 
precarious paradox where policies put into effect for the supposed purpose of 
representing multilateral interests resulted from increasingly unilateral decision-making.  
By October 1956, these officials had miscalculated severely the negative impact these 
methods had on international diplomacy and crisis management.  American, British, 
Soviet, and Egyptian officials in particular clung to shaky assumptions that they 
commanded a sense of solidarity within their respective blocs of influence at the exact 
moment when solidarity was declining.  The result led to the climax not only of the Suez 
crisis, but also the Hungarian crisis, and revealed the UN‘s indispensable value as an 
institution of multilateral diplomacy. 
 
I 
 
 As British, French, and Israeli officials conferred just outside Paris in October 
1956, Hungarians tested their political independence.  About the same time that the 
British, French, Israelis squabbled over war aims and strategic timetables, Hungarian 
students and workers united behind a 16-point resolution calling for immediate political 
change.  Among its most adamant proposals, the document demanded the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Hungary, the return of former Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy to 
political power, new elections, economic re-organization, Hungary‘s implementation of a 
more independent foreign policy, and the ―complete freedom of opinion.‖530  In many 
ways, these ideological shifts from behind the Iron Curtain paralleled Bandung principles 
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 Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, pp. 126-127. 
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of non-alignment as Hungarians plotted a distinctly independent course for themselves.  
Imre Nagy championed this cause by favoring ―democratic coalition [over] one-party 
dictatorship . . . [and] ideological warfare by neutralism and peaceful co-existence.‖531  
According to one unidentified eyewitness observing the country‘s revolutionary events, a 
sense of equality and unity replaced the Hungarian peoples‘ mutual suspicion.‖532  
Inspiring as these sentiments were in contributing to a prominent sense of Hungarian 
identity, they also helped dispel the misrepresentations of multilateralism that had helped 
precipitate the Hungarian crisis.  Hungarians were not simply rebelling against Soviet 
oppression; they were exposing the Soviets‘ double standard of claiming to represent 
multilateral interests while cracking down to ensure greater conformity. 
Khrushchev had hoped to balance Soviet policy-making on this premise, but as 
much as it reoriented political loyalties in Eastern European countries, such as Poland and 
Hungary, it also disoriented officials within the Soviet government.  Local populations in 
Poland expressed open support for Wladyslaw Gomulka, a former victim of Stalin‘s 
purges.  Gomulka‘s political career was resurrected in October 1956 when he was 
reinstated to the Polish United Workers‘ Party and became party leader soon afterwards.  
Kremlin officials feared that Gomulka‘s return to power could result in Poland‘s exit 
from the Warsaw Pact.  According to Soviet scholars Mark Kramer and William 
Taubman, Khrushchev used considerable political and military pressure in his 
negotiations with Poland‘s new government.  In Taubman‘s words, ―Khrushchev 
exercised prudent restraint.‖  However, Taubman goes on to say that the most 
challenging obstacles to negotiations were Khrushchev‘s insensitivity to Polish interests 
                                               
531 Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (New York, NY: St. Martin‘s Press, Inc., 1976), p. 66.  According to Lomax, 
Nagy also advocated the expansion of private enterprise. 
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 Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 129. 
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and his vacillation between political enticements and military intervention.  Fortunately 
for Khrushchev, Gomulka appeased the Soviets after hearing that Soviet tanks were 
heading towards Warsaw.
533
  Having successfully brought Gomulka‘s independently-
inclined Polish government under control by mid-October 1956, Khrushchev thought that 
he could manage Nagy, too. 
Originally, Imre Nagy was appointed as Hungary‘s Prime Minister in 1955 as a 
conciliatory move designed to create parity between Stalinist-era communist hard-liners 
and new reformers.  This initial experiment failed.  Nagy was removed from power after 
a few months and expelled from the Communist party for his dissenting opinions.
534
  By 
the autumn of 1956, however, Khrushchev was willing to deal with Nagy once again 
despite new efforts to keep the reformer out of power.
535
  Nagy‘s political rival was Erno 
Gero, the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Hungary.  After Nagy was removed 
from power in 1955, Soviet officials supported party hard-liners such as Gero.  As 
Nagy‘s popularity grew, Gero had reason for concern.  His interest in preserving the 
status quo would be upset by Nagy‘s return to office.  Of particular interest, however, is 
the role Moscow played in heightening tensions between these factions in Hungary, 
rather than mediating between Gero and Nagy. 
Always worried about maintaining order, Soviet policy became exceedingly 
opportunistic.  Within roughly eighteen months, Soviet leadership had reversed its 
position between stalwart conservatives and progressive reformers for a third time.  
                                               
533 See Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 293-294.  See also Kramer, ―The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in 
Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,‖ p. 169. 
534 Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 289. 
535 As journalist William Jordan recorded in an article, ―Leaders in the Kremlin [seem] ready to accept . . . 
developments that once would have been branded ‗heresy‘ and dealt with summarily.‖  See William J. 
Jordan, ―Communist World in Throes of Major Change,‖ NYT, 28 October 1956, p. 4B. 
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According to one scholar, the Soviets‘ impulsive policy-making led officials in Moscow 
to chastise Gero for exaggerating the potential threat Nagy‘s resurgence might have had 
on maintaining party order and ―[stampeding] Moscow into an ill-advised commitment of 
Soviet troops [in Hungary].‖536  In many respects, Khrushchev‘s indecisiveness only 
worsened matters.  Yet, Soviet opportunism and indecision reflected the Kremlin‘s 
understanding of the relationship between multilateral legitimacy and fulfillment of 
unilateral national interests.  In Poland, Gomulka served as the country‘s leader as long as 
he conformed to the Soviets‘ agenda.  Khrushchev hoped to recreate this situation in 
Hungary with Imre Nagy.  Unfortunately, this relationship between multilateral and 
unilateral interests was incredibly unstable.  As Kramer points out, during the height of 
the Soviet-Polish standoff, tensions bordered on civil war.  Polish soldiers in the Red 
Army remained loyal to the Soviet Union.  Poland‘s internal security forces, however, 
―were fully willing to fight on behalf of the new Polish regime.‖537  In Hungary, the lines 
of loyalty were more clearly drawn. 
Following through with their 16-point plan, Hungarians chose Imre Nagy to lead 
the country once again.  Political police, known as the Allamvedelmi Hatosag (AVH), 
tried to repress Nagy‘s reformist movement.  On 25 October, these police officials fired 
into a massive crowd gathered to hear Nagy‘s inaugural speech as Hungary‘s newly 
elected leader.
538
  Forty-eight hours later, the Red Army engaged the rebellious 
Hungarians. 
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That same day, 27 October, the Soviets mobilized their diplomatic resources in 
the United Nations Security Council to face-off against the international community.  The 
Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Arkady Sobolev, disavowed Hungary‘s sovereignty, 
arguing instead that the issue remained a domestic dispute between Hungary‘s rival 
political factions and therefore lay outside the UN‘s jurisdiction.  Sobolev then took the 
diplomatic offensive by accusing the United States of inciting rebellion within several 
sovereign countries in violation of UN principles.  For example, Sobolev noted how in 
1952, the United States Congress appropriated $100 million for funding political dissent 
across Eastern Europe.
539
 
Although President Eisenhower was reluctant to disturb the Cold War status quo, 
the administration‘s ―rollback‖ rhetoric made it impossible to simply ignore the 
Hungarian cause.  The result led to a paradoxical impasse during the Hungarian crisis.  
On the one hand, ―[Eisenhower] instructed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to 
maintain caution and avoid giving Moscow any reason to suppose that the United States 
had either instigated or would support the Hungarian rebels.‖540  On the other hand, ―to 
maintain their political prestige, . . . it was most important for the United States to 
conceal their inadequacy as best as they could from international public opinion.‖541  Just 
                                               
539 ―Excerpts from the Debate in the UN Security Council on Rebellion in Hungary,‖ NYT, 29 October 
1956, p. 10.  See also Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 132.  Some mid-level CIA 
officials clamored for Western intervention in Hungary.  Schemes ranged from supplying weapons to 
inserting ―trained saboteurs.‖  See Grose, Gentleman Spy, p. 437. 
540 Grose, Gentleman Spy, p. 437. 
541 Csaba Bekes, ―Cold War, Détente, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,‖ in The Cold War after Stalin’s 
Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?, eds. Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, Inc., 2006), p. 218.  Other historians made similar observations.  Douglas Little describes how 
Eisenhower had hoped to contrast the Soviets‘ brutish handling of the Hungarian crisis with the West‘s 
sense of moral purpose.  Little as well as historians Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley agree that the 
Eisenhower‘s desire to ―liberate‖ Eastern Europe from communist rule was nothing more than ineffective 
rhetoric.  Any moral leverage the West had over the Soviet Union, Little argues, was nullified by the Suez 
War.  H.W. Brands opposes these perspectives.  Brands credits Eisenhower for criticizing America‘s allies 
and their involvement in the Suez War.   Instead of losing the moral initiative, Eisenhower‘s consistency 
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as American policy-makers suffered from their own shortcomings in handling the Suez 
crisis, the same officials were attempting to deal with Soviet intervention only to confront 
nearly identical obstacles.  Where the Eisenhower administration sought to enlist arms 
suppliers for Israel while sustaining the status quo in the Middle East, Eisenhower also 
wished to encourage independence for Soviet satellites without having to enforce it.  In 
doing so, the Eisenhower administration created another paradox for itself with regard to 
the Hungarian situation where the U.S. government sought to advance Cold War interests 
without escalating Cold War tensions.  Fortunately for Eisenhower, Khrushchev was 
suffering from similar bouts of indecision and proceeded to withdrawal.  By 30 October, 
both Nagy and the Soviets agreed to a cease-fire. 
 
II 
 
As events in Hungary quieted, the events in Suez exploded.    On the evening of 
29 October 1956, Israeli forces launched their invasion of the Sinai in dramatic fashion.  
A squadron of C-47 transport aircraft dropped an Israeli airborne company east of the 
Mitla Pass, approximately twenty to thirty miles from the southern section of the Suez 
Canal.
542
  To confuse the enemy further, four WW II-vintage P-51 Mustangs flew over 
the peninsula cutting overhead telephone lines with their propellers and wings skirting 
                                                                                                                                            
bolstered America‘s image in the international community.  Eric Hobsbawm contends that the situation in 
Hungary combined with war in the Sinai allowed the Superpowers to recognize and accept the limits of 
their respective spheres of influence. See Little, American Orientalism, p. 177; Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise 
to Globalism, p. 156; Brands, The Devil We Knew, p. 106; and Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 397.  
542 The strategic objective was not to threaten the canal so much as to seize a key route that prevented 
Egyptian reinforcement of forward positions located along the border with Israel. 
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just four yards from the ground.
543
  Thirty minutes after these missions commenced, the 
commander of the UN observer station at El Auja, along the Egyptian-Israeli border, 
reported being expelled from his post at the hands of the Israelis.
544
  UN observation 
posts such as the one at El Auja were a part of the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO).  According to its mandate, UNTSO was responsible for 
supervising the General Armistice Agreement, including the policing of the border, 
following the Arab-Jewish War of 1948.
545
  Elsewhere along the border, Israeli 
formations punched through Egyptian defenses.  The Israelis‘ advance displaced innocent 
UN observers and enemy Egyptian forces alike.  On 30 October at 2:17 a.m., roughly 
seven hours after Israeli forces began their attack, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General 
E.L.M. Burns, issued a cease-fire.
546
 
Throughout that late October day, the full measure of diplomatic double-dealing 
unraveled in the hours and days following Israel‘s invasion.  A meeting between the 
Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban, and the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, William Roundtree, began with Eban 
―categorically rejecting [any notion] that Israel would attack‖ and ended promptly when 
both parties learned of news to the contrary.
547
  As the clock struck midnight in the Sinai, 
officials in Washington met with British and French embassy liaisons to discuss evoking 
                                               
543 Dayan, Moshe Dayan, p. 236. 
544 Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, pp. 179-180. 
545 UNTSO remains in place to this day. 
546 ―Excerpts from Debate in UN Security Council on the Israeli-Egyptian Situation,‖ NYT, 31 October 
1956, p. 8.  See also Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 180.  Israeli officials agreed promptly; but 
Egyptian diplomats had not responded by the time the matter was deliberated before the UN Security 
Council. 
547 Memo of Conversation, ―Tense Situation in the Near East and Israeli Mobilization,‖ 29 October 1956,  
FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, p. 822; see also Robert St. John, Eban (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Co., 
Inc., 1972), pp. 304-305.  Interestingly, Eban makes no mention of this comical twist of events in his own 
memoirs Abba Eban: An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 210-212. 
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the Tripartite Declaration.  Representing Great Britain, J.E. Coulson argued that the 
declaration ―would be inoperative.‖  Egypt detested the document‘s premise and refused 
to allow the return of Western troops to Egypt.  Without this concession, Coulson 
concluded, Britain could not engage in any military campaign against Israel.
548
  What 
seems to be the supreme irony here is that America‘s own allies quashed any idea of 
tripartite action even before the declaration was brought before the United Nations for 
consideration.  In all likelihood, the proposal would have been vetoed by the Soviet 
Union, but British officials did not care to let it get even that far. 
Coulson was correct to question the chances of Egypt‘s acquiescing to tripartite 
intervention, but the British government‘s assessment was insightful only so far as 
supporting a pre-determined military option independent of the United Nations.  These 
entrenched perspectives remained incapable of quelling the rapid series of events 
unfolding in the Middle East.  The Sevres Protocol
549
 required ample amounts of 
instability generated by the Egyptian-Israeli conflict.  Without it, the British and French 
basis for intervention was lost.  In other words, these European governments had staked 
the securing of their national interests on encouraging conflict.  The task ahead of British 
and French officials was to get the international community to condone their strategy.  
They were not alone.  The Security Council deliberations of 30 October foretold the 
difficulty policy-makers experienced in restoring order. 
                                               
548 Memo of Conversation, ―Applicability of the Tripartite Declaration to Present Situation in Near East,‖ 
29 October 1956, FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, p. 830. 
549 The Sevres Protocol was the result of secret meetings between British, French, and Israeli senior 
officials to choreograph events following Israel‘s invasion of Egypt.  Under the terms of this agreement, 
British and French officials would issue an ultimatum to both the Egyptian and Israeli forces: vacate a ten-
mile corridor on either side of the Suez Canal to allow for the insertion of Anglo-French forces. 
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Members of the UN Security Council agreed that a cease-fire was imperative but 
many of the proposals continued to place national interests ahead of international peace.  
U.S. Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., called for immediate action through 
the UN Security Council beginning with a cease-fire and a return to the status quo 
antebellum.  Later that day, Lodge‘s draft cease-fire resolution called for Israel‘s 
withdrawal from the Sinai, implored other UN members not to interfere in the conflict, 
and authorized the Secretary General to take charge of the conflict resolution process and 
provide status reports to the Security Council.  Although Lodge‘s resolution reflected the 
sentiments of the council as a whole, some delegates felt it did not go far enough.  
Yugoslavian Representative to the UN, Dr. Joza Brilej, endorsed Lodge‘s cease-fire 
proposal but noted that Israel‘s concerns over cross-border fedayeen raids should have 
been handled through the General Armistice Agreement ―for which Israel has displayed a 
growing contempt.‖  Arkady Sobolev, the Soviet representative, supported the resolution 
noting, however, the absence of any condemnation of Israeli aggression.  Sobolev also 
expressed his concerns over the ultimatums issued by Britain and France.
550
 
Concurrent with Lodge‘s cease-fire proposal, British and French officials issued 
their own conditions for a cease-fire as set by the Sevres Protocol.  Along with the 
cessation of hostilities, Egyptian and Israeli forces were to withdraw ten miles from either 
side of the Suez Canal, and allow for Anglo-French occupation of the canal-zone to 
ensure its unfettered operation.  If either of the Egyptian or Israeli governments failed to 
comply with these terms within twelve hours, ―Anglo-French forces would intervene with 
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the means necessary to ensure that their demands [were] accepted.‖551  In his address to 
the UN Security Council, British Ambassador to the UN, Sir Pierson Dixon, argued that 
because British and French forces were being deployed to Egypt to re-establish peace, the 
operation had the best interests of the world community and UN principles at heart.
552
  
Many representatives in the Security Council rejected the ultimatum and Dixon‘s attempt 
to sell it to the world body.  Sobolev favored Security Council measures being taken ―for 
the maintenance of peace and security‖ instead of leaving countries to pursue their own 
course of action.  Brilej concurred, saying that the West Europeans‘ proclamation had the 
uniquely paradoxical nature of threatening to use force ―at a time when such earnest 
efforts are being made to achieve a peaceful and mutually acceptable settlement to the 
Suez problem.‖553 
The conundrum Brilej identified was one of the often overlooked yet enduring 
legacies spanning the canal‘s existence.  Since de Lesseps‘s personal campaign to build 
the waterway in the nineteenth century, the imposition of a single perspective that 
misrepresented a broader set of competing interests not only disregard those interests, but 
also simultaneously undermining the project‘s original vision of fostering global 
economic and cultural exchanges.  In addition to contributing to increasingly popular 
notions of nationalist identity, de Lesseps‘s methods also inspired foreign policy-making 
that operated from a similarly exclusive pretext.  The combination of greater self-
                                               
551 Gorst and Johnman, The Suez Crisis, p. 100. 
552 See ―Excerpts from Debate in UN Security Council on the Israeli-Egyptian Situation,‖ NYT, 31 October 
1956, p. 8. 
553 Official Records of the Security Council (ORSC), Eleventh Year, 30 October 1956, 749th meeting, 
Document S/PV.751, p. 6.  Townsend Hoopes adds that the ultimatum did not explicitly mention bombing, 
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the ground.  When the decree took effect, the Egyptians would have had to withdrawal 110 miles in order 
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Zone corridor.  See Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 376. 
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awareness and persistent efforts to subordinate multilateral diplomacy to support 
unilateral purposes created diplomatic gridlock.  The West‘s unsuccessful negotiation of 
a collective security agreement in the Middle East stands as an excellent example.  A 
similar fundamental flaw plagued Western European efforts to act as the guardians of 
international peace in the autumn of 1956. 
 
III 
 
Not even the initial outbreak of war could curtail entrenched habits where national 
interests sought to dominate decision-making inside the international community.  Few, if 
any, officials realized that the Suez War occurred in part because of the pervasive 
inability of diplomats to distinguish between their own interests and any broader 
multilateral agenda.  The best that anyone could do was to point out the hypocrisy 
embedded within the various policy proposals as Brilej had done after hearing the British 
and French offer their ultimatum.  The longevity of these habits as traced from Ferdinand 
de Lesseps to the West‘s Middle East security plans of the early 1950s to the London 
Conferences helps epitomize an old adage: ―‗Insanity‘ is best defined as applying the 
same methods and expecting different results.‖  By the end of October 1956, the pace of 
events in the Sinai and in Eastern Europe eclipsed completely the various strategies 
designed to contain them. 
 One reason for these shortcomings was each proposal‘s inability to address the 
immediate concerns of the combatants as well as breed a good deal of suspicion and 
resentment.  Following Sobolev‘s speech, Egypt‘s UN Representative Omar Loutfi 
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deflected calls for cease-fire by insisting upon Egypt‘s right to self-defense as allowed 
under the UN Charter.  Israel‘s Abba Eban, only slightly more informed than during his 
previous day‘s meeting with Roundtree, justified the attack by arguing that the fedayeen’s 
cross-border infiltrations threatened Israeli security.  Eban also expressed Israeli 
―contempt‖ for Sobolev‘s ―accusation‖ that Britain and France ―had prompted Israel to 
[attack] Egypt.‖  Rejecting this notion further, Britain‘s Sir Pierson Dixon declared that 
―both [Egypt and Israel] . . . have shown such repeated disregard for the resolutions of the 
Security Council that [the British and French ultimatum] should have the general support 
of the Council.‖554  The Israeli and British perspectives convey the general lack of good 
faith that afflicted virtually all members of the Security Council.  In Dixon‘s case, the 
British Ambassador sought to capitalize on this situation to expand support for British 
and French intervention. The British government failed to realize that this justification for 
taking unilateral measures made the crisis more acute. 
Eban and the Israeli government were guilty of the same ignorance.  Eban 
transformed Israeli interests into international interests.  Incredibly, he made these 
connections with an amazing degree of nonchalance, rivaling that of the British 
delegation.  From Eban‘s perspective, 
World opinion is naturally asking itself what these fedayeen units are, 
what their activities imply for Israel‘s security, whether their plans for the 
future are really full of peril for Israel, and whether this peril is so acute 
that Israel may reasonably regard its elimination as a primary condition of 
its security and indeed of its existence.
555
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Issuing his own ultimatum, the ambassador declared, ―World opinion must choose 
between two candidates for its confidence: . . . the men, women, and children of Israel 
[or] these fanatic warriors of the fedayeen groups.‖  ―World opinion,‖ Eban concluded, 
―must decide whom to trust.‖556 
 Advertising national interests as multilateral interests irked influential segments 
of the international community.  Convinced of their own course of action, the British and 
French Ambassadors to the UN vetoed Ambassador Lodge‘s draft resolution calling for a 
cease-fire in the Sinai.  Sabotaging their staunchest allies‘ efforts to achieve peace 
exposed the duplicitous degree to which the British and French were willing to go not 
only to secure their interests, but also to protect their ability to do so as they saw fit.  
With the cease-fire dead in the Security Council and the deadline for evacuation of the 
Canal Zone having expired, British and French bombers began attacking Egyptian 
positions along the canal.
557
 
United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld could not tolerate this kind 
of Machiavellian belligerence.  Speaking before the Security Council on 31 October, 
Hammarskjöld excoriated the two delegations.  He noted how, in addition to 
compromising the authenticity of any negotiations that had occurred previously, British 
and French motives had threatened the basic principles of the UN Charter.  ―The 
principles of the Charter are,‖ Hammarskjöld argued, ―by far, greater than the 
Organization in which they are embodied, and the aims which they are to safeguard are 
holier that the policies of any single nation or people.‖  ―A Secretary General,‖ he 
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557 Mohamed Heikal offers a vivid account of events taking place in Egypt.  When bombing commenced at 
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proclaimed, ―cannot serve on any other assumption than that—within the necessary limits 
of human frailty and honest differences of opinion—all member nations honor their 
pledge to observe all Articles of the Charter.‖558  Much like his 1953 assessment of the 
UN‘s purpose as an organization where the international interest superseded the interests 
of any one member state, Hammarskjöld remained beholden to that premise amidst the 
Suez crisis.  By 1956, he, as well as others, began to comprehend the volatility that 
followed when UN member states attempted to fuse international interests with national 
security concerns. 
Regarding the Atlantic alliance, the British and French ultimatum to Egypt and 
Israel destroyed any vestiges of good faith President Eisenhower held for his European 
allies.  Writing to his friend Al Gruenther, President Eisenhower confided, ―I don‘t see 
the point in getting into a fight to which there can be no satisfactory end, and in which the 
whole world believes you are playing the part of the bully and you do not even have the 
firm backing of your entire people.‖  Like Nasser had done during his nationalization 
speech, Eisenhower drew parallels between contemporary events and the past.  In 
particular, he equated British Prime Minister Anthony Eden‘s action to ―the Victorian 
period.‖559  Historian Richard Immerman and others interpret the president‘s metaphor as 
a reference to traditional ―gun-boat diplomacy.‖560 
Even members within the British Commonwealth expressed their dismay.  
According to historian Thomas Millar, Eden‘s government kept Commonwealth 
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countries abreast of developments in the lead up to the Suez War.  British officials had 
also collected input from the Commonwealth governments.  Information regarding 
military intervention, however, was not shared.  Eden‘s ultimatum and subsequent 
invasion of Egypt stunned members of the Commonwealth.
561
  Like Yugoslavia‘s UN 
Representative, R.S.S. Gunewardene of Ceylon deplored the use of aggressive force to 
preserve peace.  Indeed, Gunewardene remarked, ―the events of the last few days have 
demonstrated the tremendous weight of world opinion that has been brought to bear 
against the reckless use of force.‖562  In Canada, Foreign Minister Lester Pearson called 
for tempered discontent in responding to the British government‘s actions.563  With such 
a lack of consensus, even from within the British Commonwealth, international attention 
turned to the United Nations for mediating the crisis. 
 
IV 
 
With any type of Security Council action at an impasse, as a result of the veto, 
attention turned quickly to the General Assembly.  Dr. Joza Brilej authored a Security 
Council resolution to move the Suez issue to an Emergency Special Session of the 
General Assembly as allowed by the ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution of 1950.  Immune 
                                               
561 Millar, The Commonwealth and the United Nations, p. 65.  Millar elaborates on the political orientation 
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from the Security Council‘s permanent member veto, the resolution passed and 
deliberation began late in the day on 1 November.  The President of the United Nations, 
Rudecindo Ortega, of Chile, presided over the plenary session and ended his opening 
remarks by noting the pervasive international support for the emergency meeting.  No 
sooner had Ortega finished his speech then the French representative rose to record his 
objection to the proceedings.  The Egyptian UN Ambassador, Omar Loutfi, registered his 
complaint regarding the launch of British and French bombing raids on Egyptian targets.  
Referring to the Treaty of 1888, Loutfi argued that Egypt reserved the legal right to 
defend the canal.  He also questioned the ―‗temporary measure‘‖ Britain and France were 
planning to take in occupying the Canal Zone.  Loutfi warned that in 1882, the last time a 
―temporary measure‖ had occurred, occupation of the Canal Zone lasted almost three-
quarters of a century.  For Egypt, reassurance rested with multilateral diplomacy and its 
―condemnation‖ of aggression championed foremost by the two Superpowers.564 
Pierson Dixon addressed the assembly a short time later.  Like the French 
delegate before him, Dixon questioned the validity of the emergency session and its 
ability to resolve the Suez crisis.  From the British perspective, the United Nations had 
not arbitrated the Arab-Israeli conflict successfully on previous occasions.  Now, 
according to Dixon, Arabs and Israelis were exploiting the Security Council‘s 
ineffectiveness and internal discord to gain a territorial advantage in the Middle East.  
These developments and the speed at which they progressed justified immediate British 
intervention.  Dixon equated the Suez crisis to the Korean War.  ―On that occasion,‖ 
Dixon argued, ―the Member of the United Nations which had forces on hand and was in a 
                                               
564 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 2-4.  Before yielding the podium, 
Loutfi also noted the turning of British public opinion against its own government to cement further the 
illegitimacy of aggression. 
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position to intervene at once courageously did so.‖565  The pivotal difference between 
1950 and 1956 was the role and function of the United Nations.  Under Trygve Lie, the 
UN in 1950 subordinated itself to the interests of its member states.  Hammarskjöld 
envisioned a more independent—or more appropriately a more interdependent role—for 
the United Nations.  Additionally, discussion within the Security Council in 1956 had not 
authorized, nor entertained the idea of discussing, armed intervention and appeared 
unlikely to do so. 
As Dixon continued his statement, the differences between Britain‘s unilateral 
basis for action and the UN‘s call for a multilateral approach to conflict resolution grew 
considerably.  Dixon assigned blame to the Egyptians‘ and Israelis‘ unilateral policies.  In 
Egypt‘s case, Dixon noted how Nasser ignored UN recommendations calling for Israel‘s 
maritime access to the Suez Canal.
566
  The Israeli government‘s decision to invade the 
Sinai Peninsula, on the other hand, threatened canal security and the transmission of 
international commerce.
567
  Where much of the international community began 
identifying the pursuit of unilateral policies as the source of international crisis, British 
officials interpreted the same conditions as justification for their own unilateral activity.  
British policy-makers had scripted their country‘s sacrifice to be portrayed as a service to 
the international community. 
John Foster Dulles appeared equally susceptible to the same misperceptions.  
During his often quoted ―heavy-hearted‖ speech at the first emergency session, the U.S. 
                                               
565 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 5-6.  Dixon even goes so far as to 
describe British and French involvement as a ―temporary police action.‖  See ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 
1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 6-7. 
566 The Egyptian government‘s refusal to recognize the state of Israel meant that the two countries remained 
in a state of war following the 1948 conflict.  As a result, Israeli ships were denied access to the canal. 
567
 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 6-7. 
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Secretary of State believed that the UN General Assembly held ―the moral judgment of 
the world community.‖  Consequently, Dulles decreed ―the united will of this 
Organization to have an impact upon the situation and perhaps to make it apparent to the 
world . . . that there is here the beginning of a world order.‖  Dulles even referred to this 
―united will‖ as ―the constituted authority.‖568  Yet, like Dixon, Dulles could not escape 
the temptation to depict a pluralistic forum such as the UN General Assembly in such 
monolithic terms.  As historian Townsend Hoopes put it, the Secretary‘s speech was ―a 
sermon, an appeal to the ideals of Western Man and an implied demand that these ideals 
must be met at least by the leading nations of the Western world.‖569  Although the 
General Assembly may have contributed to a sense of international solidarity, this 
awareness emanated not so much from a ―united will‖ as much as from an environment 
where various perspectives could be presented and discussed. 
When Dr. Tingfu Tsiang, the Nationalist Chinese permanent representative to the 
United Nations, addressed the assembly, he alluded to the distinctions between moral 
conformity and multilateralism.  Tsiang believed that the ―restoration of peace [in the 
Middle East]‖ depended on the ―co-operation of all parties.‖  While not perfect, Tsiang 
continued, the six principles presented to the Security Council in October served as the 
best prospect for resolving the Suez crisis.  ―If the Assembly adopted a resolution which 
primarily and instantly could restore peace, and at the same time would go far to remove 
the causes of war,‖ Tsiang suggested that, then, international opinion would appeal to 
                                               
568 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, p. 11. 
569 More specifically, Hoopes describes the speech as a balance ―between [Dulles‘s] own theme and the 
President‘s in a defense of the resonant Wilsonian principle that international justice must be looked for 
within the structures and processes of the established world organization, that these were mankind‘s highest 
expression of decency, mutual accommodation, and law, that nothing justified breaking them for selfish 
ends.‖  Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 379. 
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―the opinion of the moderate people‖ in Israel, Britain, and France.  To achieve this, 
Tsiang endorsed General Burns‘ original cease-fire proclamations requiring an immediate 
end to armed aggression and Israel‘s withdrawal.570  Compared to Dulles and Dixon, 
Tsiang‘s tone conveys a more inclusive approach to resolving the crisis.  Rather than 
mandating a moral consensus as Dulles implied, Tsiang‘s emphasis lay with forging 
practical support to which each side could attach their own moral justification. 
Many UN representatives contributing to the debate aligned themselves between 
Dulles‘s moral focus and Tsiang‘s more practical approach.  After a recess, the General 
Assembly reconvened at 9:50 p.m. on 1 November.  The Philippines‘ permanent 
representative to the UN, Felixberto Serrano, respected the spectrum of discussion, but 
concluded his remarks by supporting the U.S.‘s cease-fire proposal which re-instated the 
status quo ante bellum.  Representatives from Colombia and Ecuador also favored the 
U.S.‘s draft resolution.  As debate continued late into the night, Ecuadorian 
representative, Jose Trujillo, commended President Eisenhower for ―applying . . . the 
same [international] law to friends and enemies‖ alike.  However, not all supporters of 
the resolution upheld this sense of moral duty.  Jordanian and Syrian representatives 
contended that the resolution failed to condemn the British, French, and Israeli breach of 
the UN Charter‘s principles.  None the less, these representatives acknowledged the need 
to act promptly to prevent the entire Arab world from coming to Egypt‘s aid and thus 
expanding the scope of the conflict.
571
  Practicality motivated Jordanian and Syrian 
support.  Though imperfect, the resolution being debated would stave off the prospect of 
expansive war. 
                                               
570 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-I, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.561, pp. 8-9. 
571
 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 13-15, 17, and 27. 
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After a second recess, the assembly agreed to limit debate due to the unstable 
nature of the crisis and the immediate need for multilateral action.  Reconvening at ten 
minutes to midnight, the General Assembly heard from Israel‘s Abba Eban.  Picking up 
where he left off in the Security Council, Eban persisted with rallying world opinion to 
Israel‘s aid.  ―We [Israelis] know,‖ he confessed, ―that Israel is most popular when it does 
not hit back, and world opinion is profoundly important to us,‖ but the lack of ―peaceful 
coexistence‖ between Arabs and Israelis left the Jews no choice but to ensure ―self-
preservation.‖  Eban claimed a special relationship between Israel and international 
opinion.  This ―uniqueness‖ and ―eccentricity‖ was slowly transforming the 
―consciousness of mankind.‖572  These exhaustive efforts to sway the multilateral mind 
were stale and uninspiring.
573
  Although Disraeli‘s political legacy of portraying national 
interests as universal interests remained irresistible, it also proved to be highly ineffective 
during the most intense period of the Suez crisis. 
As if to amplify the point, Eban criticized the U.S.-sponsored cease-fire proposal.  
―It will not do,‖ he argued, ―to go back to an outdated and crumbling armistice regime 
designed by its authors to last for a few months and now lingering for eight years in 
growing paralysis of function.‖574  Clearly, the U.S.‘s sense of order based on the status 
quo ante bellum was unacceptable.  The result afforded representatives from other UN 
                                               
572 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, p. 23.  Interestingly, Eban‘s speech in 
the General Assembly lifted whole paragraphs of text from his address before the Security Council. 
573 Indeed, in defending British and French militarist impulses, Dr. Ronald Walker of Australia‘s UN 
delegation used language similar to that which Eban had employed.  Louis de Guiringand, France‘s chief 
UN delegate, also argued along the same lines as Eban.  The Frenchman categorized UN efforts as 
―powerless,‖ which in turn cultivated ―free reign to inordinate ambitions.‖  To accentuate his point, 
Guiringand referred to Nasser‘s manipulation of Arab nationalism ―to serve Egyptian national interests 
exclusively.‖  (Naturally, British and French ―ambitions‖ remained the exception.)  Like America‘s actions 
on the Korean peninsula years earlier, Guiringand continued, the Suez situation demanded immediate 
action on the part of individual member states.  Again, note parallels between Guiringand‘s reference to the 
Korean War and British representative Pierson Dixon‘s earlier use of the same example.  See ORGA, 
Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 28-30. 
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 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, p. 24. 
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member states an opportunity to exert their own broader influence in resolving the Suez 
crisis. 
India and its delegation played a substantial role in this new faction.  In noting the 
Security Council‘s support for the emergency session, Indian representative Arthur Lall 
also counted forty-nine of the UN‘s seventy-six members among the majority who 
supported a more multilateral decision-making process.  This simple acknowledgement 
conveyed as sense of independence from the elite Security Council while promoting a 
sense of interdependence within the General Assembly.  After conveying Indian Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru‘s concern that twentieth-century practices were reverting back 
to the ―predatory practices‖ of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Lall questioned 
the validity of ―vital interests‖ as a legitimate argument for unilateral intervention.  ―This 
violent approach to the safeguarding of vital interests,‖ Lall concluded, ―is . . . plunging 
the world into chaos.‖  To illustrate his point, Lall referred to the fact that British and 
French intervention on behalf of keeping the Suez Canal open had actually succeeded in 
shutting-down the canal.
575
  With Israeli ground forces pushing deep into the Sinai desert 
and British and French warplanes attacking from the air following the twelve-hour 
deadline, Nasser ordered the scuttling of ships in the canal to prevent any other country 
from seizing the waterway in tact.
576
 
The Suez crisis pivoted on the wide differences existing between unilateral action 
and the rapid mobilization of multilateral initiatives.  At the moment when the 
                                               
575 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 30-31.  The Saudi Arabian 
representative, Jamil Baroody, shared the perspective Lall and others had expressed prior to the General 
Assembly‘s adoption of America‘s draft cease-fire resolution.  The proposal was not ideal, but for Baroody, 
the inclusion of the Secretary General in the enforcement of the cease-fire offered enough evidence of 
impartiality.  See ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 33-34. 
576 To make matters worse, the Syrian government destroyed pipelines and pumping stations that moved 
Iraqi oil to Mediterranean ports for shipment to Europe.  See Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 
376. 
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governments of a select few countries embroiled themselves in war, much of the 
remaining international community was constructing a practical alternative to conflict.  
Rather than weaken and delay progressive crisis management, debates occurring in the 
General Assembly helped institute a stronger foundation for re-instituting peace.  Input 
came from various portions of the globe with fluctuating degrees of enthusiasm.  In fact, 
considerable disagreement surrounded the draft cease-fire resolution and implementation 
of the peace process.  At the very least, however, numerous UN representatives 
recognized the severity of the crisis and the policies responsible for it—specifically the 
determined attempts to fuse national interests and multilateral agendas into a unitary 
policy. 
The crisis and the prospect of an expansive war may deserve some credit for this 
epiphany, but international civil servants such as Dag Hammarskjöld had forecast this 
role for the UN for some time.  In his first address to the General Assembly as the 
Secretary General in 1953, Hammarskjöld called for the international organization to 
expand its role in global affairs.  He was a proponent of having the UN act as 
independent arbiter.  Hammarskjöld and the UN enjoyed early success in negotiating a 
dispute involving Communist Chinese and American interests regarding American pilots 
captured during the Korean War.  As a result, the secretary general and his fellow 
international civil servants were well-prepared for and receptive to managing the Suez 
crisis.  By November 1956, UN representatives were also broadening their sense of 
understanding. 
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V 
 
After the pre-vote debate concluded and the General Assembly passed the cease-
fire resolution by a more than 6 to 1 ratio, Canada‘s Foreign Minister Lester Pearson took 
the rostrum.  In the early hours of 2 November, Pearson explained his nation‘s abstention 
during the vote moments earlier.  To Canada‘s disappointment, fellow delegations 
ignored the disconnection between resolutions ending the fighting and resolutions making 
the peace.  Pearson‘s main objection was the absence of a ―provision . . . supervising or 
enforcing the cease-fire.‖577  Repeating the concerns of previous speakers, Pearson 
agreed that simply returning to the status quo solved nothing.  ―Such a return,‖ Pearson 
argued, ―would not be to a position of security, or even a tolerable position, but would be 
a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately 
another explosion.‖  To remedy this bleak forecast, Pearson suggested organizing ―a 
United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political 
settlement is being worked out.‖  Instead of an observer status like that of the UN Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the new UN force would represent ―a truly 
international peace and police force.‖578  Pearson‘s plan marked more than just a shift 
                                               
577 Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 87. 
578 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 35-36.  See also Pearson, Mike, 
Vol. II, p. 247.  According to historian Bruce Thordarson, Pearson had raised the idea of an ―international 
police force‖ during a 1 November Cabinet meeting.  The idea, Thordarson goes on to say, had existed for 
some time.  See Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 87.  According to Brian Urquhart, the idea dated back to 
November 1955 when General Burns suggested inserting UN troops along the Egyptian-Israeli border.  See 
Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 176.  See the footnote at the bottom of the page.  Adlai Stevenson, the 1952 
and 1956 Democratic nominee for President was another early advocate for stationing UN troops along the 
border.  Speaking in Charlottesville, Virginia on 11 November 1955, Stevenson criticized the Eisenhower 
administration for demonstrating ―little initiative within or outside the United Nation in devising measures 
to prevent . . . border clashes.‖  Stevenson speculated as to whether the UN should act more independently 
in this particular situation.  Eisenhower rejected Stevenson‘s idea.  Surprisingly, during the 1956 
Presidential campaign, Stevenson decided not to use the UNEF proposal as an occasion to advertise his 
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from the moral condemnation of force to the more mechanical matters of peacekeeping.  
His call for a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) marked a paradoxical twist in the 
diplomatic discourse. 
In one sense, Pearson‘s move served as a calculated response to his country‘s 
predicament.  Canada depended heavily upon strong ties between the United States, 
Britain, and France.  Destruction of this trans-Atlantic alliance threatened to place 
Canada in a position of choosing between cold war and imperial allegiances.  
Additionally, Pearson and his colleagues shuddered at the prospect of having Canada‘s 
―two mother [Britain and France] countries reprimanded for their aggression.‖579  He saw 
UN intervention as imperative to relieving Canada‘s allies. 
While admitting his desires to rescue his allies‘ image, Pearson also recognized 
and respected the ascendance of multilateral diplomacy.  ―This was 1956, not 1876,‖ 
Pearson recollects in his memoirs, ―and [the British and French] course was doomed to 
failure and ultimate disaster‖ when pitted against the international community.580  
Unobtrusively, the Canadian Foreign Minister rallied support for his UNEF proposal 
prior to announcing it at the plenary session.
581
  Pearson courted votes from UN 
representatives of non-aligned countries, especially India.
582
  One scholar contends that 
Pearson abstained during the vote pertaining to the U.S. cease-fire resolution so as not to 
                                                                                                                                            
prescient foreshadowing. See Stuart Brown, Adlai E. Stevenson, A Short Biography: The Conscience of the 
Country (Woodbury, NY: Barron‘s Woodbury Press, 1965), p. 147. 
579 Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, p. 244.  See also Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 86.  According to historian 
Robert Bothwell, Pearson wanted ―a much tougher mandate‖ levied against Nasser and Egyptian 
sovereignty.  See Robert Bothwell, ―Canada‘s Moment: Lester Pearson, Canada, and the World,‖ in 
Pearson: The Unlikely Gladiator, ed. Norman Hillmer (Ithaca, NY: McGill-Queens University Press, 
1999), p. 26. 
580 Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, p. 244. 
581 Thordarson, Lester Pearson, pp. 87 and 89. 
582
 Bothwell, ―Canada‘s Moment: Lester Pearson, Canada, and the World,‖ p. 26. 
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jeopardize non-aligned support for his international police force resolution.
583
  Pearson 
was especially qualified for this role of rallying multilateral consensus.  He understood 
the complexities of international negotiation.  Entering Canada‘s Department of External 
Affairs in 1928, Pearson went on to represent his country at ―various international 
conferences in Geneva, including sessions of the League of Nations.‖584  Similar to 
Hammarskjöld‘s career path, Pearson‘s exposure to these international settings provided 
him with the knowledge and foresight necessary for navigating sensitive diplomatic 
situations.   
Scholarly consensus is by no means united with regard to assigning credit for 
these initiatives.  In stark contrast to the pro-Pearson perspective, historians analyzing the 
Suez crisis from various other viewpoints praise the Eisenhower administration for its 
inspiration.  Russell Braddon argues that Dulles led, personally, the General Assembly in 
demanding a cease-fire.
585
  Cole Kingseed contends that Eisenhower not only called for 
referring the Suez crisis to the UN Security Council, but also convinced Lester Pearson to 
introduce his pivotal UN police force resolution.
586
  Diane Kunz agrees, saying that 
Pearson represented U.S. views while serving as an ―honest-broker.‖   Kunz argues that 
Pearson remained untainted by the British and French deception, yet, compared to 
Hammarskjöld, Pearson still commanded the respect of those European powers.
587
 
                                               
583 Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 87.  This reasoning seems a bit odd considering that so many non-
aligned countries voted in favor of the cease-fire resolution.  Had Pearson joined the majority, he probably 
would have risked very little political capital in doing so.  Still, Canada‘s abstention added to its aura of 
impartiality. 
584 Pearson, Mike, Vol. I, p. 60; and Thordarson, Lester Pearson, p. 24. 
585 Russell Braddon, Suez: Splitting of a Nation (London, UK: Collins, 1973), pp. 55-58. 
586 Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956, p. 116.  See also Guhin, John Foster Dulles, p. 393; 
and Millar, The Commonwealth and the United Nations, p. 71.  Historian T.B. Millar describes how 
Pearson took action ―after consultation with‖ the Canadian, American, and British governments. 
587 Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991), p. 126.  Historian Salim Yaqub argues that the United States led UN activity 
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What is truly fascinating about these interpretations is not only how Pearson‘s 
role satisfied the immediate concerns of those interests involved in the Suez crisis, but 
also how his efforts are portrayed to satisfy historical analysis of the event.  Assigning 
credit seems more important than analyzing the mechanics Pearson employed to achieve 
compromise.  These analyses assume that because the American-sponsored cease-fire 
enjoyed such overwhelming support that those who supported it also supported the U.S.‘s 
perspective of the crisis.  Many key delegations did not.  Conversely, Pearson made a 
whole-hearted effort to earn the endorsement of a broad segment of the General 
Assembly for his UN emergency force proposal.  If the Eisenhower administration was 
genuinely concerned about establishing such a coalition, why could it not master-mind 
such imaginative initiatives during the two London Conferences? 
Instead of possessing the embittering overtones of unilateral imperialism or the 
insufficient return to the status quo ante bellum, creation of a UN military police force 
satisfied the needs of a skeptical audience by appealing to a broad set of interests.  
Support for Pearson‘s plan included UN member states that held diametrically opposing 
perspectives.  Britain‘s Pierson Dixon seemed relieved at the prospect of introducing an 
international force and thus diffusing Britain‘s concerns.588  John Foster Dulles expressed 
both his and Eisenhower‘s ―complete agreement‖ with Pearson‘s idea.  Leonardo Vitetti, 
the Italian Ambassador to the UN, favored Canada‘s appraisal of the situation and 
identification of the need for international intervention.  Libya‘s representative to the UN 
                                                                                                                                            
throughout the Suez crisis by exerting ―[American] diplomatic and economic pressure on its allies.‖  See 
Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, pp. 64-65.  Historian Herman Finer, on the other hand , blames 
Dulles for ―stringing along‖ America‘s allies and flinching in the face of Soviet aggression.  Together, 
these actions, according to Finer, undermined the UN‘s effectiveness.  See Finer, Dulles Over Suez, pp. 
322-323. 
588 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 176.  In recording his memoir years later, Anthony Eden credits himself 
with first suggesting a need for a United Nations force.  See Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full 
Circle, p. 625. 
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echoed Pearson‘s concerns over how the UN, as an institution of world opinion, would 
implement the Charter‘s principles.  Likewise, U Win of Burma considered Pearson‘s 
proposal the organization‘s most important work and essential to repudiating ―gunboat 
diplomacy‖ for all time.589 
 
VI 
 
Though initially skeptical of the idea, Hammarskjöld also endorsed Pearson‘s 
proposal within hours of first hearing of it.  Hammarskjöld worried that organizing and 
deploying the UNEF could not respond quickly enough to contain the crisis.
590
  Rarely 
one to let his vanity consume him, however, the Secretary General held ―an imaginative, 
constructive, and forward-looking approach‖ that accommodated the commitment to 
multilateral crisis resolution.
591
  Hammarskjöld dispatched his executive assistant, 
Andrew Cordier, and Undersecretary Ralph Bunche to meet with Pearson and hash out 
the numerous details surrounding Canada‘s proposal.  Having played such an integral 
part in the General Armistice Agreement of 1948, Bunche‘s return to Middle Eastern 
matters marked his first and overdue involvement in the Suez crisis.
592
  That evening as 
Pearson, Bunche, and Cordier conferred, Hammarskjöld met privately with Iran‘s UN 
                                               
589 ORGA, Eleventh Year, ES-1, 1 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.562, pp. 39-40, 43. 
590 See Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, pp. 265-267.  See also Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, p. 251; and Urquhart, 
Hammarskjöld, p. 176.  Urquhart and Person contend that the secretary general faced a sobering reality 
check of his own.  Hammarskjöld recognized his own limitations in crafting strategies for crisis 
management.  His individual efforts had not succeeded.  As a result, he delegated authority to his 
subordinates, Ralph Bunche and Andrew Cordier.  Hammarskjöld also had to reconcile his utter disbelief 
regarding British duplicity and anger over Israel‘s belligerence.  See Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, p. 264; and 
Pearson, Mike, Vol. II, pp. 247-248, and 251. 
591 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, p. 176. 
592
 Urquhart, Ralph Bunche, p. 263. 
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representative, Djalal Abdoh.  Speaking on behalf of the entire Afro-Asian bloc, Abdoh 
requested that Hammarskjöld ―intervene personally to negotiate a cease-fire.‖593  Rather 
than handle matters himself as he was prone to do earlier that spring and summer, 
Hammarskjöld yielded to the collective spirit that proved instrumental to resolving the 
crisis. 
Other attempts at accommodating multilateral interests were unsuccessful.  
Minutes taken during a 3 November White House conference involving President 
Eisenhower, Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., and other senior officials 
reveals just how feeble and out-of-touch administration officials were when it came to 
representing a broader set of viewpoints.  For example, when Undersecretary for Near 
Eastern Affairs William Roundtree reported that Washington‘s message to Nasser met 
with a favorable reply, Roundtree described how these telegrams had helped clarify 
America‘s foreign policy agenda.  ―For the first time,‖ the meeting minutes declare, 
―[Nasser] realized that the U.S. was not simply playing the British game in the [Middle 
East].‖594  Identifying this early November communiqué, as the ―first time‖ that Nasser 
understood America‘s motives in this crisis conveys the persistent narrow-mindedness 
not only of Nasser but also of U.S. officials.  So eager were the Egyptian and American 
governments to pursue their own interests, they paid little attention to the perceptions 
those policies conveyed.  Once again, insensitivity to how others perceived of certain 
policies contributed to the intensification of the crisis. 
In another example, Hoover and Rountree met with the Ambassadors of Iraq, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia later in the day on 3 November.  Lebanon‘s 
                                               
593 Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, pp. 176-177. 
594 Memo of Conference with the President, 3 November 1956, FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, p. 947.  
Emphasis added. 
242 
 
Ambassador Dr. Victor Khouri began by expressing the Arabs‘ heartfelt wishes for 
Dulles‘s recovery from surgery and Arab thanks for America‘s encouraging role taken 
regarding Suez.
595
  Speaking for the administration, Roundtree called for re-establishing 
the status quo before any new proposals could be suggested.  Having achieved this 
through the UN cease-fire resolution (which the belligerents had yet to accept), 
Roundtree unveiled two new draft resolutions that Lodge was scheduled to introduce to 
the UN General Assembly that evening.
596
  This scenario, linking postwar changes to an 
initial return to the status quo, was the fundamental flaw of the U.S. government‘s 
approach to crisis management.  In the case of the Suez crisis, successful crisis resolution 
required changes to the status quo in order to facilitate peace.  These two actions needed 
to be addressed simultaneously.  American officials failed to consider this prerequisite.  
The Arab ambassadors sensed this when they asked how the U.S. government would 
respond if the cease-fire failed.  The administration, Hoover and Roundtree replied, 
would formulate strategies in response to events as they unfolded.  The Arab 
ambassadors expressed their fervent desire for an infusion of American leadership.
597
  
Unfortunately, U.S. officials had done so by plotting policies that were unresponsive to 
the situation at hand.  In many respects, the policies put forth represented U.S. interests 
more than those of the international community. 
 
 
                                               
595 According to the minutes of the meeting, Dulles suffered from ―acute appendicitis.‖  Later, news leaked 
that the Secretary of State was suffering form ileitis.  See Memo of Conversation, ―Visit of Group of Arab 
Ambassadors to Under Secretary,‖ 3 November 1956, FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, p. 949. 
596 The first draft resolution focused on easing Arab-Israeli tensions; the second addressed the Suez crisis. 
597 Memo of Conversation, ―Visit of Group of Arab Ambassadors to Under Secretary,‖ 3 November 1956, 
FRUS: Suez Crisis, Vol. XVI, pp. 949-951. 
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VII 
 
At first, as the First Emergency Special Session reconvened on 3 November at 8 
p.m., the prospect for American leadership seemed promising.  Omar Loutfi, Egyptian 
Ambassador to the UN, announced that the Egyptian government would observe the 
U.S.-sponsored cease-fire resolution.  During his opening remarks, however, U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., reminded the assembly that despite 
overwhelming international support for the cease-fire, hostilities continued.  Lodge 
proceeded to unveil the Eisenhower administration‘s plan for creating long-term stability 
in the Middle East.  To start, the U.S. Ambassador criticized the UN organization for 
failing to neutralize threats to regional peace.  ―While the temptation is strong to place the 
whole blame on the States directly concerned, the fact is, as Secretary Dulles reminded 
us, that the United Nations must also share responsibility for what has happened.‖598 
To rectify the situation, Lodge proposed two draft resolutions designed to 
restructure the postwar order.  The first draft resolution called for replacing the 
inadequate Palestine Conciliation Commission with another committee consisting of five 
member states answering to the conflicting parties and the UN General Assembly.  The 
second proposed resolution called for creating a three-nation panel responsible for 
clearing and securing the Suez Canal as an ―international waterway‖ and negotiating a 
peace between the belligerents.  The Convention of 1888 and the six principles adopted 
by the Security Council were to serve as the foundation for negotiation.
599
  Even amidst 
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war, American officials pressed for international control of the canal as established 
during the unsuccessful London Conferences.  Like so many other senior bureaucrats in 
the Eisenhower administration, Lodge persisted in linking peace to earlier efforts that had 
already proved fruitless.  As historian Michael Guhin put it, ―The American post-attack 
public policy followed from its pre-attack stances.‖600  In this regard, U.S. policy differed 
little from those of its British and French allies.  All attempted to use the war as 
justification for their own prefabricated policies.  As a result, little consensus lay in 
endorsing these draft resolutions. 
The best and most ironic example of the opposition facing Lodge‘s resolutions 
occurred when Iraq‘s UN delegate Muhammad Jawad expressed his government‘s 
criticism. Where the Iraqi ambassador to the United States had supported American 
leadership, Jawad lampooned the Superpower‘s plans.  Jawad argued that Lodge‘s first 
proposal did more harm than good to Palestinian interests because ―instead of 
recognizing [their] rights, [the proposal] suggests, and then only en passant, that they 
should be treated in a humane way.‖  Had Lodge and other members of the U.S.‘s UN 
delegation been more sensitive to the genuine interests of others rather than incorporating 
them into America‘s own interests, such disillusionment might have been avoided.  
Jawad considered Lodge‘s proposals as tantamount to ―appeasement‖ in the face of 
British, French, and Israeli aggression. At one point, the Iraqi delegate despaired 
When one cannot make an aggressor abide by the rule of law, then one 
accepts his interpretation of the law and his method of implementation.  What 
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strong ‗Jewish‘ lobby in the in United States.‖  See Miller, Dag Hammarskjöld and Crisis Diplomacy, p. 
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more can an aggressor ask than to commit aggression and persist in carrying it out 
despite the decisions of a world assembly? 
 
Failure to hold the aggressors accountable would compromise the UN‘s principle 
purpose, Jawad concluded.
601
  He was not alone.  Distancing himself from his American 
loyalties, Felixberto Serraro of the Philippine delegation expressed similar reservations as 
did the Soviet and Saudi Arabian delegates.
602
  Lodge‘s admonishment of the 
international community not only alienated the audience that had requested American 
leadership, but his actions also sacrificed an opportunity for engaging in multilateral 
diplomacy so that the U.S. government could advance its own interests. 
Fortunately, other UN ambassadors proposed more objective alternatives for 
reestablishing peace.  Later, during the 3 November plenary session, India‘s Arthur Lall 
introduced a more popular draft resolution.  Instead of addressing long-term issues facing 
the Middle East, Lall‘s proposal, representing ―the opinion of the delegations of almost 
all the Asian and African countries,‖ addressed the immediate concerns stemming from 
the Suez crisis.  Because the British, French, and Israelis continued flouting the UN 
cease-fire, India and a bloc of nineteen other nations called for the Secretary General to 
take direct control of the situation to oversee enforcement of the cease-fire process and 
provide a status report within twelve hours.
603
  Such broad support provided a more 
legitimate strategy for quelling the conflict rather than use the opportunity to advance 
already unpopular agendas.  Considerable support lay in endowing Hammarskjöld with 
the authority necessary for dealing with the crisis.  All that remained was to create 
instruments through which to carry out his responsibilities. 
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Again, as with Hammarskjöld and Pearson, experience in multilateral diplomacy 
helped Lall not only comprehend the need or compromise, but also marshal the support 
necessary for mediating the Suez crisis.  Lall was a central figure in the international 
activism exhibited during this time in Indian diplomacy.  Lall‘s intelligence won the 
confidence of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who chose him to represent India 
in international affairs.  Since India‘s independence in 1947, Lall had served as Consul 
General for India in New York, the first Trade Commissioner in London, the country‘s 
ambassador to Austria as well as the ambassador to the UN.  These experiences meant 
that Lall adopted a more moderate outlook when compared to India‘s other delegates to 
the UN.
604
  Born in 1911, Lall was considerably younger than either Pearson or 
Hammarskjöld, but his commitment to multilateral diplomacy shared a similar 
professional trajectory. 
Canada‘s Lester Pearson followed Lall‘s speech with his own announcement for 
creating the UNEF.  Pearson‘s private discussions the previous day had enlisted the 
Secretary General‘s support and that of his staff.  Careful not to upstage Lall‘s idea, 
Pearson introduced his peace-keeping force as a ―supplementary responsibility‖ for the 
Secretary General.  Unlike the American proposals that favored creating international 
boards staffed by the member states, decision-making under the Canadian and Indian 
model rested outside the direct hands of member states.  Greater multilateral diplomacy 
endowed Hammarskjöld with the authority and trust to act appropriately in the interest of 
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international peace and security.  As the scholar Mark Zacher put it, Hammarskjöld had 
groomed himself and the organization for an occasion such as this one ―by providing the 
Member States with a resourceful instrument for direct action in the Secretary General 
and his staff.‖605 
What some members of the international community realized was that peace and 
security could be more easily achieved independent of nationally-interested doctrine.  As 
Reiz Malile, Albania‘s UN delegate, put it, ―In our time, those who try to tamper with the 
destinies of other peoples merit universal censure.  Times have changed.  It is madness to 
think that a people can be crushed by force.‖606  Skeptics may argue that the Suez crisis 
simply reflected a brief period in history where multilateral and national interests 
converged.  However, given the U.S.‘s efforts and those of other major world powers to 
influence the course of debate, early November 1956 marked the brief ascendance of 
multilateralism over that of more unilateral national interests.  The most representative 
body of world opinion had outflanked those individual nations intent on imposing their 
own sense of order.  According to Brian Urquhart, ―creation of a UN force thus became 
the key to the resolution of the [Suez] crisis.‖  With the UNEF now sanctioned by the 
General Assembly, Hammarskjöld charged Bunche with issuing yet another cease fire, 
which was promptly sent to British, French, and Israeli officials at seven a.m. on 4 
November.
607
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VIII 
 
Seven o‘clock in the morning in New York City was one o‘clock in the afternoon 
in London.  Eden‘s Egypt Committee met for the second of two meetings that day at 3:30 
p.m.  The only consensus able to be reached was to have the full Cabinet debate the issue 
of going ahead with an invasion in light of the UN‘s call for a cease-fire and insertion of 
the UNEF.  Eden argued, unpersuasively, that the lack of a UNEF actually legitimized 
Britain‘s reasons for invading.  At 6:30 p.m., the full Cabinet debated their course of 
action, serenaded by the muffled catcalls from protesters congregating outside.
608
  Eden 
laid out three options: proceed with invasion plans as a vanguard for the later UNEF, 
suspend military operations for twenty-four hours, or hold off invasion indefinitely.  
After a lengthy debate, Eden polled his advisers.
609
  As historians Anthony Gorst and 
Lewis Johnman describe it, ―for the first time [in the crisis] a [Cabinet vote] revealed that 
some six Cabinet ministers had serious reservations about continuing with the military 
action.‖  Six of the eighteen ministers were for postponing or abandoning invasion 
plans—including both the Navy and Air Force ministers.610  In spite of these objections, 
the majority of the British Cabinet sided with Eden.  Within twelve hours Britain and 
French airborne forces landed near Port Said, the northern mouth of the Suez Canal. 
Meanwhile, domestic support evaporated.  Britain‘s opposition party leader Hugh 
Gaitskell lampooned Eden‘s justification for invasion as a spearhead to precede the 
arrival of United Nations troops.  ―Nothing,‖ Gaitskell noted, ―was said about this in the 
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[British and French] ultimatum to Egypt.‖  Furthermore, no mention of it made its way 
into Dixon‘s speeches either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly.  Editors 
at the British daily, The Observer, apologized to readers for thinking that the British 
government would respect its ―international obligations.‖611  Even the Archbishop of 
Canterbury considered the invasion unjustified and antithetical both to United Nations 
principles and the majority of world public opinion.
612
  Legal arguments supporting 
intervention also wavered. 
Despite official pronouncements favoring Eden‘s policies, defections plagued the 
prime minister‘s office of legal council.  According to a 29 October memorandum titled 
―The Right of Intervention,‖ Britain‘s Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir believed that 
intervention was legitimate if the Suez situation threatened British shipping, British 
nationals living in Egypt, or international commerce.  As debate preceding the invasion 
intensified, other legal specialists argued against intervention and its authorization under 
international law.  Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, argued 
that intervention would create a situation that endangered British nationals in Egypt, 
when one had not existed previously.  Britain‘s Attorney-General, Sir Reginald 
Manningham-Buller suggested shifting debate from international law to acting promptly 
―in the interests of the nations of the world and in conformity with the intensions 
underlying the [UN] Charter.‖613 
Such a strategy raised two major concerns, which eroded political support for 
Eden‘s government.  First, Fitzmaurice and his like-minded colleagues questioned the 
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constitutionality of the proceedings that formulated these policies.  Increasingly, Eden 
depended on counselors that devised justification for military intervention.  Restricting 
input combined with ―the practice of bypassing the regular channels of legal advice,‖ 
Fitzmaurice warned, ―always leads to trouble.‖614  Second, to justify invasion, the legal 
minds Eden trusted sought to manipulate UN principles by having them serve British 
national interests. These tactics not only served as another example of the pervasive 
tendency to confuse national interests with a multilateral agenda, but the tactics also 
sabotaged the British government‘s domestic and international credibility.  Eden‘s 
opponents wasted no time in maximizing the loss in confidence.  During a 4 November 
television and radio broadcast, Gaitskell criticized Britain‘s use of its UN Security 
Council veto saying that ―[Britain] should have been acting on behalf of the United 
Nations and . . . should have had world opinion behind us.‖  At the same time, Gaitskell 
echoed earlier calls for the prime minister‘s resignation.615 
 
IX 
 
Across the Atlantic, Democrats and Republicans in the United States prepared for 
the Presidential election of 1956.  President Eisenhower faced off against his own 
political rival: Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic Party nominee.  Behind in the polls, 
Stevenson went on the political offensive attacking Eisenhower‘s policies including the 
president‘s stand on the Suez crisis.  During an 18 October speech in Youngstown, Ohio, 
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Stevenson described Eisenhower‘s ―diplomatic strokes‖ in the Suez as ―erratic, naïve, 
and clumsy . . . through which Russia gained welcome to the Near and Middle East.‖  
Appraising the situation further, Stevenson alleged, ―the administration [lacks] any real 
capacity to adjust its policies to new conditions.‖616  Yet, Stevenson offered few 
substantial changes to America‘s foreign policy.617  Although he made a valid point 
concerning Eisenhower‘s unresponsive foreign policy, Stevenson limited his argument to 
the Cold War context Eisenhower had maintained throughout the crisis. 
The president felt little need to change his stance.  Overall, the administration 
basked in the glow of economic growth and relative peace and security.  In an 11 
September telephone conversation between Dulles and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, 
Stevenson‘s foreign policy speeches were discussed.  Nixon called the Democratic 
nominee‘s proposals ―irresponsible.‖  The like-minded Dulles thought the country could 
not ―afford [a] trial-and-error president at this time.‖618  As Election Day neared, 
Eisenhower hoped to coast to the finish smoothly.  In historian Cole Kingseed‘s words, 
―the president sought to have his administration present a calm and united front to the 
American public.‖  Realistically, Eisenhower had little to worry about.  The Democrats‘ 
virulent attacks on the president‘s policies represented a losing campaign in the midst of 
death-throes rather than an actual threat to its opponents.  In the words of a Stevenson 
biographer, Eisenhower‘s credentials in foreign policy made any political attacks 
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Stevenson launched seem feeble and petulant.
619
  As Kingseed himself mentions, by the 
end of October 1956, ―Eisenhower decided to cancel the remainder of his campaign 
appearances to prevent [international] events from getting out of hand.‖620  Even with the 
Suez war raging in early November, its effects were not felt at the polls.  The November 
7
th
 front-page headlines called Eisenhower‘s re-election ―a landslide.‖621  Winning almost 
ten million more popular votes than Stevenson out of almost sixty-two million votes cast 
and an Electoral College count of 457 to 73, there was little that could have kept 
Eisenhower from a second term. 
For British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Election Day in the United States 
combined with the rapid formation of the UNEF had upended European efforts to take 
the canal by force.  Eden had hoped to deploy forces so as to catch the United States and 
the United Nations off-guard, making the invasion a fait accompli.  Amidst mounting 
pressure from his own constituents and the international community alike, Eden agreed to 
a cease-fire effective midnight 6 November.  Within roughly thirty-six hours after putting 
troops into Egypt, the British and French operation had become a political quagmire.  
British and French forces had not secured the entire Canal Zone.  Eden could not afford 
to press the attack and continue to suffer from the repercussions of international 
reprimands.  Dwindling oil reserves, a plummeting British pound, and loss of face in the 
world community could not be surmounted, despite Secretary of State Dulles‘s second-
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guessing Eden‘s decision to halt operations.  According to historian Michael Guhin, 
Dulles contended that had the British and French fulfilled their objectives, the United 
States government could have taken a more conciliatory stance by recognizing their de 
facto control of the canal.
622
  French Prime Minister Guy Mollet also urged Eden to delay 
his cease-fire announcement a few days until Anglo-French forces had secured the 
canal.
623
 
As it turned out, Eden‘s announcement coincided with news that the Soviets were 
planning to intervene directly in the Suez crisis.  Senior Soviet official Nikolai 
Bulganin‘s 5 November letter to British and French officials denounced the ―predatory 
war‖ being waged against Egypt.  Hoping to advance Soviet interests by representing the 
sentiments of the international community, Bulganin alluded to nuclear brinkmanship if 
British and French military operations refused to desist.  To bring peace to the Middle 
East, Bulganin reiterated earlier proposals calling for depositing ―volunteers‖ in the 
region to help facilitate the peace process.  Contrary to the UNEF, the use of ―volunteer‖ 
forces would include Soviet and American personnel.  The parallels between the Soviets‘ 
suggestion and the British and French argument for direct intervention in Egypt 
demonstrate the continued insensitivity shown toward genuine multilateral diplomacy 
that minimized the role national interests played.  Although Soviet threats had little if any 
effect on British decision-making, certain parts of the world equated Eden‘s cease-fire 
with his receipt of Bulganin‘s note.624 
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With pressure to end hostilities coming from the international community in the 
form of monetary chaos, from domestic dissent in British public opinion, and from Cold 
War adversaries, the influential role played by the United Nations was overshadowed.  
Yet, for all the proposals and rhetoric offered by government officials preoccupied with 
securing peace on their terms, the United Nations was the only institution with adequate 
credibility to act.  Danish Ambassador to the United Nations Karl Eskelund remarked that 
salvation ―from the edge of catastrophe‖ came ―not by threats or bluster but by the action 
of the United Nations.‖  Eskelund continued, ―We [UN members] are breaking new 
ground, but I feel sure that we can reap a rich harvest from that ground in terms of peace 
and security.‖  The UN representatives from Ecuador, India, Iraq, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, 
and even America‘s own Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. shared in their colleague‘s 
confidence.
625
 
Eskelund‘s analysis distinguishes between individual nations‘ efforts to create 
stability and the United Nations‘ own initiatives.  Of these two perspectives, the forum of 
world opinion proved more adept at resolving crisis and conflict.  The organization 
capitalized on its somewhat oxymoronic status.  On the one hand, most of its influential 
members had challenged the institution‘s central premise by instigating instability.  Yet 
doing so allowed the United Nations to endorse alternatives to which even the most 
reluctant of nations yielded.  Although countries, such as Britain, France, Israel, Egypt, 
and the United States, never abandoned their attempts to manipulate multilateral 
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diplomacy to suit their own interests, they could not escape from acknowledging the 
UN‘s pivotal role in abating the Suez crisis. 
By the first week of November 1956, President Eisenhower was pressuring Ben-
Gurion to abide by the UN‘s resolution calling for a cease-fire and deployment of an 
international peacekeeping force.  The president threatened to end all U.S. public and 
private aid to Israel and abstain from procedures in the United Nations aimed at expelling 
the Israeli delegation from the international organization.
626
  According to historian 
Richard Miller, Eisenhower‘s ―effort was part of [the administration‘s] plan to regain the 
initiative it had achieved with its initial stand and the first resolution.‖627  Israeli historian 
Avi Shlaim describes Ben-Gurion‘s reaction as ―bitterly disappointed.  [Ben-Gurion] had 
grossly misread the international situation and now had to pay the price.‖628  Momentum 
would revert back to nationally-interested parties soon enough, but not before multilateral 
diplomacy left its historic mark upon the international community. 
 
X 
 
Capitalizing upon its momentum, the UN General Assembly convened the next 
day, 7 November, to approve the UNEF‘s structure and mission.  The collective body 
formed an Advisory Committee to handle UNEF‘s operational parameters.  In addition to 
the Secretary General, the committee included representatives from seven nations: Brazil, 
Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan.  While some committee 
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participants may have had their own interests in quelling the violence, such as the 
Canadian government‘s desire to repair strained relations between the U.S. and Great 
Britain, all of the UN committee participants understood these motives to be secondary to 
the immediate concern for resilient stability and peace.  Committee members and UN 
officials moved ahead as quickly as possible.  Hammarskjöld and his subordinates 
wanted to assemble and deploy UNEF troops in order to keep hostilities from flaring up 
again between Egyptians, Israelis, and Europeans while simultaneously preventing any 
opportunity for the Soviet Union to send their own military contingent to the region.
629
 
Given the intensity of ill-will existing between the combatants and the degree to 
which various governments had contributed to amplifying the Suez crisis, officials at the 
United Nations faced considerable challenges in making the UNEF a reality.  Shortly 
after the General Assembly authorized creation of the UNEF, Hammarskjöld contacted 
General Burns asking his advice as to the size and composition of the proposed UN 
Emergency Force.  Ideally, Burns favored a division-sized force complete with 
reconnaissance units, a tank brigade, and fighter-aircraft units.  Such a deployment would 
be capable of withstanding aggression or challenges to UNEF authority and legitimacy.  
Burns requested unit contributions no smaller than a battalion from those member states 
interested in offering personnel.  Burns also requested that the soldiers be expected to 
serve for at least one year.
630
  In typical fashion, however, Burns quickly adjusted his 
requirements to the realities established by a demanding pace of events.  By mid-
November, the first UN troops would be arriving in Egypt. 
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Hammarskjöld entrusted UN Undersecretary Ralph Bunche with vetting member 
states willing to offer UNEF military unit contributions.  According to Brian Urquhart, 
Bunche became quite popular as UN ambassadors lobbied for inclusion in the emergency 
peacekeeping force.
631
  From early- to mid-November Romania, New Zealand, the 
United States, Burma, Iran, and the Philippines volunteered but were rejected.
632
  Criteria 
for UNEF participation eliminated many prospects which posed challenges for 
assembling the UNEF in a timely manner. 
For example, nations with ample reserves to devote to the UNEF were ineligible 
mainly due to politics.  As belligerents in the Suez War, French and British forces would 
make a mockery of any peacekeeping force them included them.  China‘s UN delegation 
remained ambivalent to the crisis.  Although communist China had opened official 
relations with Egypt in the spring of 1956 when Nasser recognized the communist regime 
as China‘s legitimate government, China‘s representation in the United Nations remained 
under Nationalist control.  In a show of support for Egypt, China‘s communist 
government had recruited 280,000 Chinese ―‗volunteers‘‖ to help Egypt repel its 
invaders.  According to historian Richard Miller, Nasser gave serious consideration to the 
Chinese as well as the Soviet offers of assistance.
633
  Superpower involvement, however, 
risked further escalation of tensions as well as the fueling of Cold War anxieties.  As 
General Burns notes, mutual suspicion also disqualified Eastern European countries and 
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the ―‗Mediterranean powers‘‖ who happened to be NATO allies.  Burns argues that these 
satellite states of Superpower spheres of influence would have been susceptible to 
puppeteering.
634
  However, with Hungary‘s revolt, Soviet officials may have been more 
worried about extending any higher profile to rambunctious elements within their spheres 
of influence. 
Once these hurtles were cleared, Hammarskjöld and the UNEF faced the 
challenge of deploying the force while simultaneously addressing the skepticism of those 
most directly affected by it.  As Urquhart put it, ―the stationing of a UN force on the 
sovereign territory of a member state had never occurred before and would have aroused 
the sensibilities of any sovereign government‖—particularly the Egyptians who endured 
colonial rule and invasion.
635
  To remove any misperceptions, General Burns flew into 
Cairo on 8 November to inform Egypt‘s senior officials directly.  Two issues blocked the 
immediate deployment of UN troops.  First, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Egypt‘s Foreign 
Minister, expressed concern over Canada‘s inclusion in the UNEF.  Fawzi and other 
Egyptian officials questioned Canada‘s motives and impartial integrity because of its ties 
to the British Commonwealth.  Second, the Egyptian government voiced concern over 
UNEF‘s simply replacing Western troops with an international force to operate the Suez 
Canal. 
To ease these anxieties, both Hammarskjöld and Burns relied upon UNEF‘s 
mandate as authorized by the UN General Assembly.  No single country determined the 
force‘s course of action or its operational guidelines.  Additionally, the United Nations 
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had no jurisdiction over canal operations.  Although peacekeepers would occupy the 
canal-zone initially, the force‘s objective was to separate the belligerents, not to seize 
territory.  In one unpublished communiqué, Hammarskjöld warned Nasser that ―any 
wavering from Egypt‘s side now would undoubtedly isolate Egypt in world opinion 
which so far had been its best protection.‖636  At this point, the UN Secretary General was 
more concerned about organizing the UNEF and having it establish a buffer between the 
warring parties. 
In spite of these early challenges, progress was made.  By 12 November, Nasser 
agreed to Colombian, Swedish, Finnish, Indonesian, and Yugoslav participation in the 
UNEF.
637
  Burns held his second face-to-face meeting with Nasser, who had designated 
Brigadier General Amin Hilmy as his chief liaison officer to the UNEF.  Preparations for 
quartering UNEF troops and all the accompanying needs went rather smoothly.  In 
Burns‘s own words, ―of course, from time to time there were arguments and difficulties, 
but one felt in dealing with [Hilmy] there was always goodwill, and a sincere intention to 
treat UNEF as one would treat an ally in wartime, at the least.‖638 
The good relations established early on proved infectious.  Hammarskjöld arrived 
in Egypt on 16 November, the day after the first contingent of UNEF troops had arrived.  
During a series of meetings lasting three days, Hammarskjöld and Nasser settled upon the 
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637 Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish participation was also expected.  Preparations for the deployment of 
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―good faith‖ agreements.  The Secretary General vowed to respect Egyptian sovereignty 
while the UNEF retained its autonomy with regard to enforcing the cease-fire.  
Additionally, Nasser and Hammarskjöld agreed that the Egyptian government reserved 
the right to request UNEF‘s removal but to base that request on ―the completion of the 
force‘s task.‖639 
This kind of agreement epitomized multilateral diplomacy.  Hammarskjöld was 
receptive to Nasser‘s heightened sense for national sovereignty and accommodated 
Nasser‘s concerns.  For example, the Egyptian government would work with the UN to 
determine UNEF assembly areas and deployment both during and after all invading 
forces had withdrawn.  Also, the role UNEF personnel played in the Suez Canal Zone 
was temporary and solely dependent on the presence of Anglo-French forces.  
Hammarskjöld would have to consult Egyptian officials if the national composition of 
UNEF changed or expanded.  In return, Nasser not only respected Hammarskjöld‘s 
representation of multilateral interests, but Nasser also catered to those interests by 
promising not to evict UNEF personnel without referring the matter to the UN General 
Assembly.
640
  Each party respected the interests of the other on a fundamental level. 
 
XI 
 
As the situation in Suez moved from acrimonious to accommodating, the situation 
in Hungary became more volatile.  The cease-fire and withdrawal of Soviet forces from 
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Hungary, that began being implemented by 29-30 October, broke down over the course 
of a few hours.  The short-lived cease-fire allowed Soviet forces to reorganize and re-
deploy within Hungary.    By 2 November, Soviet military strength inside Hungary, 
measuring between 75,000 and 200,000 soldiers and 1,600 to 4,000 tanks, began a bloody 
and methodical march back towards Budapest.
641
 
With the resumption of hostilities, a second round of diplomatic activity at the 
United Nations ensued.  Beginning on 1 November, Imre Nagy, Hungary‘s Prime 
Minister, cabled Hammarskjöld proclaiming Hungary‘s neutrality and negation of its 
Warsaw Pact alliance with the Soviet Union.  Nagy requested that the United Nations and 
―the four great Powers‖ help defend Hungary‘s neutral position.642  Meanwhile the Soviet 
Union‘s Ambassador to the UN, Arkady Sobolev, continued to insist that Soviet force 
was necessary for isolating subversive activities in Hungary sponsored by the Western 
powers.  On 3 November, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. took new action in the United Nations 
Security Council.  Lodge presented a draft resolution calling for the Soviet‘s immediate 
end to ―intervention‖ in Hungary, the Soviets‘ ending ―the introduction of additional 
forces into Hungary,‖ international recognition of Hungarian sovereignty, and UN help in 
the distribution of humanitarian aid.
643
  Not surprisingly, the Soviet delegation vetoed 
Lodge‘s proposal.  Paralleling the script followed during the UN debates relating to the 
Suez crisis, a later Security Council vote succeeded in moving debate of the Hungarian 
crisis to the General Assembly.   
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Unlike Suez, events in Hungary moved at such a pace that no proportionate 
multilateral or unilateral response could be mounted.  ―Caught by surprise and embroiled 
in the crisis over Egypt,‖ writes historian John Thompson, ―the Western powers reacted 
slowly to the thwarted Hungarian uprising.  They judged direct support to the 
revolutionaries too risky and instead settled for aiding Hungarian refugees.‖644  Keeping 
Hungary within the Soviet sphere of influence was imperative to the communists‘ 
security interests.  Once the leadership in Moscow reversed course and intervened with 
impunity, the fate of Nagy‘s government was nearly sealed.  Any Western efforts to 
exploit Hungary‘s defection from behind the Iron Curtain would have risked a wider 
confrontation directly involving the two superpowers.  The Suez crisis did not pose such 
an immediate threat to either superpower, thus allowing the UN to exert a greater degree 
of influence. 
Time also factored into determining the viability of UN intervention in the two 
crises.  Where the Suez crisis dragged on for months, the Hungarian crisis was 
suppressed in a few weeks.  Seventy-two hours after appealing to the world organization, 
Nagy‘s government struggled to survive.  The same day that Ambassador Lodge 
presented his draft resolution, Janos Kadar, one of Nagy‘s own Cabinet officials, split-off 
to form his own rival government—one friendlier to Soviet influence.  Early in the 
Sunday morning hours of 4 November, Soviet troops and tanks entered Budapest intent 
on extinguishing Nagy‘s government.  By two-o‘clock that afternoon, the last Hungarian 
radio transmissions, pleading for help against Soviet aggression, died out.  Soviet control 
re-imposed itself within Hungary over the next several days. 
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Only after these events transpired did the General Assembly convene.  Lodge 
continued pressing for UN action on behalf of Nagy‘s government.  He recalled how the 
Soviet Union itself had initially supported Nagy and acquiesced to his new ―‗liberal 
socialist government.‘‖  Lodge pointed out the peculiar creation of a rival government at 
the exact moment that the Soviets began their invasion.  Lodge concluded that Nagy 
remained the legitimate leader of Hungary and that, therefore, the United Nations should 
act upon his calls for assistance. 
UN delegates from America‘s NATO allies supported Lodge‘s conclusions.  Sir 
Pierson Dixon of Great Britain called for an ―immediate cease-fire‖ as a ―first step‖ in 
assisting Hungary.  Canada‘s Lester Pearson, the architect of the UNEF, proposed that a 
similar UN force be deployed to Hungary.
645
  These proposals came too late to be of any 
help to Nagy.  Sobolev responded by saying that the Nagy government actually 
represented counter-revolutionary elements responsible for repressing the peoples‘ will.  
Elaborating upon his point, Sobolev said, ―The government of Nagy fell apart, and the 
Revolutionary Peasants and Workers Government has been set up.  [This new 
government] includes some members of the Nagy Cabinet who remain true to the 
Hungarian people.‖646  Compared to the French and British attempt in the UN to present 
their actions in Suez as a fait accompli, the Soviets had succeeded in presenting the 
Hungarian situation in precisely such a context. 
Sobolev also attempted to seize the diplomatic initiative only to be outflanked by 
the General Assembly‘s recommendations.  Further discussion of the Hungarian 
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situation, Sobolev argued, favored ―Fascist elements‖ opposing the interests of the 
Hungarian people.  Because Britain, France, and the United States sponsored the 
continuation of debate, the Soviet Ambassador declared that the whole matter was a ploy 
to distract the United Nations from the abuses occurring in Egypt.
647
  By the end of the 
second emergency session, the General Assembly agreed upon a resolution insisting that 
the Soviet Union end its intervention in Hungary, empowering the secretary general to 
investigate matters surrounding the Hungarian issue, and requesting that the Hungarian 
government permit UN observers into Hungary. 
Opportunities to capitalize on these terms disappeared when British and French 
forces invaded Egypt on 5 November.  World public opinion fixated on Egypt throughout 
the most crucial period of the Hungarian crisis.  In the eyes of many specialists, the 
escalating Suez War was a greater threat to world peace.  As historian Richard Miller put 
it, ―Hungary was strictly a big-power struggle and [Hammarskjöld‘s] influence could not 
have materially changed it.‖  The confusion and rapidly changing circumstances, such as 
Nagy‘s initial triumph followed by his government‘s precipitous demise, made UN 
participation difficult to define.
648
  After nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Suez crisis 
remained in a fluctuating state where governments sought to shape world opinion.  Nagy 
and the Hungarian crisis enjoyed no such honeymoon.  During the General Assembly 
debates on the Hungarian crisis, UN delegates from Asian and African countries 
remained silent.  Several nations, including Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Saudi 
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Arabia, and Yugoslavia abstained from voting on the 4 November resolution.
649
  Had 
they objected to the Soviet‘s repressive measures more vehemently there is little basis 
that it would have altered the outcome.  Soviet military dominance was so swift and 
complete that more organized protest could have continued to have been ignored. 
 
XII 
 
The blistering pace of events occurring at the height of the Suez crisis and the 
Hungarian crisis revealed the extent to which national interests had marginalized the 
broader diversity not only between generalized spheres of influence, but also within 
them.  Khrushchev grappled with the consequences of his earlier policies sooner and for a 
more prolonged period than his Western counterparts.  Khrushchev‘s attempt to usurp 
reform agendas proved to be more successful in Poland than in Hungary.  Wladyslaw 
Gomulka‘s return to power in Warsaw and Imre Nagy‘s return in Budapest gave the 
Kremlin leadership pause, but only to varying degrees.  Where Gomulka yielded quickly 
to renewed Soviet imposition, Nagy‘s government defiantly called the Soviets‘ bluff.  By 
doing so, the progressives in Hungary at least exposed the Soviets‘ utter disrespect for 
representing a more inclusive array of interests. 
The Suez crisis and the subsequent Suez War served the same purpose for the 
leading Western powers.  After the full extent of British, French, and Israeli complicity 
began to unfold, attention turned to monopolizing international opinion to condone or 
condemn military intervention.  In addition to alienating the United States from its 
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staunchest NATO allies, the efforts to occupy the UN‘s attention also fractured the 
British, French, and Israeli alliance.  British Ambassador to the UN, Pierson Dixon, 
sought to soften British policies by portraying British intervention as necessary for 
securing global trade or acting as a vanguard for future UN action.  Meanwhile, Israeli 
Ambassador Abba Eban delivered a blunt ultimatum to the world body—to either support 
Israel‘s cause or the cause of Israel‘s enemies. 
For the UN Secretary General, the deliberation with which respected Western 
powers associated their own interests with multilateral interests was intolerable.  In his 31 
October speech to the Security Council, Hammarskjöld admonished any effort to 
circumvent the principles of the UN Charter.  The head of the United Nations had no 
alternative other than to assume that all member states agreed to and abided by the 
principles.  Governments that abused that assumption or used the means of UN principles 
to secure nationally-interested ends threatened the UN‘s purpose as well as its legitimacy. 
Fortunately, Hammarskjöld‘s warning was heeded.  The Yugoslavian delegation‘s 
recommendation to move debate to the UN General Assembly under the ―Uniting for 
Peace‖ resolution helped the organization to retain the initiative.  Though limited in 
scope, Henry Cabot Lodge‘s draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire was 
popular but unattainable without significant changes to the status quo ante bellum.  Lester 
Pearson‘s draft resolution calling for insertion of a UN Emergency Force addressed the 
dire need for greater border security between Egypt and Israel.  Arthur Lall‘s proposed 
resolution for Hammarskjöld to organize the UNEF helped ease skepticism regarding the 
force‘s objectivity. 
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Peacekeeping strategies developed and implemented over the next several days in 
early November 1956 bridged several divides simultaneously.  First, it tempered the     
reluctance of those UN members who questioned the limits of the American proposal.  
Creating new structures to guarantee peace encouraged more genuine support for the 
cease-fire.  The war signified a changing status quo and a new approach addressed those 
changes.  Second, the influx of more multilateral input responded indirectly to British, 
French, and Israeli skepticism of, if not down-right loathing for, international action.  
While still difficult for these aggressors to digest, UN-led peacekeeping remained a 
benign instrument that helped diffuse tensions. 
Interestingly, numerous sources credit various national leaders with these 
innovations.  British Prime Minister Anthony Eden commends himself.  Others praise the 
Eisenhower administration.  Indeed, in at least one particular meeting with Arab 
ambassadors, U.S. leadership in resolving the Suez crisis was considered to be 
imperative.  Yet, lingering questions undermine the extent of the Eisenhower 
administration‘s involvement.  For example, if U.S. officials had proposed creation of the 
UNEF in private consultations, why would America‘s Ambassador to the UN, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr., propose superfluous UN resolutions that could potentially compete with 
the UNEF for legitimacy and funding?  If this idea was central to American policy-
making, why would Lodge jeopardize the UNEF‘s popularity by following up with two 
highly-unpopular draft resolutions of his own?  Also noteworthy are the differences in 
postwar structure between the UNEF and Lodge‘s second of two proposals.  Where 
administration of the UNEF rested with UN officials directly, Lodge‘s securing of the 
Suez Canal involved the creation of a three-nation panel reminiscent of recommendations 
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harkening back to the London Conferences.  Lodge‘s ideas lacked the broad consensus 
that Pearson‘s and Lall‘s proposals enjoyed.  The Arab world, as well as more 
dependable allies such as the Philippine delegation, frowned on Lodge‘s agenda. 
The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 4 November led the European powers to 
a similar, albeit more severe, repudiation.  Within Eden‘s own government, consensus 
disintegrated.  Opposition came from those most responsible for spear-heading the 
invasion, including Cabinet-level Naval and Air Force ministers, Eden‘s political 
opposition also mobilized.  Hugh Gaitskell torpedoed any and every attempt Eden made 
to justify armed intervention.  Doubts also surrounded the legal authority Eden had in 
upholding international law in the Canal Zone. 
Contrary to these developments, various international officials recognized the 
need for prompt UN action and endorsed Hammarskjöld‘s philosophical approach.  UN 
Ambassadors including Karl Eskelund, Arthur Lall, Joza Brilej, and Tingfu Tsiang 
adhered to the sacrosanctity of the UN Charter and helped provide UN officials with the 
authority necessary for reestablishing peace.  Dag Hammarskjöld, Ralph Bunche, and 
General E.L.M. Burns moved rapidly to facilitate the UNEF‘s success.  In doing so, 
Hammarskjöld negotiated with Nasser directly and enacted the ―good faith‖ agreements.  
Perhaps more than any other single event throughout the Suez crisis, these agreements 
represent the unassailable value of multilateralist diplomacy.  Hammarskjöld honored 
Egyptian sovereignty.  Nasser respected UNEF‘s peace-keeping mission and the General 
Assembly‘s jurisdiction over determining when that mission had been accomplished. 
Sadly, multilateral consensus began dissolving shortly after the deployment of 
UN peacekeepers to the Canal Zone and the Sinai Peninsula.  The Soviet Union crushed 
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Hungarian opposition within roughly forty-eight hours after renewing attacks on Nagy‘s 
government.  Despite a new round of debate and activity in the UN General Assembly, 
the speed with which the Red Army accomplished its mission left no doubt as to the fate 
of Hungarian sovereignty or Soviet dominance. On the contrary, Soviet leaders had 
learned valuable lessons from the Suez crisis and their own experiences following 
Khrushchev‘s ―secret speech.‖  Rather than fight to define their unilateral legitimacy, the 
Soviet leaders created a rival Hungarian government challenging Nagy‘s claim of 
representing the will of the Hungarian people.  In doing so, the Kremlin devised more 
effective strategies for fusing multilateral diplomacy seamlessly with national interests.  
After the Suez crisis abated, Arab and Western leaders enacted similar strategies of their 
own. 
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Chapter V 
 
The Image of Inclusiveness: Responses to Multilateral Diplomacy 
and its Effects on International Relations, 1956 to the 1960s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1958, Hannah Arendt, one of the world‘s leading political theorists, published a 
book that examined the precarious status of humanity.  The sum of all human 
―experience,‖ she declared, can be understood so long as it can be shared.650  During the 
perilous days when the Suez crisis reached its crescendo, the international community 
had shared in successfully resolving the immediate conflict.  The multilateral measures 
taken through the UN General Assembly established a more viable sense of international 
security.  Unfortunately, this sentiment began dissipating almost as soon as Dag 
Hammarskjöld and his staff began acting on General Assembly recommendations. Many 
delegates interpreted the resolution of the Suez crisis as justification for the continued 
pursuit of national interests that had done so much to escalate the crisis.  Paralleling the 
developments of the nineteenth century, the national leaders of 1956 and beyond sought 
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new avenues through which unilateral interests could become synonymous with a greater 
sense of multilateral legitimacy.  As experienced during the Suez crisis, attempts to use 
national interests as a basis for multilateralism intensified international crises that the 
United Nations was charged with resolving.  Investigation of the immediate aftermath of 
the Suez crisis, the policies implemented, and the long-term consequences demonstrate 
how UN influence and prestige declined as governments began pursuing their interests 
through other international organizations. 
Analyzing these new patterns not only adds to the historical significance of the 
Suez crisis, but it also helps broaden understanding of the increased reliance on various 
institutions in international affairs.  As International Relations specialist John Ikenberry 
put it, ―international institutions [act as] constraining and connecting mechanisms 
between states.‖651  Charles Maier, a specialist in European Studies, shares the contention 
that those state officials who contribute to and instill faith in ―transnational values and 
morals‖ develop a more reserved set of foreign policies.652  Indeed, there is a degree of 
validity in these assessments.  During the Suez crisis, the United Nations served as the 
ideal example of the prudent restraint international organizations contributed to resolving 
crisis.  Reasons for constraint revolved around the UN‘s impartiality as international civil 
servants attempted to address multiple interests without allowing any single national 
interest to dominate. 
Instead of recognizing this new, highly effective role for which the United 
Nations was ideally qualified for resolving international crises, some scholars have 
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explained how individual states began addressing this new dimension in international 
affairs.  Ikenberry articulates how ceaseless quests for world power detract from the true 
value of international organizations.  ―Because power is the ultimate determinant of 
outcomes in international relations,‖ Ikenberry insists, ―institutions do not matter.‖653  
Developments occurring within the international system following the Suez crisis reveal 
a more complex relationship between institutions and governments. 
Rather than abandon organizations such as the UN, policy-makers worldwide 
sought to create institutions to rival the UN‘s multilateral legitimacy.  Government 
officials devised strategies that used private organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and quasi-governmental 
organizations not to restrain states but to more convincingly camouflage national interests 
in order to gain greater international clout.
654
  For U.S. officials, this effort represented an 
entirely new objective in the country‘s ―grand strategy.‖  Historian Paul Kennedy notes 
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how the Eisenhower administration, in particular, developed this ―very American‖ 
concept to balance domestic demands with international security concerns.
655
  While 
taking the lead on creating the United Nations following the Second World War, 
American policy-makers also established a more homogenous global economic order.  
According to economic historian Diane Kunz, ―the capitalist economic system [the 
Bretton Woods system] depended on the United States—as provider of gold, lender of 
last resort, and, crucially, military protector.‖  In return, Kunz continues, ―Bretton Woods 
furnished the United States multilateral cover under which to run the Western economic 
order.‖656  Over the course of the intervening decades, the scope of institutional collusion 
has become the accepted practice. 
International institution experts Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker make a more 
explicit connection between state and non-state actors.  While not originally created to 
work with governments, NGOs and the like ―have become exponentially more visible 
precisely in connection with governments.‖  Several scholars of NGO activities concur.  
According to John Clark, ―Many liberal governments are co-opting NGO leaders on to 
various official bodies or commissions.‖  P.J. Simmons argues that ―the growing 
                                               
655 Paul Kennedy, ―American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from the European 
Experience,‖ in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1991), pp. 168-170.  Specifically, Kennedy focuses his research on the polity‘s role in maintaining a 
vigilant balance particularly between military and non-military matters.  Commonly described as the ―guns 
and butter‖ debate, the objective was to create a domestic environment with the highest standard of living 
while maintaining an optimal state of military readiness.  See also Maier, ―International Associationalism: 
The Social and Political Premises of Peacemaking After 1917 and 1945,‖ p. 50. 
656 Diane Kunz, ―The International Financial System and the Nation-State,‖ in From War to Peace: Altered 
Strategic Landscapes in the Twentieth Century, eds. Paul Kennedy and William Hitchcock (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 220.  According to economist, Joan Spero, countries of the developing 
world grew ―increasingly dissatisfied with the [Bretton Woods] system that affected their economies but 
excluded them from its management and from what they felt was an equitable share of its wealth.‖  See 
Joan Spero, The Politics of International Relations, Third Edition (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1985), p. 
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influence of NGOs are not in the field but in the arena of public opinion and the corridors 
of power.‖657  The United Nations was not one of these beneficiaries. 
 In the wake of the Suez crisis and the extended emergency session debates, the 
UN‘s corps of international civil servants competed more aggressively with the 
governments of the world for distinction as curators of multilateral legitimacy.  Officials 
of virtually all nationalities launched various campaigns to mobilize broader international 
opinion in order to suit their own purposes.  Some Arab governments continued operating 
through the UN General Assembly, turning it into their own soapbox.  During the 
Lebanon Crisis of 1958, the United States encouraged this type of activity to warrant 
direct U.S. intervention.  As Britain aligned itself more closely with the United States, 
French officials moved to expand a supranationalist agenda and thus minimize the need 
for appealing to the United Nations.  Nasser‘s creation of the United Arab Republic 
(UAR) paralleled those actions taken by the French government.  By the time of the 
Congo Crisis, beginning in 1960, the UN‘s ability to impose itself as an international 
arbiter was extremely limited.  The member states‘ various attempts to manipulate public 
opinion and power hurt more authentic opportunities for advancing multilateral 
diplomacy.  The process was a slow one whose origins emerged as the Suez crisis began 
to abate. 
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Delegates of particular UN member states interjected exclusive interests 
throughout many of the emergency-session UN General Assembly debates pertaining to 
the Suez crisis.  As delegates from Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, and Sweden set forth a draft resolution to grant Hammarskjöld the authority to 
create the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), other members embarked on their own self-
aggrandizing campaigns.
658
  Lebanese and Libyan delegates credited Arab unity with the 
political victory that the United Nations—as a whole—had formulated.  Speaking for 
Lebanon, Edward Rizk applauded pan-Arab resiliency in the face of imperialist 
aggression and equated Egypt‘s domestic solidarity of spirit with that of American 
revolutionary Patrick Henry.  Not content with proclaiming Arab resolve, Rizk dismissed 
the General Assembly‘s contribution to ending the crisis.  ―The success the Assembly has 
had so far,‖ Rizk declared, ―is very limited indeed and does not go beyond putting an end 
temporarily to the senseless fighting.‖659  Libya‘s Fathi Abidia agreed with Rizk‘s 
assessment of Arab courage and righteousness, portraying Arabs as the agents of peace 
while casting ―colonialism and Zionism‖ as the culprits of conflict.660 
Meanwhile, British and French delegates as well as their supporters associated 
UNEF‘s deployment with their own operational success.  Members of the British 
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Commonwealth, including British Ambassador to the UN, Pierson Dixon, praised Eden‘s 
decision for creating conditions that allowed the UNEF to ―establish itself in the area.‖  
Once UN forces were in place, British and French contingents could be relieved.  
Australia‘s Ambassador to the UN, Sir Ronald Walker, deflected attention away from 
Western European intervention by blaming the Soviets and their Czechoslovakian arms 
deal for triggering the Suez crisis.  French Ambassador to the UN, Louis de Guiringaud, 
pointed out that the French government had originally proposed the idea of creating an 
―international army‖ as early as 1919 at the Paris Peace conference.661 
These efforts to be counted among the multilaterally-minded had their limits, 
however.  French, British, and British Commonwealth responses to an Asian-African 
draft resolution calling for the immediate extraction of French and British forces from 
Egypt were less enthusiastic.
662
  Dixon, Walker, and de Guiringuad argued that the 
proposal was redundant.  Hammarskjöld‘s creation of the UNEF implied removal of all 
other combatants.  Dixon and de Guiringuad went on to question the General Assembly‘s 
jurisdiction over peacekeeping operations.  As representatives of two of the world‘s great 
powers, these two ambassadors said that such matters should be debated in the Security 
Council.
663
  The trend towards restricting debate over the peacekeeping process mirrored 
that of the diplomatic maneuverings that occurred in late October 1956 as the same 
delegates labored to keep debate from spilling into the General Assembly in the first 
place.  Dixon and his French colleague were also loath to acknowledge any gap between 
their countries‘ unilateral intervention and the installation of the UNEF. 
                                               
661 ORGA, Eleventh Session, ES-1, 7 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.567, pp. 111-114. 
662 This draft resolution is commonly referred to as the ―nineteen-power resolution.‖ 
663
 ORGA, Eleventh Session, ES-1, 7 November 1956, Doc. A/PV.567, pp. 113-115. 
277 
 
The same day that these exchanges took place in the General Assembly, Israeli 
Prime Minster David Ben-Gurion began his own public relations campaign.  During a 
speech before the Knesset, Ben-Gurion described Israel‘s military dominance as 
beneficial not only for the country‘s ―security and internal tranquility,‖ but also for ―our 
external relations on the world scene.‖  ―Israel,‖ he continued, ―has confined itself to 
safeguarding its rights in the international waterway and world public opinion has 
supported this demand.‖  Moments before associating Israel‘s national interests with 
world opinion, however, Ben-Gurion criticized Britain, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union for appeasing Egypt‘s ―Fascist‖ regime.664  Outbursts such as this one weakened 
the already feeble influence Israel held with the United States, Soviet Union, and United 
Nations.
665
  Ben-Gurion continued the perplexing practice of chastising members of the 
international community for their timidity while simultaneously fusing Israel‘s national 
aspirations together with the interests of the international community. 
Interestingly, both Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and President 
Eisenhower developed similar attitudes in the aftermath of the Suez crisis.  Nasser 
interpreted Arab ―victory‖ in the crisis as justification of his authority over Egypt and 
throughout the Arab world.  As political scientists Adeed Dawisha and William Zartman 
put it, ―Through skillful and effective use of his propaganda machine, Nasser created in 
the minds of his people an image of himself as the first genuinely local hero who not only 
had dared to defy the might of the West, but had actually won.‖  ―From then on,‖ 
Dawisha and Zartman argue, ―Nasser‘s legitimacy as Egypt‘s president, and the 
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legitimacy of the political order which he had created were not to be questioned.‖666  As 
discussed earlier, Nasser‘s control of universities by the mid-1950s silenced ―the 
country‘s leading source of opposition activism.‖  By 1958, board members of Egypt‘s 
professional associations were required to become members of Nasser‘s ruling political 
party.
667
  Nasser hoped that such unanimity of opinion would spread to encompass 
regional ethnic loyalties, too. 
Almost precisely when Nasser presumed to speak for his fellow Arabs, his appeal 
was beginning to erode.  Nasser‘s claim to represent pan-Arab interests encountered 
turbulence as the Arab League convened in Beirut on 13 November 1956.  The League‘s 
agenda at this meeting covered the Suez crisis, Arab concerns regarding increased Soviet 
influence in the Middle East, and the need for increased Arab unity.  As historian Richard 
Miller argues, some attendees understood the last point of discussion as a ―backhanded 
slap‖ at Nasser‘s snubbing of the pan-Arab community when he nationalized the Suez 
Canal.
668
  The Arab community was caught in a frustrating conundrum between not 
wanting to endorse Nasser‘s unilateral means to achieve pan-Arab ends and not wanting 
to miss an opportunity to humiliate Western imperial powers. 
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II 
 
The Eisenhower administration faced a similar situation.  On the international 
stage, Eisenhower advocated an expanded role for the United Nations.  During a 14 
November press conference, he seemed receptive to the prospect of using the United 
Nations as an independent institution not only in preserving Arab autonomy from threats 
of Soviet subversion, but also in assuming a larger role in world affairs.  Later, however, 
a White House official amended the president‘s remarks saying that the United States 
should remain at the forefront of containing communism.  By implication, this single 
exception nullified any potential opportunity for expanding the UN‘s role.669 
With regard to the Middle East, the Eisenhower administration had little need for 
the United Nations.  In a 27 November letter to England‘s (iconic) former Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill, President Eisenhower revealed the depth to which national interests 
pervaded his thinking.  First, Eisenhower focused attention on communist infiltration as 
―the real enemy‖ upon which all other factors in the Middle East were measured.  
Second, he hoped to rehabilitate ―British prestige‖ in the region to assist in curtailing 
communism‘s appeal in Arab countries.  Lastly, he wanted to cushion Britain‘s energy 
and economic upheavals resulting from the Suez Canal‘s closure.670  Aided by fears of oil 
shortages in Western Europe, the Suez crisis debased the value of the British pound as 
investors sought safety in the more stable U.S. dollar.
671
  Motivated by his own agenda 
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and encouraged by his British allies, Eisenhower disregarded Arab sentiments and risked 
re-igniting the conflict that UN peacekeepers were in the process of mediating.  The 
president‘s obsession with communism led him to endorse an ill-fated policy of siding 
with a one-time imperialist power in a region that despised not only the Western 
imperialist legacy, but also any unwelcome intervention from foreign countries. 
The multilateral factors that had helped resolve the Suez crisis yielded to the 
prevailing mindset through which crisis and conflict had intensified.  As UNEF troops 
began arriving in Egypt to physically diffuse the situation, the key participants 
responsible for escalating the crisis had already begun ignoring the UN‘s efforts that had 
led to the deployment of the peacekeeping force.  The insensitivity Israeli, Egyptian, and 
American officials exhibited towards international diversity both between and within 
blocs, as well as towards the accomplishments of pluralistic peace-making, meant that 
one of the most valuable lessons emerging from the crisis went unheeded.   
Fear of threats to America‘s national interests in the Middle East following the 
Suez crisis led Eisenhower to pursue an increasingly interventionist policy.  According to 
historians Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, Eisenhower and Dulles were 
determined to thwart any Soviet infiltration into the Middle East ―‗vacuum‘‖ following 
the exit of British and French forces by 27 December 1956.  Ambrose and Brinkley note 
how the term used to describe the situation in the region ―infuriated Arabs.‖672  Depicting 
the Middle East as a political void served as another example of the West‘s disregard for 
Arab nationalist sentiments.  To prevent communist exploitation, White House officials 
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drafted and edited what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine in December 
1956.  Two days before its public unveiling on 5 January 1957 before a joint session of 
Congress, Eisenhower shared his doctrine with Saudi Arabia‘s King Saud signifying his 
elevated status as the West‘s newest ally in the Middle East.  The doctrine declared that 
communist subversion in the Middle East ―would undermine the foundations of 
international peace and hence the security of the United States.‖  To bolster the region‘s 
sovereign countries and protect them against communism‘s spread, Eisenhower asked 
Congress to extend economic and military aid to states looking to stimulate development 
and strengthen self-defense.
673
  Though more subtle in its approach, the Eisenhower 
doctrine followed a similar course to that of early American policies attempting to 
incorporate Middle Eastern countries into a defensive pact arrayed against communism 
and receptive to Western influence. 
Nasser remained skeptical.  Within days of hearing the president‘s speech, Nasser 
derided the Eisenhower doctrine as a veiled attack on Arab nationalism because 
international communism was nearly non-existent in the Arab world.  Adding to Nasser‘s 
concerns, Harold Macmillan succeeded Anthony Eden as Britain‘s Prime Minister on 9 
January 1957.
674
  Under Macmillan‘s leadership, Britain supported American foreign 
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policy objectives more readily.  Some historians argue that American officials 
―indirectly‖ influenced British politics making Macmillan prime minister and thus 
making Britain a ―junior partner‖ in fulfilling U.S. interests in the Middle East.675  By 
early February 1957, U.S. officials including Secretary of State Dulles fed Nasser‘s 
suspicions by broadening President Eisenhower‘s initial proclamation to guard against 
any ―type of nationalism which would lead to a loss of independence [in the Middle 
East].‖676  For close to the next decade and a half, writes historian Douglas Little, U.S. 
foreign policy ―hoped to exorcise the demon of Nasserism and shield pro-Western 
regimes from revolutionary change.‖677  Instead of ameliorating these tensions, Nasser 
and Eisenhower used the conditions in the region to justify their own mutually exclusive 
and antagonistic courses of action.  Eisenhower‘s policy of intervention provoked Nasser 
into reiterating calls for Arab solidarity against non-Arab incursions, which amplified 
America‘s need more for direct regional involvement.  
Some politicians and scholars picked up on the disconcerting effects the 
Eisenhower doctrine could have on the international system.  As Congress debated 
Eisenhower‘s new Middle East policy, Representative Stewart Udall (D-AZ) read a 
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published critique of the doctrine into the congressional record.  Authored by esteemed 
scholar and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the article criticized the president‘s policy for 
its ―moralism‖ and ―vagueness‖ and for the corrosive influence these factors had upon 
global realities.  Niebuhr argued that Eisenhower‘s ―grand solution‖ favored the ―power 
and comfort of [the United States]‖ at the expense of ―the troubles and turmoils of the 
world at large.‖678  Throughout its long history, the Suez Canal symbolized the mistaking 
of national interests for global interests.  As the world emerged from the Suez crisis, 
according to Niebuhr, the United States seemed poised to repeat the error.  Niebuhr also 
took his assessment a step farther by implying that this misrepresentation became the 
basis for constructing, in this particular case, American foreign policy. 
Eisenhower‘s policy ignored more pressing matters facing the international 
community.  Socio-economic development, national self-determination, and non-
alignment provided the context through which many leaders, such as Nasser, understood 
the international arena.  Yet, America‘s Cold War context and attempts to associate the 
needs of the developing world to it undermined the very nature of the challenges facing 
countries attempting to plot an independent course in world affairs.  With regard to the 
Middle East, the Eisenhower administration created its own context for foreign policy-
making rather than basing its actions on the immediate concerns that faced the region and 
its population. 
A similar mindset beset the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  During 
the NATO Council meetings of 1956 and 1957, members agreed to consult with their 
allies within the organization to coordinate responses pertaining to ―out-of-area 
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issues.‖679  NATO scholar, John Milloy contends that ―When a dispute arose between 
two or more members that could not be settled directly, they were obligated to involve 
NATO before submission to any other international agency.‖680  Developments such as 
these did not bode well for the United Nations‘ ability to maintain multilateral diplomacy.  
 
III 
 
Independent of NATO, European leaders also began defining in greater detail the 
context by which they would interact with the rest of the international community.  In 
comparing British and French foreign policies, historian William Hitchcock contends that 
France favored plans for supranational integration.  Prior examples include the Marshall 
Plan‘s creation of regional institutions to organize Europe‘s economic recovery efforts in 
1948 and the European Coal and Steel Community‘s (ECSC) synchronization of 
economic interests for France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries in 1951.
681
  
Throughout the 1950s, French officials came to understand that their national security 
and economic recovery lay in reconciliation with Germany more than associating with 
the United States. 
Soon after the Suez crisis, French and other European officials rededicated 
themselves to European integration.  The 1957 Treaty of Rome expanded commercial, 
social, and cultural collaboration among ECSC members by establishing the European 
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Economic Community (EEC).  The central focus of the EEC, or ―Common Market,‖ 
promoted the free flow of goods among its members at the expense of those states outside 
the community.  The treaty created ―Trans-European Networks‖ that integrated the 
EEC‘s ―transportation, telecommunications, and energy infrastructures.‖  Additionally, 
the six European states sought closer social and cultural ties.  Socially, the community 
sought improved labor and educational opportunities.  Members looked to raise living 
standards and improve employment opportunities through contributions made to ―a 
European Social Fund.‖  In education, exchanges of information and experience 
combined with greater student mobility were designed to enhance the ―European 
dimension in education.‖  Greater social cooperation meant the ―cultural heritage of 
European significance‖ would be preserved.682  Matters involving ―international 
organizations‖ were referred to the EEC Commission which served as an intermediary on 
behalf of its member states.  Where self-interest prevailed, a paradox soon followed. 
While EEC members banded together for mutual benefit based on exclusion, on 
the one hand, they professed continued support for the international community as a 
whole.  For example, members encouraged the economic and social ―integration of the 
developing countries into the world community.‖683  Yet, EEC members remained 
determined to dictate the terms by which this was to happen. 
Like the British involvement in the Baghdad Pact of 1955, where London officials 
looked to retain some degree of influence in Middle Eastern affairs and do so at the 
expense of the U.S. and its interests in facilitating a collective security agreement to 
contain communism, French officials sought to use the EEC in a similar way.  According 
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to John Hargreaves, author of Decolonization in Africa, ―[although] the expenses of aid 
and commercial preference were diffused among France‘s partners in the EEC, the franc 
zone was preserved and substantial credits distributed through the [EEC‘s] Ministry of 
Co-operation [were manipulated by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
French President.]‖684  Specifically, the French government benefited from EEC funds 
devoted to the development of non-self-governing territories.  While responsible for 
contributing nearly thirty-five percent of the total sum, French dependencies received 
over eighty-five percent of the outlays.  Other members of the EEC accepted these 
conditions in exchange for French concessions on other matters.
685
 
The anti-colonial faction of the international community was less compliant.  
Beginning in October 1957, the UN General Assembly debated the potential effects the 
Treaty of Rome could have on the process of decolonization.  The Afro-Asian bloc 
within the UN worried that the Common Market would hamper efforts encouraging 
African industrialization in both dependent territories and independent states.  These 
delegates also expressed concern over the potential eclipsing of African economic 
interests by those of the European-dominated Common Market.
686
  Much like Nasser‘s 
fear of ―collective colonialism‖ regarding international control of the Suez Canal, similar 
concerns arose over African integration into a European economic order. 
Delegates from EEC countries and the United States attempted to allay these 
apprehensions.  As they did so, however, they undermined the integrity of the United 
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Nations as a forum for multilateral diplomacy.  Western delegates argued that the 
Common Market would promote ―‗economic development of the African territories‘‖ and 
thus promote ―mutual interest.‖  Betraying their own concerns about the setting of these 
debates, Western delegates questioned the UN‘s authority as a forum for such 
discussions.  The U.S. delegation stated that debates pertaining to ―the operation of the 
Common Market [should be left to] the GATT organization.‖687 
This mentality reflected the West‘s growing discontent with the United Nations 
and initiatives taken to circumnavigate its jurisdiction.  For example, while the Treaty of 
Rome promised to comply with UN principles, the treaty reserved the right ―to promote 
[the Community‘s] overall harmonious development . . . leading to the strengthening of 
[the Community‘s] economic and social cohesion.‖688  As NATO members established 
guidelines that orchestrated decision-making and policy-making in matters of Western 
security concerns, members of the EEC took parallel steps in matters of commerce, 
education, labor, and culture.  Such structures parallel those that already existed within 
the United Nations.  With such redundancy, nations could challenge more inclusive 
organizations such as the UN while continuing to represent a broader, international 
interest. 
Put another way, individual heads of state may have been committed to UN 
principles, but they reserved the right to construct their own policies to enforce these 
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principles.  Leaders often justified an unpopular course of action by presenting it as a 
defensive measure.  The prime ministers of Britain and France invaded Egypt to protect 
international trade.  Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion justified the invasion of 
Egypt in part by calling it a preemptive defensive measure taken against the fedayeen.  
The Eisenhower Doctrine was the latest manifestation of this trend of rationalizing 
unilateral national decisions as necessary defensive measures to protect peace. 
When President Eisenhower deferred to UN principles, he did so only in so far as 
the principles remained beholden to an American context.  One example of this involved 
Israeli policies put into effect in early 1957.  As the UNEF established a buffer between 
Egyptian and Israeli forces, a majority of Israelis resented withdrawing back across the 
Sinai Peninsula and returning to their original borders.  Reluctant to give up their gains, 
Israeli policy-makers sought to exchange territory for unobstructed maritime passage 
through the Strait of Tiran and security concessions that protected Israel‘s administrative 
interests in the Gaza Strip to thwart future fedayeen attacks.
689
  Negotiations between the 
United Nations and Israel stalled in early February 1957 when Israeli forces refused to 
evacuate from these two areas considered so vital to their security concerns.  As General 
Burns, commander of UNEF put it, ―Israel thus defied the opinion of the world, as 
expressed by the General Assembly.‖690 
Although substantial numbers of Americans and their elected representatives 
sympathized with Israel‘s security concerns, the Eisenhower administration kept its 
dispassionate distance.  During a 20 February speech, Eisenhower made his perspective 
clear.  ―Britain and France have withdrawn their forces from Egypt.  Thereby they 
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showed respect for the opinions of mankind.‖  Later in a televised address, the president 
declared the following: 
If we [Americans] agree that armed attack can properly achieve the 
purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of 
international order. . . .  If the United Nations once admits that 
international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have 
destroyed the very foundation of the organization, and our best hope for 
establishing a real world order.
691
 
 
While Eisenhower‘s expression of support for UN principles was valuable, it was 
compromised by the Chief Executive‘s new Middle East policy.  The Eisenhower 
Doctrine‘s heavy emphasis on military aid helped facilitate the use of force to maintain 
international peace acceptable to U.S. security concerns.  This kind of logic paralleled the 
thinking of British and French officials who had made similar proclamations in an effort 
to legitimize their intervention in Suez. 
The double standard developing between multilateral ends and the unilateral 
means used to achieve those ends ignored the conditions that make ―armed attack‖ more 
likely.  Similar to the Soviets‘ Czech arms deal of 1955, the introduction of U.S. weapons 
under the Eisenhower Doctrine stood poised to re-ignite a regional arms race.  Dulles‘s 
expansion of the doctrine to include not only communist threats, but also Arab nationalist 
actions meant that the chances for greater volatility grew exponentially.  Future 
instability in the Middle East would no longer be relegated to an Arab-Israeli dispute.  In 
essence, Eisenhower and several other world leaders cloaked their own national security 
interests in UN principles, which undermined the legitimacy of the United Nations.  John 
Ikenberry‘s concept of international organizations acting as institutions of restraint was 
waning in the months and years following the Suez crisis.  While Eisenhower deserves 
                                               
691
 Quoted in Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, p. 251. 
290 
 
some credit for recognizing the importance multilateral diplomacy played in the Suez 
crisis and weighing the alternatives stemming from it, the conclusions he drew remained 
self-serving.  Eighteen months later the usurpation of multilateralism to reflect self-
interest contributed to a new crisis in Lebanon. 
 
IV 
 
Much like the Suez crisis, political tensions in Lebanon escalated as a result of the 
excesses of competing national interests.  By February 1958, Nasser‘s pan-Arab 
philosophy spread to Syria culminating in an Egyptian-Syrian alliance known as the 
United Arab Republic (UAR).
692
  News of this unified, supernationalist front split 
opinion all across the Arab world.  The Iraqis and Jordanians, grew apprehensive and 
formed their own Arab Federation.  Other Arabs, from all across the Middle East 
including many Lebanese Muslims, rallied to Nasser‘s ideology.  Within months, 
regional political tensions accentuated Lebanon‘s domestic political problems which 
pitted the country‘s Christian President and his supporters against the majority Muslim 
populace.  President Camille Chamoun rejected allegiance to either of these new pan-
Arab unions and, instead, re-affirmed his country‘s commitment to principles found in 
                                               
692 Interestingly, according to historian Roby Barrett, Nasser justified his action ―to prevent a Communist 
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both the United Nations and Arab League Charters.
693
  These perspectives and 
Chamoun‘s efforts to extend his term as president upset the country‘s pro-Nasser 
supporters.
694
  Civil war erupted in May 1958. 
Instability in Lebanon cascaded throughout the international community.  Despite 
its preference for a diplomatic solution to the Lebanese crisis, the Eisenhower 
administration voiced its willingness to intervene militarily if the crisis escalated.  
Eisenhower‘s senior staff reached this consensus as early as 13 May 1958.695  Historian 
Erika Alin argues that the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to use the Eisenhower 
Doctrine as the basis for intervention in Lebanon and attached certain ―conditions‖ 
President Chamoun was to meet before American military deployment.  Among these 
criteria, the Lebanese government was ―to file an official complaint of its grievances 
regarding [UAR] interference in its affairs with the United Nations Security Council.‖696  
While seemingly altruistic, Eisenhower‘s deference towards the UN during the Lebanon 
crisis actually undermined the integrity of the international organization by having the 
world organization serve to legitimize America‘s unilateral intervention.  After the Suez 
crisis, American policymakers were becoming particularly adept at creating these 
conditions.  In essence, officials in Washington wanted the best of all possible worlds. 
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Proceedings in the UN did not follow the Eisenhower administration‘s script.  By 
early June, both Lebanese and UAR officials turned to the United Nations to raise 
awareness and garner support for their respective positions.  Dr. Charles Malik, 
Lebanon‘s Foreign Minister, appealed to the UN Security Council for help in neutralizing 
rebel support from the UAR.  Reports of cross-border infiltrations and gun smuggling 
from neighboring Syria turned the civil war into a regional conflict undermining 
Lebanon‘s national sovereignty.  In presenting the UAR‘s argument, Egyptian Foreign 
Minister Omar Loutfi accused the Lebanese government of attempting to distract 
domestic and world public opinion from Chamoun‘s political power-grab.697  At the 
conclusion of these UN Security Council hearings, members agreed to a Swedish 
proposal calling for the secretary general to send an observation team to Lebanon to 
investigate reports of outside interference and deliver its findings to the Security Council.  
Tensions increased dramatically when pro-Nasserist forces in Iraq seized control 
of the country in mid-July 1958.  According to historian L.J. Butler, this revolution posed 
an even greater threat to British and, more broadly, Western interests in the region than 
did the Suez crisis.  Strategically, the Baghdad Pact was subject to dissolution.  
Economically, the generous oil concessions that Western interests had established with 
the Iraq Petroleum Company could be subject to nationalization.
698
  British and American 
officials feared that Iraq‘s revolution was the start of a pan-Arab domino theory.699     
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The next day, 15 July, American Marines landed in Lebanon.  President 
Eisenhower began his address to the American people by clarifying that American 
military forces were deployed at President Chamoun‘s request.  In notifying Congress, 
Eisenhower said that American motives showed ―concern‖ for Lebanese independence 
―which [the U.S.] deems vital to the national interest and world peace.‖700  In addition to 
perpetuating the tendency to unite national interests with international harmony, the 
president‘s unilateral action rested upon the general premise of the Eisenhower Doctrine.  
According to one anonymous U.S. government official, legal justification for intervention 
in Lebanon lay in the Mansfield Amendment inserted into the doctrine‘s preamble.  The 
amendment credited to Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) stated that ―the United States 
regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the 
independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East.‖701  In many respects, this 
amendment reflected the sentiments expressed in Dulles‘s corollary to the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, which authorized implementation of the policy if either communist or Arab 
nationalist threats interfered with American interests in the region.  Yet, as historian 
Richard Miller points out, ―the intervention could not be justified under the provisions 
spelled out in the operative sections of the Doctrine.‖  Only proof of armed interference 
from states compliant with international communism could justify the deployment of 
American forces.
702
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Unconcerned with these discrepancies, the Executive Branch moved ahead with 
building consensus for military intervention in Lebanon.  President Eisenhower and his 
senior staff sought endorsement, not dialogue.  Although the president met with 
Congressional leaders the day before the landings took place, Eisenhower and his 
advisors did so to garner support for their decision rather than engage in debate.  Where 
Senators Mike Mansfield, William Fulbright (D-AR), and Speaker of the House Samuel 
Rayburn (D-TX) distinguished between pro-Nasser and communist influence, the 
president and Secretary of State Dulles considered the two linked.  By the meeting‘s 
conclusion all agreed that Eisenhower‘s actions were ―generally approved . . . as the 
best.‖703 
Leaders of the House and Senate demonstrated their compliance soon thereafter.  
During an exchange in the House of Representatives, one Congressman asked to address 
his fellow members, to which Rayburn replied, ―Not if it is controversial.  The Chair is 
not going to recognize Members to talk about foreign affairs in this critical situation.‖704  
Contrast this mentality with the extensive debate that occurred during the Suez crisis and 
one begins to appreciate the role that the United Nations played in resolving conflict.  
Where participants at the United Nations achieved consensus through the exchange of 
viewpoints, leaders interested in protecting national interests demanded consensus 
through conformity. 
As the Lebanon crisis escalated, enlisting the United Nations to endorse a 
particular perspective proved hazardous to multilateral diplomacy.  When Eisenhower 
explained America‘s intervention to an American audience, U.S. Ambassador to the 
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United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., presented the country‘s case to the Security 
Council.  Lodge looked to transfer the matter from the U.S. to the UN as quickly as 
possible by expanding the UN‘s presence in Lebanon to include a police force.  Lodge, 
along with British and Jordanian officials, described threats to Lebanon and other 
sovereign Arab states if the United Arab Republic consolidated its gains.
705
 
Reports from the UN‘s own observers were less dire.  In presenting the observer‘s 
findings to the Security Council, as required, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld stole 
momentum from Lodge‘s call for urgent action.706  Swedish delegate Gunnar Jarring 
criticized America‘s intervention so much so that he proposed suspending UN operations 
in Lebanon.  Koto Matsudaira, Japan‘s UN representative, shared similar regret and 
believed that any compromise was the sole responsibility of the United Nations.  Soviet, 
Asian, and African officials also denounced America‘s move.707 
Within two weeks, the Security Council became mired in deadlock.  Draft 
resolutions such as America‘s bolstering the UN‘s mandate in Lebanon and the Soviet‘s 
call for America‘s immediate withdrawal reflected the unimaginative efforts of 
attempting to divert multilateral diplomacy to suit national interests.  The Swedish and 
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Japanese proposals fell victim to the permanent members‘ veto.  Motivated by public 
relations maneuvering, world leaders tried to plan an international summit on their own, 
but it too failed. 
A greater and more genuine appeal to multilateral diplomacy combined with 
political transformation within Lebanon itself helped end the crisis.  The untenable 
political climate in Lebanon meant that new elections were held almost immediately.  
General Fuad Chehab replaced Camille Chamoun as Lebanon‘s elected president on 31 
July 1958.
708
  In early August, debate within the United Nations shifted from the Security 
Council to the General Assembly under the ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution.  Similar to the 
Suez crisis of 1956, the Lebanon question of 1958 found an eager audience focused on 
compromise.  Hammarskjöld took the initiative by agreeing to have the UN observers 
play a more flexible role in Lebanon, requesting mutual re-assurance of non-aggression 
within the Arab world, and expressing support for the UN‘s involvement in Arab 
economic development.  On 21 August amidst a flurry of draft resolutions, delegates 
from the ten Arab members of the UN issued their ―Good Neighbor Resolution.‖  In 
exchange for the removal of foreign troops, Arab leaders agreed to respect Lebanese and 
Jordanian sovereignty as well as UN principles.  The General Assembly passed the 
resolution unanimously.  While critiquing these events in a news conference, New 
Zealand‘s Sir Leslie Munro proclaimed that Arab consensus emanated from ―the 
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harmonizing influence of the Assembly itself.‖709  By October 1958, the 14,000 U.S. 
troops deployed to Lebanon were removed.  While it is true that negotiations took place 
privately, the appeal to and expression of the General Assembly contributed to a more 
resilient agreement based on a more authentic attempt to engage in multilateral dialogue 
rather than imposing a prefabricated solution grounded in an ideological mindset. 
 
V 
 
The dichotomy existing between multilateral diplomacy and unilateral interests 
clashed again during the Congo crisis of the early 1960s.  Like much of the rest of the 
African continent, the Congo and its population were wrestling with attempts to transition 
from colonial rule to independence.  The Congo‘s Belgian colonial government made 
tentative gestures towards Congolese autonomy by studying possible constitutional 
reforms and allowing for ―limited municipal elections‖ by 1958.  Headway was slow and 
cumbersome at best and counter-productive at worst.  Throughout the 1950s, Congolese 
social and cultural groups served as centers for directing nationalist ideology.  As African 
specialist Edgar O‘Ballance explains, these associations served a dual purpose because 
―all political activity was banned in the Congo and the only Congolese groups that were 
permitted were those with social, cultural, or study objectives, plus low-level advising 
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committees.‖710  The restrictions conveyed the sense that Belgians in the Congo were 
sympathetic to independence so long as they directed its course. 
As seen so often throughout world affairs during the 1950s, governments sought 
to co-opt domestic organizations to create the illusion of a diversified society while 
maintaining a high degree of hegemony.  Similar to the shah‘s consolidation of political 
power during 1953 in Iran, and Nasser‘s Egyptian revolution of 1954, the restriction of 
civic associations in the Congo was the latest attempt to contain socio-political 
pressures.
711
  Because of the colonial government‘s repressive legacy in the Congo, 
however, the double standard by which it pursued decolonization undermined the 
Belgians‘ legitimacy as stewards of Congolese soveregnity.  Organizations such as the 
Alliance des Ba-Kongo (ABAKO), led by Joseph Kasavubu; the Confederation des 
Association Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) led by Moise Tshombe; and the 
Mouvement National Congolias (MNC), led by Patrice Lumumba, challenged Belgian 
rule.  In 1958, Lumumba‘s MNC represented Congolese interests at the All-African 
Peoples‘ Conference in Ghana. Early the following year, rioting erupted in the Congo 
capital of Leopoldville as a result of a volatile mix of fervent nationalist ideology and a 
two-year old economic recession that left as much as twenty-five percent of 
Leopoldville‘s workforce unemployed.712  The combination of a discredited government 
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and social unrest reduced the Belgian plan for a transition of power from several years to 
a matter of months. 
The Congo gained its independence on 30 June 1960.  The MNC won majorities 
in the newly created Senate and central assembly, guaranteeing Lumumba‘s becoming 
Prime Minister.  Joseph Kasavubu became the chief executive and head of state.
713
  
Tragically, Congolese leaders and the polity were ill-prepared for independence, leaving 
a tremendous vacuum of power.  According to Political Scientist David Gibbs, although 
nearly three-quarters of Congolese society benefited from some measure of primary 
education, only thirty people graduated from universities in the Congo in 1960.  Gibbs 
also mentions that by 1960 one person in the whole of the Congolese population had a 
law degree.
714
  These statistics did not bode well for a society that was now placed in 
charge of its own bureaucracy. 
The rush towards independence in addition to an over-burdened central 
government created severe political rifts between Lumumba‘s MNC and its rivals.  Moise 
Tshombe‘s organization, based in the Congo‘s Katanga province, was established to 
consolidate interest groups within Katanga in order to represent a more unified whole.  
As a result, Tshombe‘s ―federation of tribal and professional groups‖ felt no loyalty 
towards Lumumba‘s government.  Kasavubu also wrestled with Lumumba for greater 
control.  Distrust between these two leading governmental figures led to fissures that 
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pervaded all levels of the bureaucracy.
715
  By 5 July, various factions in the Congo sensed 
the weakness gripping the central government and began acting on their own impulses. 
More than simply devolving into a civil war, the conflict between Tshombe, 
Lumumba, and Kasavubu bordered on anarchy.  As one historian described it, Belgian 
colonial officials returned to their homeland, ―leaving a crossfire among various groups 
struggling for the succession.‖716  Mutineers in the Congolese National Army targeted 
Belgian nationals and army officers who had remained in the Congo.
717
  The legacy of 
colonial exploitation as well as economic frustrations and political factionalism 
contributed to Congolese recriminations.  The sense of ill-will spread despite the efforts 
of both Lumumba and Kasavubu to address the overwhelming sense of injustice that 
many Congolese felt.  The government‘s inability to restore order held severe 
consequences for both the Congo and the international community. 
Lumumba‘s government was also hampered by the sheer logistics of governing.  
The Congo was colossal in size.  It measured over nine hundred thousand square miles, 
making it larger than Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway combined.  The 
nearly non-existent infrastructure meant that urban centers and provinces were isolated.  
As a result, efforts to establish a cohesive sense of national unity were particularly 
daunting. 
Eager to assert his own autonomy at his rivals‘ expense, Moise Tshombe issued 
―a unilateral declaration of independence‖ for Katanga province on 11 July 1960.  
Katanga possessed a wealth of natural resources.  The province held significant amounts 
                                               
715 O‘Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998, pp. 7 and 14-15. 
716 Brands, The Devil We Knew, p. 63. 
717 See O‘Ballance, The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998, pp. 15-16; and Brands, The Devil We Knew, 
p. 63. 
301 
 
of copper, uranium, cobalt, radium, germanium, zinc, and industrial-grade diamonds.   
The mining giant, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (U.M.K.), sold $200 million worth of 
Katanga‘s minerals per year and supplied ten percent of the world‘s copper, sixty percent 
of its cobalt, and most of the world‘s radium.  The company‘s annual revenues profited 
Belgian bankers, who owned approximately forty-two percent of U.M.K.‘s shares.718  
The breakdown of law and order in the Congo threatened U.M.K. operations.  Tshombe 
understood these economic factors and asked Belgian officials for political recognition 
and military support. 
Although Western powers were hesitant to recognize Katanga‘s secession 
officially, Belgian, Western European, and American policy-makers reacted positively to 
Tshombe‘s unilateral declaration.  The reintroduction of Belgian troops to the Congo 
eased the concerns of panicked U.M.K. investors, Western European consumers of 
Katanga‘s resources, and America‘s Cold War security interests in sub-Saharan Africa.719  
According to a 9 April National Security Council report, continued exertion of Western 
European influence in West Africa remained vital to America‘s security interests 
throughout the Congo crisis and much of the process of decolonization in the early 
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1960s.
720
  Yet, the return of Belgian forces on 12 July transformed the scope and severity 
of the Congo crisis.
721
 
Lumumba countered Belgian intervention with his own calls for international 
support.  As with many events surrounding the Congo crisis, this appeal was not as 
straightforward as may have seemed.  Anxious for immediate support, some members of 
Lumumba‘s government requested direct American military intervention.  At the moment 
when Lumumba needed to present himself as the executor of Congolese sovereignty, he 
was distracted by the rampant lack of political discipline originating from within the 
ranks of his government‘s bureaucracy.  Undaunted, Lumumba‘s messages to UN 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld addressed the destabilizing effect Belgian troops 
were having in the Congo.  Lumumba blamed the Belgian government for masterminding 
Katanga‘s secession.  In a second message, Lumumba stipulated that UN forces would be 
deployed ―not to restore [the] internal situation in [the] Congo but rather to protect 
national territory‖ from Belgian encroachment.  An additional clarification stated that 
only neutral countries were to contribute to the creation of a UN force, thus eliminating 
direct American participation.
722
 
The Eisenhower administration helped Lumumba save face by denying direct 
intervention and deferring to the United Nations.  Christian Herter, the new United States 
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Secretary of State, explained to Hammarskjöld that ―‗the United States believes that any 
assistance to the government of the Congo should be through the United Nations and not 
by any unilateral action by any one country, the United States included.‘‖723  Like 
Congolese policy-makers, American officials also had to address their own self-
conflicted policies.  On the one hand, officials in Washington supported exercising 
influence through trusted Western European allies, such as the Belgian government, 
which saw a need for unilateral intervention the Congo.  On the other hand, President 
Eisenhower endorsed UN resolutions calling for the insertion of UN peacekeepers into 
the Congo, thereby disposing of the need for unilateral action.  Much like America‘s 
strategic interests in the Middle East during the early to mid-1950s, policy-makers along 
the Potomac River cloaked the execution of their own unilateral interests in Africa in 
multilateral terms.  Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon expressed these quirky 
sentiments during an 18 August National Security Council meeting.  While responding to 
a series of policy questions regarding American interests in Africa, Dillon supported ―the 
decision to provide aid to the Congo through the UN.‖  Moments later, however, as he 
assessed America‘s continued reliance on Western European nations to serve as proxy 
powers in Africa, Dillon admitted that ―it was still [America‘s] objective to get the 
Belgians back into the Congo, but whether this was practical we do not know.‖724 
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VI 
 
Seizing the opportunity to capitalize from the turbulence created by contradictory 
policies such as these, the Soviet delegation to the United Nations took immediate action 
during the UN Security Council debate on 13 July.  After the Tunisian delegate proposed 
a draft resolution calling for the removal of Belgian forces from the Congo and insertion 
of UN peacekeepers, the Soviet representative accused the United States of interfering in 
the Congo‘s domestic affairs and employing the services of United Nations‘ personnel 
including Undersecretary of the United Nations Ralph Bunche to advance Western 
interests in the region.
725
 
Several historians specializing in the Congo crisis make similar arguments.  
According to David Gibbs, Hammarskjöld became a puppet of Western interests.  
Additionally, Hammarskjöld‘s subordinate Andrew Cordier maintained strong ties with 
the U.S. State Department.
726
  Other scholars criticize Hammarskjöld for sacrificing his 
status as an impartial international civil servant.  Once the UN peacekeepers began 
arriving in the Congo, Hammarskjöld argued for a weak Congolese government that 
would remain dependent on the UN forces.  Edgar O‘Ballance describes the deployment 
of UN forces as ―Hammarskjöld‘s empire-building project.‖727  Given the international 
community‘s convincing mandate authorizing UN intervention and the chaotic conditions 
enveloping the Congo, these assessments seem excessive. 
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Reminiscent of the organizational agility Hammarskjöld displayed during the 
Suez crisis, the Secretary General maneuvered UN policy between ideological loyalties 
that infiltrated the Congo crisis.  As witnessed during the Security Council deliberations 
of 13 July, the Soviet delegation linked UN activities to Western interests.  Yet, when 
voting on the resolution to create a UN peacekeeping force, also referred to as the 
Organizations des Nations Unities au Congo (ONUC), the U.S.S.R. approved the 
resolution along with the United States.  Regardless, the Cold War divide widened as 
both Katanga‘s leader, Moise Tshombe, and Belgian government officials warned of 
communist plans to exploit the anarchy engulfing the Congo.  Tshombe portrayed 
Lumumba as a puppet of Soviet and Communist Chinese regimes.
728
  Indeed, Lumumba 
had appealed to the Soviet leadership for military aid, shortly after making a similar 
request to the United States government.
729
  Intending to represent himself as a non-
aligned nationalist and play the Superpowers off against one another, Lumumba‘s actions 
backfired.  His opportunistic gamble weakened rather than strengthened his position. 
Congolese relations with the United Nations were somewhat better, although not 
without misgivings.  Regarding the issue of Katanga‘s independence, UN officials 
refused to recognize the province‘s sovereignty.  As King Gordon of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace put it, ―The mandate of the United Nations Force . . . 
would apply to the entire Congo.  Belgian troops would have to withdraw from the 
Congo, including Katanga, and the [ONUC] would have the right of deployment in all six 
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provinces, including Katanga.‖730  The UN‘s selective recognition buoyed Lumumba‘s 
political fortunes as a Congolese leader, but he began squandering his advantage soon 
thereafter.  By August 1960, Lumumba demanded that non-African ONUC troops, who 
were believed to be motivated by ulterior, imperialist motives, be withdrawn from the 
Congo.  The next month, as Lumumba‘s political legitimacy declined, the Congo‘s 
President, Joseph Kasavubu, and the newly-appointed commander of the Congolese 
Army, Colonel Joseph-Desire Mobutu, wanted Ghana and Guinea troops expelled from 
the ONUC.  Smelling the political ―blood in the water,‖ Kasavubu and Mobutu protested 
the pro-Lumumba sympathies of these ONUC contingents.
731
  While Hammarskjöld 
respected Kasavubu‘s right to contest Lumumba‘s legitimacy, Hammarskjöld ignored 
proposed changes to the ONUC‘s composition. 
 
VII 
 
Additional efforts to compensate for any perceived complicity with Western 
interests included Hammarskjöld‘s charting a more independent course for the ONUC in 
early September.  The secretary general began by appointing Rejashwar Dayal as the 
UN‘s Special Representative in the Congo.  Dayal was an ardent anti-colonialist and 
supporter of Lumumba‘s nationalist agenda.732  Although Lumumba‘s grip on power was 
slipping, UN officials continued to recognize him as the legitimate ruler even as other 
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Western powers sought to replace Lumumba.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
drafted plans to assassinate the Congolese leader and supported Mobutu‘s 14 September 
military coup.  Lumumba was removed from office and retreated to his residence, where 
ONUC forces surrounded Lumumba‘s compound and prevented Mobutu‘s forces from 
arresting the former Prime Minister.
733
  Thus, the UN‘s intervention upset Mobutu‘s 
efforts to consolidate political power and frustrated American efforts to establish a 
Western-friendly regime in the Congo.  Vindication of Hammarskjöld‘s handling of these 
events came on 17 September, when the UN General Assembly rewarded him with a vote 
of confidence. 
During the General Assembly‘s emergency session, the scope of the crisis became 
nearly incomprehensible.  Deadlock beset the Security Council over a draft resolution 
commending the UN‘s efforts in the Congo and imploring UN member states to 
appropriate the funds necessary for continued UN activities while requesting that 
members ―refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and 
order [in the Congo].‖734  Sensing an opportunity to outmaneuver the Soviet delegation 
and its Security Council veto of the proposed draft resolution, the U.S. delegation evoked 
the ―Uniting for Peace‖ resolution to take the matter before the General Assembly.  The 
United States representative, James Wadsworth, reiterated the proposed Ceylon-Tunisian 
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resolution.  As he did so, Wadsworth spoke out against any ―unilateral action‖ that would 
―obstruct the United Nations effort in the Congo.‖  The introduction of ―personnel or 
equipment . . . [by] any power,‖ Wadsworth continued, ―would be particularly 
dangerous.‖735  Wadsworth was referring to the deployment of Soviet aid to the 
Congolese government, but his statement rejected any unilateral intervention.  The CIA‘s 
plot against Lumumba and support for Mobutu as well as the Belgians‘ support for 
Tshombe were equal if not greater transgressions. 
Wadsworth‘s approach was the latest in a long series of diplomatic maneuvering 
during international crises.  Rather than objectively pursue multilateral diplomacy, 
American officials simply relied on the traditional practice of seeking the ―multilateral‖ 
label to condone the application of a particular agenda.  ―Unilateralism,‖ writes historian 
Melvyn Leffler, ―is quintessentially American.‖736  However, the masquerading of these 
selfish ambitions also characterized American diplomacy.  The Soviet delegation played 
into its adversary‘s scheme by openly criticizing Hammarskjöld and the UN organization 
for supplanting Belgian colonialism with other forms of Western imperialism.
737
  
Sensitive to their own national interests and equally eager to disguise them, the Soviet 
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delegates decided to make the United Nations the scapegoat for the Congo‘s political 
disintegration.  Yet, lampooning Hammarskjöld deflected international attention in a way 
that hurt Soviet prestige.  By doing so, Wadsworth and many of his fellow UN 
representatives sympathized with the secretary general and commended him on his 
efforts and his impartiality.  Thus, the Americans successfully shifted international focus 
away from criticism of the West, and they looked good doing so. 
Wadsworth and his contemporaries in the Eisenhower administration did not stop 
with blaming the Soviets for obstructing world peace.  Privately, American officials in 
Washington criticized the Belgian government for supporting ―anti-Lumumbist‖ factions 
in the Congo that conflicted with the UN‘s agenda.  These abrasive policies helped 
legitimize Soviet and Afro-Asian claims of imperialist interference.  During the same 
closed-door meeting, the American advisers credited the UN with maintaining its 
impartiality in the Congo as well as ―preventing unilateral interventions‖ while 
simultaneously providing an adequate degree of ―law and order.‖738 
As witnessed in previous international crises, American policy-makers were quick 
to identify the self-interests of other countries and the detrimental effects these policies 
had on crisis resolution, but the same officials remained oblivious to their own 
government‘s role in the crisis.  Scholars such as David Gibbs argue that American and 
other Western support for Katnaga‘s succession in July 1960 was ―highly 
destabilizing.‖739  The CIA‘s plans to assassinate Lumumba, whom the UN peacekeepers 
protected, also prove America‘s penchant for acting unilaterally.  Blind-spots such as 
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these convey the hypocritical nature of American foreign policy-making.  The fact that 
these unilateralist activities were ubiquitous among all the major powers involved in the 
Congo crisis made the United Nations‘ own intervention imperative. 
Once again, however, self-interest prevailed.  By mid-February 1961, Lumumba 
was caught, imprisoned, and killed after attempting to rally his remaining pockets of 
support.  On 21 February, the UN Security Council allowed the ONUC ―to use military 
force, if necessary, to prevent civil war.‖740  Safeguards against the UN interfering in 
domestic matters were removed, which upset some members of the international 
community.  After Lumumba‘s death, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt (UAR), Ceylon, 
Indonesia, and Yugoslavia made preparations to withdrawal from the ONUC.  Reasons 
included the loss of the legitimate Congolese ruler and a lack of legitimacy in having the 
UN participate in the domestic affairs of any state. 
Hammarskjöld, Ralph Bunche, and other UN officials persevered.  For the next 
three years, they continued to stitch together the fabric of Congolese sovereignty.  The 
world organization paid high price for its efforts.  Hammarskjöld‘s death in a plane crash 
en route to cease-fire negotiations between Congolese and Katangan representatives 
threatened to leave the UN leaderless and adrift at a time when it needed Hammarskjöld‘s 
sense of visionary purpose.  UN officials remained vigilant, however.  By 1963, Bunche 
and 20,000 peacekeepers negotiated Katanga‘s return as a province of the Republic of the 
Congo and aided in returning stability and prosperity to the country.
741
  The following 
year, UN peacekeepers ended their mission and withdrew. 
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VIII 
 
Spanning roughly the same period of time in which the United Nations was 
engaged in rehabilitating the Congo, the blending of non-governmental and quasi-
governmental organizations continued unabated.  One of the newest incarnations 
emerged in 1960 with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  As 
salvage crews labored to clear the Suez Canal of debris in the spring of 1957, Nasser 
hosted a conference intent on enhancing Arab influence in the oil industry.  One of 
several recommendations called for establishing an international organization to oversee 
Middle Eastern oil production.  Little came of this idea until 1960 when massive oil 
reserves flooded the market triggering a price crisis.  Plummeting revenues drove 
Western-owned oil companies British Petroleum and Standard Oil of New Jersey to cut 
fixed rates upon which they had agreed to divide profits with their Arab partners.  
Without changes to this ―posted price,‖ oil companies would have to bear the brunt of all 
profit losses resulting from falling crude oil prices.
742
  A month after Standard Oil‘s 
announcement in August 1960, Arab oil producers retaliated by forming OPEC. 
 The move symbolized a broader, post-Suez crisis trend towards creating exclusive 
organizations representing national interests.  Overnight, OPEC acted on behalf of 
countries controlling eighty percent of the world‘s crude oil exports while consisting of 
only five founding member states: Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran.  
Similar to the Western-dominated oil consortium established in Iran after the 1953 
revolution, OPEC differed only in scale.  Where British, French, American and Iranian 
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interests had divided Iran‘s oil revenues among themselves to maintain the status quo of 
international exploitation, OPEC coordinated oil policies among its members to exert 
their own leverage within the international community.  More generally, the founding of 
OPEC paralleled Europe‘s Treaty of Rome in that they both created more exclusive sub-
divisions within the international community.  While perhaps constructive in providing a 
greater degree of international networking and institutionalism, the potential for creating 
new and more complex threats to the international system remained. 
For example, although Venezuela‘s participation provided a modicum of 
international legitimacy, OPEC cleaved the Arab world in two.  In 1957, Nasser‘s 
strategy aimed to assert Egyptian interests in Arab oil politics while overlooking the fact 
that Egypt itself was not an oil producing country.  As energy expert Daniel Yergin 
phrased it, ―It was a case of a ‗have not‘ seeking to . . . arouse and shape public opinion . 
. . of the ‗haves.‘‖743  By 1960, segregating Arab interests doomed Nasser‘s pan-Arab 
ambitions.  The United Arab Republic became a radical threat to Saudi Arabia‘s 
conservative shift.  Indeed, the feud boiled over during the 1962 Yemeni Civil War to the 
point where Egyptians and Saudis engaged in a proxy war against each other.  Some 
scholars argue that OPEC replaced the Arab League as the ―most important consultative 
forum‖ in the Middle East.  Yet OPEC remained a consultative arena for the haves at the 
expense of the have-nots.
744
 
 Like the Treaty of Rome, OPEC‘s statute shared a paradox by espousing 
international integration on the one hand while maintaining an exclusive membership on 
the other hand.  Under Article 31 of OPEC‘s guidelines, those who serve the organization 
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are ―international employees with an exclusively international character.‖  As such, staff 
must act independently of any government.  In his assessment of the organization, Issam 
Azzam describes OPEC employees as ―international civil servants‖ making them 
professional equivalent of UN employees despite their representing a much smaller 
constituent group.
745
  Yet, according to the statute‘s preamble, the organization is defined 
as a ―permanent intergovernmental organization‖ committed to ―coordination and 
unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the 
best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively.‖746  
Contradictions such as these plagued governments and the institutions they created to suit 
all sorts of interests.  Europe sought greater economic and social association.  Petroleum 
producers wanted to synthesize distribution of a single commodity.  By the mid-1960s, 
the United States moved to institutionalize its ideology and cultural identity. 
 
IX 
 
  With an appropriate measure of irony, American policy-makers opened a new 
effort to spread their interests via private institutions when President Lyndon Johnson 
proclaimed 1965 the ―International Cooperation Year‖ in celebration of the United 
Nations‘ twentieth anniversary.  Beginning in January, Representative Dante Fascell (D-
FL) framed debate by quoting excerpts from Richard Gardner‘s book In Pursuit of World 
Order.  Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
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Affairs, advocated the proliferation of ―international institutions‖ where national interests 
intersected with pragmatic foreign policy-making.
747
  Fascell‘s own participation on the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs placed him at the forefront of the trend towards greater institutional 
networking.  By June, Facell and his subcommittee colleagues, Frances Bolton (R-OH), 
Donald Fraser (D-MN), and Peter Frelinghuysen (R-NJ) introduced a resolution 
rededicating Congressional support for UN principles while simultaneously promising 
further ―growth of institutions of international cooperation.‖748 
 Controversy followed weeks later when some Representatives questioned the 
value of the UN‘s place in world affairs.  Harold Gross (R-IA) labeled the organization a 
―wind palace that has no principles‖ and credited the United States with forcing British, 
French, and Israeli compliance during the Suez crisis.  Representative Claude Pepper (D-
FL) expressed how ―high hopes [for the United Nations] have turned into 
disillusionment.‖749  One of the major criticisms was the escalating cost UN members 
bore for prolonged peacekeeping efforts.
750
 
 Speaking on behalf of the subcommittee, Representative Frelinghuysen offered a 
thoughtful and eloquent rebuttal.  He used his opponents‘ objections as examples for 
strengthening the UN rather than weakening it.
751
  In some ways reminiscent of 
Hammarskjöld‘s 1953 Annual Report to the General Assembly, Frelinghuysen 
commended the organization‘s inclusiveness: 
                                               
747 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 1st sess., 1965, Vol. 111, parts 1-2: 970. 
748 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 1st sess., 1965, Vol. 111, part 9: 12850. 
749 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 1st sess., 1965, Vol. 111, parts 11-12: 
14402-14403. 
750 For a description of UN peacekeeping overruns regarding both the ONUC and the UNEF, see footnote 
#77. 
751 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 1st sess., 1965, Vol. 111, parts 11-12: 
14404. 
315 
 
The UN is a genuine international organization which does not separate 
the ―have‖ countries from the ―have nots‖ or the big from the small, strong 
from the weak, or the developed from the underdeveloped, or the capitalist 
from the Socialist or even Communist.  The United Nations has refused to 
become a handmaiden of any particular alinement [sic] or ideology.  This 
is its strength.
752
 
 
Built upon the exchange of interests, the UN occupies a unique and essential position in 
the international system.  Although Frelinghuysen and others on the subcommittee tried 
to transplant this sentiment, their efforts had unintended consequences. 
Rather than cultivate a more multilateral perspective to temper the nation‘s 
interests, the subcommittee‘s initiative slowly manifested itself into a partnership 
between the national interest and the agendas of private organizations.  On 22 October 
1965, Fascell presented a provocative report to Congress laying the foundation for future 
foreign policy decision-making.  The report‘s conclusions proved somewhat paradoxical.  
On the one hand, surveys of the country‘s private international organizations revealed 
that they wanted to remain independent of ideological or political influence.  On the other 
hand, these institutions supported government involvement in coordinating programs 
among various private institutions and ―enhancing their effectiveness.‖  The report went 
so far as to suggest establishing a federal umbrella agency to direct private 
organizations.
753
 
While Fascell‘s dream of creating such an agency failed, the desire for increased 
institutionalization of American foreign policy making persisted.  In 1967, Representative 
Gilbert Gude (R-MD) advocated a similar viewpoint when he addressed the Capitol Hill 
Kiwanis Club.  With regard to foreign aid specifically, Gude argued that ―the growth of 
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intermediate institutions [expanded] the decision making process‖ while contributing to a 
sense of ―national consensus‖ and more responsive governance.754  While enticing, 
Gude‘s conclusions, as well as those of many of his colleagues, failed to address a 
growing dissatisfaction with a single, unitary consensus. 
Political conservatives and liberals expressed their concern over a monolithic 
perspective.  The notion of there being an attainable ―national consensus‖ proved illusive 
at best, and highly-improbable at worst.  Quoting from the venerable Walter Lippmann, a 
young Representative named Donald Rumsfeld (R-IL) exploited what Lippmann 
described as ―the great consensus‖ and its being mistaken for ―the false consensus[,] 
which is achieved by manipulating opinion in order to erase opposition to the will of the 
leader.‖755  Rumsfeld used Lippmann‘s article as cheap political capital for criticizing the 
Johnson Administration; but the accomplished journalist had tapped into America‘s 
underlying domestic tension of the age. 
 
X 
 
Leading scholars also observed similar disquieting trends. In her book The Human 
Condition, Hannah Arendt believed that the most serious problem facing society was an 
individual‘s political isolation from effective governance.  Experts, political operators, 
and insiders held such an advantage in information and resources that individuals could 
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not voice or spread their own opinions successfully.
756
  Instead, as historian Daniel 
Boorstin argues in his book The Image, first published in 1961, American society 
manufactured ―extravagant expectations . . . of [the American people‘s] power to shape 
the world‖ which generated a false sense of the real world and the problems affecting it.  
Like Lippmann‘s ominous proclamation of a ―great consensus,‖ Boorstin described how 
Americans had mastered the ability ―to fabricate national purposes when [Americans] 
lack them, to pursue these purposes after [Americans] have fabricated them.‖757  The 
Charter statements of the nation‘s youth movements during the early 1960s reinforce this 
general sense of misguided malaise.  The Students for a Democratic Society Port Huron 
Statement of 1962 warns of the resulting demoralization: 
The American political system is not the democratic model of which its 
glorifiers speak.  In actuality it frustrates democracy by confusing the 
individual citizen, paralyzing policy discussion, and consolidating the 
irresponsible power of military and business interests. . . . 
 
Even students of the ideologically opposed Young Americans for Freedom believed that 
democracy had somehow gone astray.  As a result, these young conservatives believed 
that greater individual freedom required less government.
758
  By the 1960s, politicians 
worldwide endorsed the expansion of non-governmental and quasi-governmental 
organizations to spread their interests abroad. 
Both Fascell and Gude argued that this very threat justified the need for a more 
inclusive foreign-policy debate, but the participation of private institutions faced daunting 
challenges.  According to one 1969 study of State Department sub-culture, government 
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officials considered ―independent outsiders‖ as a threat to the Department‘s monopoly on 
foreign policy making.
759
  Fascell‘s proposal for government coordination of private, 
non-government organizations was one way of easing these tensions, but this did not 
occur until the 1980s.  Once it did, scholar Akira Iriye argues, a ―kind of symbiosis 
existed between governmental and non-governmental activities, the former focusing on 
state-to-state aid and the latter on marginalized segments of recipient populations.‖760  
Yet, even with the input of private organizations, foreign policy activities retained a high 
degree of conformity.  Simply incorporating private organizations into the decision-
making process did not necessarily mean adopting a more universal approach.  Many 
scholars such as Iriye and others applaud the new role international organizations created 
for themselves.
761
  Unfortunately, the United Nations was not one of these beneficiaries. 
 
XI 
 
Throughout the 1960s, the United States and other Western governments 
marginalized the role of the United Nations in international affairs as decolonization 
expanded the number of UN member states.  According to one-time UN civil servant, 
Brian Urquhart, U.S. officials grappled with a paradox where the superpower‘s majority 
in the General Assembly was to oversee decolonization, which in turn destroyed the 
majority that the U.S. once enjoyed.  The efforts of the U.S. and other Western powers to 
control the pace of decolonization via the UN soon gave way to a more independent 
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inertia.  From 1947 to 1967, ninety-four independent countries joined the United 
Nations.
762
 
Instead of leading these efforts, the West either observed passively or pursued 
their own controversial strategies for managing these dramatic changes.  Having helped 
establish the European Economic Community, the French government attempted to reign 
in its colonial possessions by organizing a new federation that was to replace the 
dilapidated imperial model.  Under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, the French 
Community called for independent home-rule for French colonies, while France retained 
control over the colonies‘ defense, fiscal, economic, and foreign policy as well as the 
judicial system.
763
  This type of independence without sovereignty was met with mixed 
reactions.  A referendum among French African colonies in the late 1950s endorsed the 
proposal.
764
  Yet, as historian Tony Chafer describes it, French efforts to ease the 
transition from colonization to independence proved inadequate for ―African 
aspirations.‖765  French disingenuousness contributed to fourteen African states 
proclaiming their independence in 1960.  Meanwhile, French military forces continued to 
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protect vital areas of economic and political importance in countries including Senegal, 
Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Madagascar.
766
 
Divisions between independent African countries and the West continued into the 
1960s and beyond.  In addition to fostering intractable political instability in places such 
as the Congo, African and Western interests encountered deadlock in economic matters 
concerning the implementation of the New International Economic Order (NIEO).  
African nations enlisted in this new framework as a result of economic hardships that 
often accompanied independence.  Richard Bissel‘s assessment of the NIEO and its 
―institutionalization . . . in UN [and other] organs‖ demonstrates how negotiations broke 
down.  This methodical approach to economic revitalization, Bissel writes, ―was far more 
useful for casting blame than for funding solutions, since most of the proposed solutions 
involved the commitment of massive resources or compromising basic principles by the 
West to such a degree that the NIEO solutions would not be implemented.‖  Interestingly, 
Bissel identifies the OPEC oil shocks of the 1960s and 1970s and the resulting economic 
stress Western countries felt as one reason for the repudiation of NIEO proposals.
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Another, and perhaps the culminating, event that heightened Western 
disillusionment with the UN General Assembly involved the seating of the People‘s 
Republic of China.  In Brian Urquhart‘s estimation, the UN vote in 1971 to recognize 
Communist China‘s delegation, after twenty-one years of U.S. stone-walling, signified 
―the end of the automatic U.S. majority.‖768  Chinese officials proceeded to use their new 
position in the world to represent the interests of the developing world.  Within roughly a 
decade of Communist China‘s participation at the UN, the country‘s membership in other 
                                               
766 Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa, p. 208. 
767 Bissel, ―An Introduction to the New Africa,‖ p. 6. 
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international organizations jumped from around ninety in 1976 to over three hundred by 
the early 1980s.
769
  
 
XII 
 
 In the wake of the Suez crisis, members of the international community appeared 
to be insulating themselves in increasingly myopic foreign policies.  Once the UNEF 
arrived in the Sinai and the war ended, delegates in the General Assembly began claiming 
credit.  Arab and Israeli attempts to do so resulted in glaring paradoxes.  Enthusiasm 
shown for pan-Arab solidarity actually fractured the region between Nasser‘s United 
Arab Republic (UAR) and the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Federation.  Israeli Prime Minster 
David Ben-Gurion tethered Zionist interests to international interests while 
simultaneously disparaging the international community for appeasing Nasser and his 
ideology.  British and French officials sought to rescue their international prestige by 
yielding graciously to UNEF forces as they arrived while proclaiming, as the French did, 
that an international peacekeeping force had been their brain-child. 
Americans, meanwhile, prepared to fill a political void in the Middle East that 
only they perceived.  The unveiling of the Eisenhower Doctrine, originally designed to 
prevent communist infiltration into the region, actually succeeded in upsetting Arab 
nationalists who showed no communist affinities.  Despite misgivings from international 
relations theorists, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, the Eisenhower Doctrine enjoyed broad 
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support in the Untied States.  Yet, one of Niebuhr‘s main criticisms was how far removed 
the doctrine was from the pressing realities that threatened the region more directly. 
Interaction among policies of mutual exclusion contributed to a series of self-
fulfilling prophecies.  For example, in its purest form, Eisenhower‘s Doctrine was 
designed to quash any alternative ideologies that might threaten American interests in the 
Middle East and authorized intervention should any threat emerge.  Fed up with the long 
history of Western policies that presupposed intervention, Arab nationalists united to 
form associations like the UAR.  These types of activities antagonized American policy-
makers and thus provoked a need for implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine.  Roughly 
two months after the Suez crisis was resolved, the same tensions that had instigated it 
resurfaced to dictate national policy once again.  Such activity served the paradoxical 
purposes of reinforcing Nasser‘s calls for pan-Arab unity while simultaneously justifying 
America‘s direct and indirect intervention in the region. 
Within three months of Eisenhower‘s declaration, leading states of Western 
Europe created the European Economic Community (EEC) to elicit greater integration 
across Europe, thus creating a more formidable bloc in the international arena.  Following 
pan-Arab trends in the Middle East, the EEC created pockets of interdependency that 
individual states could affect more easily.  Although these alliances succeeded in 
providing a greater sense of cohesion in a globalized world, the relations between the 
United Nations and its members suffered. 
By 1958, a new round of international crises was emerging in the Middle East and 
other areas in various stages of political flux.  The cleaving of Arab nationalism into two 
rival camps, along with Christian-Muslim tensions, helped trigger the Lebanese crisis as 
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Lebanese Prime Minister Camille Chamoun attempted to maneuver politically between 
Nasser‘s UAR and the Arab Federation.  Civil War forced Chamoun to request outside 
intervention.  Interest in quarantining Nasser‘s ambitions led Dulles and others to expand 
the Eisenhower Doctrine to include threats from pan-Arab fanatics.  During 
Congressional deliberations over the application of the president‘s new Middle East 
policy, some reservations were expressed in smaller private gatherings, but debate in 
larger chambers was curtailed on the eve of American Marine landings in Lebanon.  The 
absence of genuine debate was a common characteristic of American foreign policy 
during this period of time.  In the case of the Lebanon crisis, defenders of American 
intervention may argue that Iraq‘s revolution made action imperative.  Yet, resolving the 
crisis occurred when the UN General Assembly convened and endorsed the Arab-
inspired ―Good Neighbor Resolution.‖  Foreign forces would exit Lebanon in exchange 
for Arab assurances respecting the sovereignty of other Arab nations. 
Two years later, the circumstances that led to the Lebanese crisis reappeared in 
the Congo during its traumatized transition to independence.  Belgian insistence on 
directing the process left the Congolese isolated without any measurable visceral or 
intellectual investment.  The few Congolese social organizations, permitted by the 
Belgians, served as the stewards of Congolese political identity.  Independence in 1960 
left the leaders of these organizations to govern from an almost untenable situation.  
Internal instability in the Congo fed the competing national interests of not only Belgium, 
but also the Soviet Union and the United States.  As a result, the Congo crisis erupted 
into yet another international situation demanding UN involvement. 
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Hammarskjöld‘s abilities as an impartial international civil served admirably once 
again.  The ONUC peacekeeping forces sought to achieve three objectives.  First, keep 
individual countries from acting unilaterally in the Congo.  Second, keep the Congo 
united.  Third, respect Congolese sovereignty by refusing to intervene in domestic 
matters.  UN officials did well in maintaining these standards of conduct by refusing to 
endorse any particular agenda that favored one set of interests over another and expanded 
ONUC objectives only when instructed to do so by the General Assembly. 
Specific national interests included Belgian interests in reasserting colonial 
control in the Congo, as well as Cold War interests of the Superpowers.  Mining interests 
in the Katanga province left many Belgians supporting Katanga‘s independence.  
Unofficial though it was, such support hampered UN efforts to maintain the Congo as a 
whole.  American interests supported UN intervention in addition to devising strategies 
intent on having the Belgians return to the Congo.  Like earlier instances during 
implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1958 or the numerous examples in the 
escalation of tension precipitating the Suez crisis, American policy-makers operated from 
a monolithic mindset.  ―Overall,‖ writes David Gibbs, ―the relative absence of 
bureaucratic rivalries during the Eisenhower administration was notable.  Officials in the 
Eisenhower administration with rare exceptions assented to the dominant pro-Belgian, 
pro-Katanga policy.‖770  As the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba associated with the 
Soviet Union, American officials drafted assassination plans and supported a military 
coup in the Congo.  All of these unilateral activities worked against the United Nations 
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and its peacekeepers.  The General Assembly‘s vote of confidence along with the 
perseverance of UN officials, such as Ralph Bunche, played a pivotal role in salvaging 
Congolese sovereignty.  
The camouflaging of unilateral practices in multilateral contexts as witnessed in 
the many dealings following the Suez crisis continued into the 1960s and beyond.  
Employees at OPEC rivaled the international civil servant status of United Nations 
personnel.  In the United States, various Congressional representatives wished to create a 
closer relationship between government and non-government organizations.  In the case 
of national security interests specifically, consensus and conformity characterized these 
relations.  These developments marginalized the role multilateral diplomacy could play in 
conflict resolution. 
In addition to stifling opportunities for broader multilateral dialogue, these trends 
also contributed to rising consternation between and within societies.  OPEC, for 
example, crippled pan-Arabism by dividing the Arab world between those countries that 
possess petroleum reserves and those that do not.  American society was also divided 
between those who monopolized power and those who felt increasingly alienated from 
the decision-making process. 
The combination of these outcomes following the Suez crisis and subsequent 
crises meant that multilateral diplomacy was becoming the exception rather than the 
norm.  Hannah Arendt‘s desire for societies to participate in shared experiences was 
being misconstrued.  While the international community paid lip-service to the UN‘s 
accomplishments in constructively facilitating conflict resolution, many of the same 
officials undercut these successes by attempting to use multilateral means to achieve 
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unilateral ends.  Over the decades, the United Nations‘ identity suffered as these means 
and ends, which had a long history of subtlety, became increasingly imperceptible. 
327 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Understanding the Suez crisis from an internationalist perspective allows for a 
more comprehensive analysis of the crisis and the central role the United Nations played 
in its resolution.  The proceedings that took place within the UN General Assembly in 
early November 1956 offered a diplomatic alternative that provided the greatest chance 
for successful mediation.  The temporary ascendance of pluralistic diplomacy was due in 
part to two key factors.  The first factor was the relationship between national interests 
and the international community as defined by the UN General Assembly.  The second 
factor was the influence exerted by key figures including UN Secretary General Dag 
Hammarskjöld, Indian Ambassador to the UN Arthur Lall, Canadian Foreign Minister 
Lester Pearson, and others. 
 For all its success in the fall of 1956, UN and its multilateral negotiations cannot 
be segregated from the realist world of international relations entirely.  Appeals to 
national interests remained too seductive for commercial entrepreneurs, special interest 
groups, and political leaders to ignore.  From de Lesseps‘s dealings in the mid-nineteenth 
century as he campaigned to construct the canal to the rise of Zionism to the national 
security interests of the Cold War, various interests competed to represent a broader set 
of international interests.  De Lesseps‘s strategy inspired British policy makers and their 
attempts to portray imperial interests as universally benevolent.  The Zionist Theodore 
Herzl modeled his ―Jewish State‖ on de Lesseps‘s Universal Company of the Maritime 
Suez Canal.  These events played a fundamental role in the escalation of international 
tensions throughout the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
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 Since its inception, the United Nations wrestled with these two developments and 
responses to them as characterized by the Arab-Jewish dispute and the decolonization 
movement.  UN negotiator Ralph Bunche gained a first-hand understanding of the 
brewing Arab-Jewish conflict resulting from Israel‘s independence in 1948.  Like 
Hammarskjöld, Bunche‘s experience as an international civil servant provided him with a 
diplomatic awareness that would prove indispensable during the Suez crisis.  Both men 
maintained a sense of objectivity and impartiality at a time when national interests were 
at their most myopic.  Bunche‘s role in UNSCOP and Hammarskjöld‘s handling of 
Senator McCarthy‘s investigation of U.S. employees in the UN as well as the issue of 
U.S. prisoners of war in China testify to the new role to which UN staff laid claim.  This 
role was based on using the United Nations as an independent alternative in the pursuit of 
multilateral diplomacy as expressed in Hammarskjöld‘s UN address in 1953. 
 The emphasis on independence was emblematic of the burgeoning non-aligned 
movement too.  Meetings such as the Asian Relations Conference (ARC) and the 
Bandung Conference defined the principles of non-alignment which endorsed greater UN 
involvement as an honest broker in resolving international disputes rather than act as an 
instrument in the service of the great powers.  Although this sense of deference to the UN 
could be interpreted as simply the most efficient way for newly independent nations to 
maximize their leverage in international affairs, influential voices from within the non-
aligned camp held conflicting views on the matter.  Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru and the Prime Minster of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, supported a more genuine 
internationalist perspective.  Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai were among those that wished not only to manipulate the UN, but 
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also to monopolize non-aligned gatherings and portray themselves as the movement‘s 
leader. 
 While the proceedings at Bandung were not eclipsed by Nasser‘s and Zhou‘s 
agenda, their efforts were indicative of international relations of the 1950s.  Examples 
preceding Bandung include Iran‘s Western-supported coup d‘etat in 1953 and the 
subsequent creation of a ―multilateral‖ oil consortium whose membership included 
Britain, the United States, France, and Iran.  For many non-aligned nationalists, these 
brazen acts by Western powers justified their suspicions of engaging with Europe and the 
United States.  Additional evidence came in 1955 when British officials began divesting 
themselves of their imperial holdings in Egypt and Iraq only to reverse course and 
participate in the Baghdad Pact.  France‘s imperialist war in Algeria had a similar affect.  
U.S.-Arab collective security negotiations and the highly-conditional terms American 
officials attached to them also disregarded Arab concerns regarding anti-imperialist and 
Zionist ambitions. 
 Between the autumn of 1955 and the autumn of 1956, the inability of individual 
states to engage in multilateral diplomacy grew more acute.  The collapse of collective 
security negotiations, and promise of Western munitions that the agreement would have 
included, left Nasser to negotiate an arms deal with the Soviets.  To combat their fears of 
communist influence in Egypt, Western powers appealed to Nasser‘s socio-economic 
needs in an attempt to win Nasser‘s loyalty.  The U.S. and British Aswan Dam loan 
proposal, however, with its stipulations regarding World Bank management of Egyptian 
finances, remained insensitive to Nasser‘s commitment to national self-determination.  
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Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal and the impasse resulting from the two 
London conferences led to the further deterioration of multilateral discourse. 
 Amidst this vacuum of legitimate multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations 
played a pivotal role in crisis and conflict resolution.  Hammarskjöld rebuffed efforts 
intended to manipulate the UN into condoning military intervention.  Moving debate to 
the General Assembly provided a greater degree of pluralism that remained focused and 
effective.  Pearson‘s call for deployment of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) 
to separate the belligerents and re-establish peace combined with Lall‘s proposal that 
Hammarskjöld take charge of the UNEF‘s creation and administration helped implement 
a cease-fire that created a new, peaceful status quo. 
Hammarskjöld‘s ―good faith‖ agreement with Nasser also aided in UNEF‘s 
success.  The deployment of an international peacekeeping force on Egyptian soil 
threatened to draw Egyptian sovereignty into question.  Where foreign intervention had 
elicited an immediate and negative response by Nasser in earlier situations, 
Hammarskjöld the UNEF would be responsible in part for protecting Egyptian 
sovereignty once the force took up its final positions along the Egyptian-Israeli border.  
In return, Nasser was responsible for the nearly uninterrupted flow of international 
commercial goods through the Suez Canal.  This ―good faith‖ agreement made each party 
responsible for protecting the interests of the other.  As a result, UN sponsorship of 
multilateral diplomacy helped secure the national interests of individual nations by acting 
independently of any one set of interests.  Egypt got the sovereignty it desired.  Western 
European commercial traffic could navigate the Suez Canal without fear of being seized. 
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Israel had a protected border with one of its strongest regional adversaries.  The United 
States got at least a temporary reprieve in the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
In the weeks and years following the Suez crisis, much of the international 
community took extraordinary steps to insulate national interests from international 
interference.  Strategies adopted included more traditional methods of making national 
interests representative of a broader international agenda.  The formation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), and the meetings occurring within NATO stressed the need for greater 
uniformity.  The Eisenhower Doctrine targeted communist expansion in the Middle East 
and was even expanded to include any threats against U.S. interests in the region, 
including Nasser‘s pan-Arab sense of ethno-nationalism.  Nasserism, as it came to be 
known, was another example of usurping an inclusive agenda to serve a single purpose.  
In doing so, the escalation of international crisis intensified once again. 
For example, competition between supporters of Nasser‘s United Arab Republic 
(UAR) and the Iraqi-led Arab Federation precipitated the Lebanon Crisis of 1958.  
Lebanese Prime Minster Camille Chamoun‘s efforts to remain independent of these rival 
factions were futile.  His only recourse was to call on the United States for assistance.  
Eager to gain international legitimacy for military intervention in Lebanon, U.S. officials 
deferred to the United Nations not to lead the international community in another round 
of multilateral diplomacy, but instead to endorse the U.S. course of action as established 
by the Eisenhower Doctrine.  International tensions subsided, however, after the UN 
General Assembly supported the ―Good Neighbor Resolution,‖ which removed U.S. 
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forces from Lebanon in exchange for Arab promises to respect the sovereignty of Arab 
states. 
Similar circumstances affected Congolese independence in 1960 and the civil war 
that ensued shortly thereafter.  The UN‘s recognition of Patrice Lumumba‘s government 
set the organization on a political collision course with U.S. and European leaders who 
supported Lumumba‘s opposition.  Belgian bankers supported Moise Tshombe and the 
creation of an independent Katanga province, which held precious natural resources.  
U.S. policy makers also supported for Katanga‘s secession and, later, Colonel Joseph-
Desire Mobutu‘s coup against Lumumba.  Despite these unilateral courses of action, UN 
negotiator Ralph Bunche and the UN General Assembly carried on after Hammarskjöld‘s 
death to enact a cease-fire that respected the Congo‘s sovereignty as a single state. 
Multilateral diplomacy may not replace traditional diplomatic methods, yet, 
during the course of events comprising the Suez crisis, UN-led multilateral initiatives 
proved their value.  Pluralistic diplomacy helped alleviate the escalation of tensions in the 
international community.  In dong so, the United Nations served the interests of various 
nations without subjecting itself to the interests of any one nation.  National leaders 
respected the UN‘s legitimacy, but they recoiled from endorsing a more independent role 
for the organization.  Instead, much of the international community resorted to using 
international organizations to advance a uniform sense of world order.  Returning to more 
genuine expressions multilateral diplomacy has a distinct place in international affairs 
and may be necessary now more than ever. 
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